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This short article provides an introduction to the special issue “Gosseries on Intergenerational Justice,” so as to guide interested readers. In the first half of the article, we provide a short introduction to Axel Gosseries’s book _What Is Intergenerational Justice?_ where we distill the essence of each chapter. In the second half, we succinctly summarize the main points in each of the special issue’s contributions (to which Gosseries responds in the “reply to critics” article that concludes the special issue).

Can species membership warrant the advantageous treatment of an individual, human or nonhuman? For decades, philosophers have debated the moral justification of speciesism. This debate, however, risks becoming a hard to solve clash of ultimate intuitions—a possibility that has led some authors to develop an alternative epistemic approach to speciesism, which inspects, not speciesism’s moral correction, but the epistemic reliability of speciesist judgments. That is, whether, those judgments arise in epistemically favorable circumstances—or whether they are the product of reliable judgment-formation mechanisms. In this article, I pursue three goals. First, to survey and articulate, in a coherent manner, a so far undertheorized epistemic turn in the literature. Second, to explain why it is desirable to adopt an epistemic approach which supplements the traditional moral approach. And, third, to critically assess three recent contributions—suggesting some possible avenues for future work, as of yet neglected.

This paper introduces sentientist political liberalism. Elaborating on the fundamental ideas in John Rawls's political liberalism, we propose that the scheme of fair social cooperation among persons should be understood as embedded within a broader system of social coexistence between persons and other sentient beings. This prompts a revision of the original position: We add a second phase in which participants, acting as trustees for animals, deliberate on principles of fair coexistence. We also extend the idea of public justification to include a duty of diligent trusteeship and the permissibility to appeal to comprehensive doctrines to reform anthropocentric political cultures.

Can the ideal of relational equality—or, more generally, the relational approach to justice—be applied to animals? Animals have, across time and place, held different social statuses (e.g. as incarnations of gods to be worshiped or as plagues to be exterminated). And yet, in spite of this, the above question remains underexplored. In this paper, we defend an optimistic answer, and make a twofold contribution. First, we formulate and thoroughly inspect three challenges to the extension of the relational framework to animals: (i) that they cannot engage in reciprocal interpersonal relationships (the ‘absence of social relations problem’), (ii) that, given animals’ lack of a sense of self-worth, it is not clear how social hierarchies between animals and humans could be objectionable (the ‘absence of understanding problem’), and (iii) that animals are not, or so at least many philosophers argue, humans’ moral equals (the ‘absence of moral equality problem’). Second, we argue that these challenges, although important, can be answered. The relational framework, we argue, is flexible and rich enough to overcome the three challenges without losing normative attractiveness and substantive bite. If we are right, some social hierarchies between humans and animals may be objectionable on grounds of relational justice.

Can the dead subject later generations to their will? Legal and political philosophers have long worried about this question. But some have recently argued that subjection between generations that do not overlap is impossible. Against these views, we offer an account of this kind of subjection and the conditions under which it may occur—the Mediated Subjection View. On this view, legal subjection between nonoverlapping generations occurs when past generations seek to guide the future’s behavior, and legal officials in the future deem the norms and legal frameworks inherited from the past as reason-giving and action-guiding, and have the effective power to enforce them. Under these circumstances, we argue, future legal officials act as intermediaries of the past, enabling past generations to subject later ones to their laws. We first inspect the normative significance of subjection and introduce and motivate the Mediated Subjection View. We next scrutinize four objections to the possibility of legal subjection between nonoverlapping generations and show how our view can answer them.

Despite growing interest in workplace democracy, the question whether nonworker stakeholders, like suppliers and local communities, warrant inclusion in the governance of democratic companies, as workers do, has been largely neglected. We inspect this question by leaning on the boundary problem in democratic theory. We first argue that the question of who warrants inclusion in democratic workplaces is best addressed by examining why workplace democracy is warranted in the first place, and offer a twofold normative benchmark—addressing objectionable corporate power and upholding efficiency—to assess the principles of democratic inclusion on offer. Against this benchmark, we next argue that the All-Affected Principle is unfit due to its over- and underinclusive extensional results, and that the All-Subjected Principle, whose variants we examine alongside their extensional results, holds more promise when coupled with independent considerations of justice or a constrained variant of the All-Affected Principle. These combinations need not entirely preclude, but speak against, nonworker stakeholder inclusion.

Happy cow messages are instances of commercial speech by the animal industry which, by action or by omission, mislead consumers about the harmful effects that the industry has for nonhuman animals, the environment, or human health. Despite their ubiquity, happy cow messages have received little philosophical scrutiny. This paper aims to call attention to this form of speech, and to make the case for its restriction. To do so we first conceptualize happy cow messages. Second, we argue that they encroach upon individual autonomy in two particularly objectionable ways: by impairing our ability to behave according to our moral convictions, and by thwarting our capacity to identify and reason about our moral duties. This, we hold, grounds a pro tanto case for stricter and more comprehensive regulations of commercial speech by the animal industry. Third, and against the objection that restricting happy cow messages would violate freedom of speech, we contend that none of the most influential arguments for free speech grants them protection. Indeed, we suggest, those rationales seem to call for their restriction. Fourth, and finally, we review some possible ways to defuse the misleading potential of happy cow messages through commercial speech regulations.

