Pablo Lopez-Silva

Over the last several years, predictive processing approaches to computational neuropsychiatry have been gaining explanatory traction. According to these accounts, some of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia arise from aberrant precision-weighting during hierarchical Bayesian inference. In contrast to computational approaches, the phenomenological tradition in psychiatry holds that disruptions or alterations of the self (Ichstörungen) lie at the core of schizophrenia. In this article, we aim to integrate these approaches. We align ourselves with the phenomenological insight that self-disturbances lie at the core of schizophrenia and with the hierarchical conception of the self-model that emerges from the predictive processing architecture. We suggest that disruptions of the “hard core” of the narrative self-model might be partially involved in the generation of aberrant experiences and hyperreflexivity, and in some aspects of the sense of self-alienation and ambiguity that is characteristic of the phenomenology of schizophrenia.

In 2021, Chile became the first country to discuss two initiatives addressing the potential misuse of neurotechnologies: a constitutional amendment (Bill 13827-19) and a bill to create neurorights (Bill 13828-19). While the constitutional reform was swiftly approved, the bill for the creation of specific neurorights remains under discussion in the Chamber of Deputies. Despite initial support, both initiatives currently face criticism. Meanwhile, Chile has advanced in regulating AI systems through legislative proposals (Bills 16821-19/15869-19). A study by (Humeres et al. in Big Data Society, 12(1), 2025) identifies three key controversies in Chile’s AI regulation process: deflection of technology liability, instrumentalization of policy, and moralization of technology use. This chapter explores how this analysis focused on sources of controversy could inform the neurorights debate currently in need of a systematic socio-political analysis. Applying this framework could help categorize the diverse positions within the discussion, providing a more comprehensive understanding of its development.

This chapter introduces and contextualizes some of the main debates regarding the impact of neurotechnological developments in Latin America over the last years. In its first part, the chapter makes sense of core conceptual lessons that local researchers have learnt from their active involvement in the discussion of these issues in their local governments and academic communities. In its second part, the chapter focuses on a number of practical cases derived from the Latin American experience on discussions about neuroprotection, neurorights, neurolaw regulations, and artificial intelligence policy.

In October of 2021, Chile became the first country in the world to approve a constitutional reform that explicitly integrates legal safeguards against the misuses of medical and commercial neurotechnological applications (Law N° 21.383). This legislative initiative was aimed to show the Chilean government’s explicit concern about how neurotechnological progress could negatively impact society if not properly regulated. Due to its novelty and nature, this constitutional amendment has been the target of heated debate over the last years. The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, after specifying the ethical concerns that gave rise to the Chilean constitutional reform, we clarify the conceptual and legal foundations contained in the core message of the bill proposed and discussed by the Senate of Chile (Bulletin 13.827–19). After, we offer some critical considerations about the content of the bill and the way in which it is aimed to incorporate the so-called ‘neurorights’ to the Chilean legal order.

This chapter offers a brief commentary on the main contributions of Latin American researchers to debates about the ethical, socio-economic, and geopolitical impact of the use of neurotechnologies. Latin America’s vulnerability to limited access and development of neurotechnologies underscores the risk of exacerbating existing inequalities. Yet, this vulnerability also provides valuable insights into the consequences of rushed regulation, the importance of interdisciplinary collaboration, and the need for technological education to address socio-economic and epistemic disparities.

Some have advocated for creating new fundamental neurorigths with universal validity such that national legislations worldwide should adapt to enforce them. Others have brought into question such a movement warning against rights inflation. We argue that we should avoid introducing new fundamental rights in any legal framework whenever possible. We call this the situated approach since whether it is possible to protect the mind without introducing new rights is a question that should be asked in each legal framework separately. We show that in the case of Chile, that can be done, and we propose how. Specifically, we provide a critical assessment of local regulatory proposals and show that, as a result of the local legislative debate, they have evolved from a universalist stance towards a much more situated view. However, we suggest that in their current state, they still are insufficiently grounded in the Chilean legal system, which we regard as providing enough protection against neurotechnological harm in most relevant cases.

Over the last years, 4E approaches to cognition have attempted to overcome the limitations of brain-centered conceptions of psychiatric disorders by emphasizing the enactive, embodied, embedded, and extended nature of the mind. However, even though all 4E approaches reject the claim that mental health conditions can be fully explained as brain disorders, the conceptual and disciplinary plurality within the framework has led to internal disparities when it comes to establishing the exact way in which mental health (and illness) should be reconceptualized. We do not think this is necessarily a bad thing. As pointed out in our target paper, these theoretical disparities show the conceptual richness of the 4E framework... Read More.

Over the last years, 4E Cognition approaches have emerged in an attempt to overcome the limitations of neuro-reductionism about mental disorders, that is, the view that mental disorders can be fully explained as brain disorders. Instead, 4E approaches emphasize in varying degrees the situated, embodied, embedded, and enactive features of psychopathological conditions. Despite its growing popularity, the development of this alternative framework is not characterized by a distinguishable conceptual unity. This paper examines and classifies the main current 4E approaches to mental health, outlining their core commitments, differences, and implications. Two main strands are distinguished: strongly situated or extended views, comprising applications of the classical and social versions of the extended mind hypothesis, and strongly embodied and enactive views, involving applications of the so-called autopoietic enactivism. We examine the main claims of such approaches regarding two conceptual issues: i) _the location problem_, that is, whether mental disorders are predicable of individuals, social contexts, or the relation between them, and ii) _the boundary problem_, that is, how to distinguish psychopathology from non-pathological diversity such as cases of mere social deviance and the like. In the final section, we offer an overview of some of the main practical implications of the 4E turn in mental health research.

Over the last years, 4E Cognition approaches have emerged in an attempt to overcome the limitations of neuro-reductionism about mental disorders, that is, the view that mental disorders can be fully explained as brain disorders. Instead, 4E approaches emphasize in varying degrees the situated, embodied, embedded, and enactive features of psychopathological conditions. Despite its growing popularity, the development of this alternative framework is not characterized by a distinguishable conceptual unity. This paper examines and classifies the main current 4E approaches to mental health, outlining their core commitments, differences, and implications. Two main strands are distinguished: strongly situated or extended views, comprising applications of the classical and social versions of the extended mind hypothesis, and strongly embodied and enactive views, involving applications of the so-called autopoietic enactivism. We examine the main claims of such approaches regarding two conceptual issues: i) the location problem, that is, whether mental disorders are predicable of individuals, social contexts, or the relation between them, and ii) the boundary problem, that is, how to distinguish psychopathology from non-pathological diversity such as cases of mere social deviance and the like. In the final section, we offer an overview of some of the main practical implications of the 4E turn in mental health research.

Delusions are a heterogenous transdiagnostic phenomenon with a higher prevalence in schizophrenia. One of the most fundamental debates surrounding the philosophical understanding of delusions concerns the question about the type of mental state in which reports that we label as delusional are grounded, namely, the typology problem. The formulation of potential answers for this problem seems to have important repercussions for experimental research in clinical psychiatry and the development of psychotherapeutic tools for the treatment of delusions in clinical psychology. Problematically, such alternatives are scattered in the literature, making it difficult to follow the current development and state of the target discussion. This paper offers an updated critical examination of the alternatives to the typology problem currently available in the literature. After clarifying the two main philosophical views underlying the dominant formulation of the debate (interpretivism and functionalism), we follow the usual distinction between doxastic (the idea that delusions are a type of belief) and anti-doxastic views. We then introduce two new sub-distinctions; on the doxastic camp, we distinguish between revisionist and non-revisionist proposals; on the anti-doxastic camp, we distinguish between commonsensical and non-commonsensical anti-doxasticisms. After analyzing the main claims of each view, we conclude with some of the most fundamental challenges that remain open within the discussion. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science Philosophy > Consciousness Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Neuroscience > Cognition.

This book presents an informed-by-experience insights of Latin-American-based research on the debate about how to protect citizens from the risks raised by neurotechnological applications. Written by researchers in philosophy, law, and ethics of neuroprotection, the chapters of this book reports on their individual experiences and case studies. They offer a timely snapshot of practical, conceptual, and legal ideas and challenges emerged in Latin American countries, which may inspire researchers and professionals all over the world.