On a prominent family of views about the justification of legitimate policy-making (_public justification views_), considerations about the rights and well-being of nonhuman animals can only play a derivative role at best. On these views, these considerations matter only if they can figure in the content of the public reasons that citizens can offer each other. This thesis I call the Indirect View. Some authors have argued that this constitutes a reason to reject the ideal of public justification, or at least to qualify it. It is unclear, however, whether public justification theorists will be persuaded by this. In this paper, I argue that they should. In order to do so, I focus on three justifications of the ideal of public justification that have been offered in the literature (justice, our reactive attitudes, and civic friendship), and contend that none of them supports the Indirect View. In some cases, this is because the value in question (e.g. justice) might indeed be extended to animals. In other cases, this is because there is often a trade-off between the values in play and considerations about the rights and well-being of animals in which the former do not always outweigh the latter.

Nonhuman animals are unable to exert any direct control over the functioning of democratic institutions –the decisions of which, nevertheless, have a pervasive impact on their lives. Their interests are therefore likelier to be set back or unfairly discounted, and their choices are more vulnerable to arbitrary interference. Because of this, some authors have suggested that we ought to redesign our political institutions so that they are more responsive to the interests of animals. We argue that this strategy fails to address the root of the problem, which is animals’ lack of robust political agency. We defend that, should it become technologically feasible, we have a pro tanto obligation, derived from the values that underpin democracy, to uplift, or radically enhance, the political agency of nonhuman animals, so that they can better participate in mass democratic politics, express their interests as they see them, self-organise to defend them, and hold their representatives accountable. Finally, we explain how our argument manages to resist the most important objections against animal enhancement and, in some cases, it does so better than alternative proposals based on the value of animal well-being.

How should political power and influence be allocated in democratic systems? That is, roughly, the core of the boundary problem in democratic theory. As of late, some authors have begun paying increased attention to the methodological aspects of this dispute. This paper attempts to make a twofold contribution to this ‘methodological turn’. On the one hand, it identifies and analyzes five desiderata of a successful principle of democratic inclusion. Any such principle, I argue, must be grounded in a clearly identifiable set of values, must provide a clear standard of inclusion, must specify the relevant modalities of inclusion, must provide sound bridging principles, and must be extensionally adequate. In the first half of the paper, these desiderata are developed and critically scrutinized. On the other hand, I also extract three lessons from the previous discussion. First, that a unique answer to the boundary problem (i.e. one grounded in one single principle) is unlikely. Second, that a satisfactory answer to the boundary problem need not necessarily appeal, as some have argued, to distinctively democratic values. And third, that intuitions about political exclusion (i.e. those requiring or permitting the exclusion of some individuals) should be treated with special caution.

This article provides a survey of the emerging debate on the political representation of nonhuman animals. In Section 1, I identify some of the reasons why the interests of animals are often disregarded in policy-making, and present two arguments why these interests should be considered. In Section 2, I introduce four institutional proposals that have been discussed in the relevant literature. Section 3 attempts to make explicit the underlying logic of each proposal (i.e. which specific problems it wants to tackle). Section 4 discusses some of the main normative pros and cons of each proposal.

Some authors have suggested that the All Affected Interests Principle, an influential principle of political inclusion, requires that animals have their interests politically represented. In this paper, I provide a systematic formulation, assessment, and defense of this argument, and suggest a middle way between two strategies found in the literature. On the one hand, I argue that applying the All Affected Interests to animals inevitably requires that we make some (potentially controversial) assumptions about the weight and scope of animal interests, and cannot remain morally noncommittal. This is because most formulations of the principle do not apply to all interests, but only to those that satisfy a relevancy test – which requires first-order moral reasoning. On the other hand, I also contend that one can defend some substantive claims about the inclusion of animals via the All Affected Interests Principle without having to endorse a comprehensive account of animal rights, or a theory about the worth of natural entities. For the All Affected Interests Principle to apply to animals, all that we need are instances of normatively relevant interests systematically affected by political decisions. The interest of mammals in avoiding pain and suffering, I contend, provides such an example.

¿Qué papel juegan los animales no humanos en la filosofía política de John Rawls? En este artículo identifico tres posibles respuestas. Según la respuesta integracionista, los animales pueden ser incluidos en su teoría de la justicia, como genuinos receptores de deberes de justicia. De acuerdo con la respuesta compatibilista, por otra parte, los animales no pueden ser incluidos en la teoría de la justicia de Rawls, pero sí encajan en su teoría política más amplia. Por último, según la respuesta del conflicto, existe una tensión entre el reconocimiento del estatus moral de los animales y algunos elementos esenciales del pensamiento político de Rawls. El objetivo principal de este artículo es defender esta última respuesta. Para ello, argumento en primer lugar que los principales intentos de integrar a los animales en la teoría de la justicia rawlsiana no logran alcanzar su objetivo, pues acaban contradiciendo elementos esenciales de dicha teoría. En segundo lugar, defiendo también que la estrategia compatibilista es insatisfactoria, pues se muestra incapaz de incorporar ciertas asunciones centrales de la ética animal.