With a higher prevalence in schizophrenia, delusions of thought insertion (TI) are regarded as one of the most severe symptoms of psychosis. Patients suffering from TI report that external agents are able to place thoughts into their minds or skulls. A version of the doxastic approach characterizes delusions as abnormal beliefs rooted in anomalous experiences. Nonetheless, the exact role of these experiences in determining the content and the way in which delusional beliefs are fixated is still under debate. While _endorsement_ models claim that the abnormal experience comprises the very content of the delusional beliefs, _explanationist_ approaches claim that delusional beliefs emerge as explanations for abnormal experiences with less specific content. This paper combines conceptual analysis with phenomenological data to examine the merits of both endorsement and explanationist approaches to TI. I propose that potential solutions to the dispute could lay in finding a middle ground between the two approaches, and non-exhaustive ways in which hybrid doxastic approaches to TI could be formulated.

Este artículo examina el debate acerca de si el delirio de inserción de pensamiento constituye un contraejemplo para el denominado principio de inmunidad al error a través de la mala identificación. Luego de distinguir diferentes formulaciones del principio en la literatura, concluimos que el fenómeno delirante en cuestión no constituye un contraejemplo para el principio examinado. En la parte final se clarifica el concepto de autoadscripción psicológica y su uso relativo a los pronombres de primera persona en el contexto del debate acerca de la relación entre inserción de pensamiento e inmunidad al error a través de la mala identificación.

The concept of mental privacy can be defined as the principle that subjects should have control over the access to their own neural data and to the information about the mental processes and states that can be obtained by analyzing it. Our aim is to contribute to the current debate on mental privacy by identifying the main positions, articulating key assumptions and addressing central arguments. First, we map the different positions found in current literature. We distinguish between those who dismiss concerns about mental privacy and those who endorse them. In this latter group, we establish a further disagreement between conservative and liberal strategies to protect mental privacy. Then, we address the first discussion by articulating and criticizing different skeptical views on mental privacy. Finally, we try to identify what are the unique features of neural data and examine how they may be connected to the ways in which neurotechnological mindreading could put mental privacy at risk. We suggest that even if neural data is unique, it may not require new strategies to protect people from its misuse. However, identifying the special features and risks of neurotechnological mind-reading is necessary for the second discussion on mental privacy to properly take off.

Patients suffering from delusions of thought insertion (TI) report that external agents of different nature have placed thoughts into their minds. The symptom involves distressing feelings of intromission and exposition, loss of mental privacy, diminished ego boundaries, and a – often neglected – peculiar “physicality”. A dominant approach within cognitive sciences characterizes TI as involving alterations in the experience of being the author of certain thoughts. For the advocates of this so-called Standard Approach to TI, the absence of a sense of agency for certain thoughts would lead to their externalization, this explaining the general structure of the clinical reports. In this paper, I problematize the phenomenological picture of everyday thoughts that the standard approach adopts when trying to make sense of TI. I claim that the standard approach neglects two more fundamental aspects of TI, namely the multimodal nature of thinking in psychosis and the deeply social dimension of the phenomenology of delusions in schizophrenia. After this, a broader descriptive phenomenological characterization of TI is provided. Finally, I establish some connections between the characterization of TI developed here and current research in social perception and clinical practice.

En filosofía de la mente se ha sugerido que, a diferencia de los estados puramente materiales, los estados conscientes serían aquellos de los cuales podemos decir que existe ‘un algo que es como estar en ellos’ para un sujeto, esto es, estados que poseen una fenomenología. Asumiendo una demarcación intuitiva entre estados sensoriales y estados cognitivos, durante los últimos años se ha establecido un debate en torno a la pregunta acerca del carácter fenoménico de nuestros estados cognitivos, especialmente, el de nuestros pensamientos. A este asunto se le ha denominado el debate acerca de la fenomenología cognitiva. El análisis del debate parece depender del examen crítico de las formas en las que establecemos conclusiones acerca de los componentes fenoménicos de nuestra propia vida mental. El presente artículo elabora diversos problemas que se derivan del uso de dos estrategias en este contexto: reportes introspectivos y los contrastes fenoménicos. Luego de analizar la forma en que tales estrategias podrían favorecer a cierta posición dentro del debate, el artículo concluye comentando cómo algunos asuntos asociados a la fenomenología de la actividad matemática podrían iluminar el debate.

El problema tipológico surge al intentar definir el tipo de estado mental que subyace a los reportes de pacientes delirantes. Este artículo explora dos de los enfoques más populares a este problema en la literatura actual en filosofía de la mente. El análisis concluye que el enfoque doxástico —que conceptualiza los delirios como creencias anormales— es superior en términos conceptuales, empíricos y fenomenológicos al enfoque imaginístico, que caracteriza a los delirios como un tipo de estado mental imaginario. Finalmente, se concluye con algunos de los desafíos que el enfoque necesita resolver para ampliar su alcance y poder explicativo.

ResumenEl enfoque posracionalista surge desde la crítica constructivista a la forma en que el cognitivismo tradicional conceptualiza la relación entre sujeto y realidad. Tomando como principal unidad de análisis el estudio de la identidad personal como fenómeno bio-psicológico, el modelo de Vittorio Guidano se ha convertido en la formulación más popular de este enfoque. Lamentablemente, la abrupta partida de su fundador parece haber dejado una serie de cuestiones conceptuales abiertas a la base del modelo. El presente artículo identifica los aspectos fundamentales de la epistemología posracionalista de Guidano y luego de explorar su obra tardía, propone que es posible identificar dos momentos fundamentales en el enfoque: (i) Un primer momento (que denominamos Guidano 1 y que concentra la mayoría de la literatura en el tema) que es la expresión de una marcada influencia constructivista que implica la idea de que el principio organizador del funcionamiento de los sistemas humanos es la sobrevivencia. (ii) Un segundo momento (que llamamos Guidano 2 y que no ha sido exhaustivamente explorado en la literatura actual) que puede ser identificado como el producto de un giro hacia la filosofía fenomenológico-existencial. Acá, la identidad de un organismo no solo está orientada a la sobrevivencia, sino que, sobre todo, al sentido de la existencia misma. Se concluye clarificando el tipo de fenomenología que guiaría la práctica clínica de Guidano 2.Palabras clave: cognitivismo; constructivismo; fenomenología; posracionalismo.

After examining some of the most fundamental aspects of the general concept of ‘neuroright’ in the current discussion, this paper analyzes the concept of ‘the mental’ contained in the very first law of neurorights in the world currently under discussion in the Senate of the Republic of Chile (Bulletin 13.828-19 of the Chilean Senate). It is claimed that the lack of specificity of the target notion might not only posit difficulties for the creation of specific legal frameworks for the protection of subjects from potential misuses of neurotechnologies with access to neural data, but it might also make very difficult the process of decision-taking when interpreting the law.

Uno de los principales problemas de la filosofía de la psicopatología contemporánea consiste en definir qué tipo de estados mentales son aquellos que denominamos delirantes. A esto se le ha denominado el “problema tipológico de los delirios”. El principal objetivo de este artículo es examinar las principales alternativas filosóficas contemporáneas a este problema: el doxasticismo—de acuerdo con el cuál los deli-rios deben ser caracterizados como creencias—y al anti-doxasticismo—el cuál niega el estatuto doxásticos de los delirios y ofrece una caracterización alternativa. Para examinar el debate, el artículo presentará las principales características de ambas posiciones y sus fundamentos. Después, examinaremos los principales argumentos esgrimidos contra el doxasticismo y las respuestas y contraargumentos por parte de las alternativas doxásticas. Finalmente, expondremos algunas cuestiones conceptua-les y desafíos abiertos relacionados con el debate y que, a nuestro juicio, deberían de marcar la hoja de ruta de los filósofos de la mente interesados en los delirios en los próximos años.

Disturbances in social cognition are a core feature of schizophrenia. While most research in the field has focused on emotion perception, social knowledge, theory of mind, and attribution styles, the domain of social perception has received little specific attention. In this paper, we suggest that this issue can be explained by the lack of a precise and unitary definition of the concept, this leads to the existence of different competing uses of the concept and their conflation with other domains of social cognition. Relying on resources coming from the ecological approach to psychology and the phenomenological tradition in psychiatry, we propose that the concept of Social Perception should be used to refer to low-level pre-reflective processes underlying the awareness of interpersonal interactions with and between others. Clinical data suggests that people with schizophrenia have problems perceiving social situations as opportunities for social engagement, so, in order to fulfil this explanatory need, we propose that the term should be used to capture this important—yet neglected—domain of social cognition. We conclude with the discussion of some future directions for research derived from our proposal.

En el campo de la psicología ecológica, la noción de affordance refiere a la percepción de oportunidades para la acción en los objetos del entorno. Problemáticamente, la falta de unidad conceptual parece dominar la caracterización del fenómeno haciendo que su significado varíe drásticamente dependiendo del autor que hace uso de ella. Este artículo ofrece una exégesis sistemática al trabajo original de J.J. Gibson enfocándose en la pregunta sobre qué son las affordances y cuáles son sus componentes fundamentales. Finalmente, se propone una clasificación que permitirá categorizar diversas alternativas contemporáneas del concepto según la forma en la cual entienden la relación entre tales componentes.

RESUMEN El carácter analítico de Meditationes implica que, por una parte, ninguna verdad puede ser interpretada sin referencia al lugar concreto que ocupa en el orden de razones y, por otra, que no existen en Meditationes ficciones que permanezcan inadvertidamente como tales. Sin embargo, la presencia de algunas pasiones no ha sido justificada, lo que pone en cuestión el carácter analítico de la obra. Proponemos que tales pasiones son efecto de juicios implícitos. Para poner a prueba nuestra hipótesis, hemos elegido un enigmático párrafo que hemos denominado el "texto de la adoración." ABSTRACT The analytical character of Meditationes de Prima Philosophia implies that: a) no truth can be correctly interpreted without reference to the concrete place it occupies in the order of reasons of the text ; b) there are no fictions in Meditationes that remain inadvertently as such. However, the presence of some passions has not been adequately explained, putting into question the truly analytical character of the work. We propose that these passions are effects of true but implicit judgments. To test our hypothesis, we have chosen an enigmatic paragraph called the "text of the adoration."

A group of philosophers suggests that a sense of mineness intrinsically contained in the phenomenal structure of all conscious experiences is a necessary condition for a subject to become aware of himself as the subject of his experiences i.e. self-awareness. On this view, consciousness necessarily entails phenomenal self-awareness. This paper argues that cases of delusions of thought insertion undermine this claim and that such a phenomenal feature plays little role in accounting for the most minimal type of self-awareness entailed by phenomenal consciousness. First, I clarify the main view endorsing this claim i.e. the Self-Presentational View of Consciousness and formulate the challenge from thought insertion. After, I offer a systematic evaluation of all the strategies used by the advocates of this view to deal with this challenge. Finally, I conclude that most of these strategies are unsatisfactory for they rest in unwarranted premises, imprecisions about the agentive nature of cognitive experiences, and especially, lack of distinction between the different ways in which subjects can become aware of their own thoughts.

RESUMEN Una atribución de agencia mental es definida como el acto de asignar el inicio o autoría de un pensamiento en primera persona a un agente específico, esto, con el fin de generar grados suficientes de control sobre nuestra vida cognitiva. Si bien esta estrategia es fundamental para distinguir diferentes tipos de estados cognitivos - tales como deliberaciones, razonamientos, juicios, entre otros -, muchos autores han indicado que también es clave para entender experiencias cognitivas psicopatológicas en psicosis. Este artículo revisa la forma en que la estructura subjetiva de los delirios de inserción de pensamiento puede ser utilizada como una estrategia para evaluar los méritos argumentativos de las teorías que intentan explicar la arquitectura y naturaleza de las atribuciones de agencia mental. Luego de evaluar algunos aspectos fundamentales de las dos teorías dominantes en la literatura actual, se sugiere que, a pesar de sus importantes aportes al desarrollo de la discusión, tales enfoques no poseen los recursos explicativos suficientes para lidiar con el desafío propuesto. ABSTRACT An attribution of mental agency is defined as the act of assigning the initiation or authorship of a first personal thought to a specific agent in order to generate sufficient degrees of control over our own cognitive life. Although this strategy is crucial to distinguish different types of cognitive states - such as deliberations, reasonings, judgements, among others -, a number of authors have suggested that it is also crucial to understand psychopathological cognitive experiences in psychosis. This paper explores the way in which the subjective structure of thought insertion can be used as a strategy to evaluate the merits of theories aiming at explaining the nature and architecture of attributions of mental agency. After examining some of the most fundamental aspects of the two dominant theories in current literature, I suggest that, despite the contributions made by such theories to the discussion, none of them is able to face the challenge in a plausible way.