Paco Calvo Garzon

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Recent advances in plant biology suggest that plants engage in complex behaviours once thought to require nervous systems. This article surveys the empirical foundations of plant cognition, covering research on goal‐directed movement, decision‐making, anticipatory behaviour, communication, phytoacoustics, and plant neurobiology. In addition, we examine evidence for systemic signalling and anaesthesia in plants, alongside parallels and contrasts with animal cognition. These findings indicate that cognition may not be restricted to neural organisms, challenging conventional boundaries of mind. Building on this empirical base, we explore the philosophical and ethical implications of attributing cognition to plants. The discussion engages classic debates about other minds, functionalism, multiple realisability, and the possibility of plant sentience. Even if plant sentience remains speculative, their cognitive complexity raises broader questions about ecological value, precautionary concern, and the scope of moral consideration. Taken together, these discussions highlight how empirical discoveries in plant biology intersect with enduring philosophical questions about mind, intelligence, and moral status. A companion article, Plant Cognition—A Methodological Primer, provides the necessary theoretical and methodological background, whereas this piece focuses on evidence and implications.

Part I: What counts as cognition, and how can it be studied in organisms without nervous systems? The emerging field of plant cognition confronts these questions by integrating philosophy, plant science and comparative psychology. This article provides a methodological primer on the field. We first survey major theoretical approaches—computationalist and representationalist, radical embodied, and behaviour‐first—and consider how they might be integrated. We then examine methodological strategies, from comparative experimental paradigms to the role of philosophy in clarifying concepts and guiding research design. Finally, we address key epistemic challenges, including replicability, anthropomorphism and confirmation bias. Taken together, these discussions establish a conceptual and methodological foundation for plant cognition research. A companion article, Plant Cognition—An Empirical Primer, complements this survey by reviewing the empirical evidence and its philosophical implications.

_The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology_ is an invaluable guide and major reference source to the major topics, problems, concepts and debates in philosophy of psychology and is the first companion of its kind. A team of renowned international contributors provide forty-two chapters organised into eight clear parts: historical background the status of psychological theories models of the mind behaviour, development and the brain thought and language perception and consciousness the inner world psychology and the Self. The _Companion_ covers key topics such as the origins of experimental psychology; folk psychology; behaviorism and functionalism; philosophy, psychology and neuroscience; the language of thought, modularity, nativism and representational theories of mind; consciousness and the senses; dreams emotion and temporality; personal identity and the philosophy of psychopathology. Essential reading for all students of philosophy of mind, science and psychology, _The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology_ will also be of interest to anyone studying psychology and its related disciplines.

_The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, Second Edition_ is an invaluable guide and major reference source to the major topics, problems, concepts and debates in philosophy of psychology and is the first companion of its kind. A team of renowned international contributors provide forty-nine chapters organised into six clear parts: Historical background to Philosophy of Psychology Psychological Explanation Cognition and Representation The biological basis of psychology Perceptual Experience Personhood. _The Companion_ covers key topics such as the origins of experimental psychology; folk psychology; behaviorism and functionalism; philosophy, psychology and neuroscience; the language of thought, modularity, nativism and representational theories of mind; consciousness and the senses; dreams emotion and temporality; personal identity and the philosophy of psychopathology. For the_ second edition_ many of the current chapters have been updated, and seven new chapters added on important new topics such predictive processing, comparative cognition, learning, and group cognition, as well as a new introductory chapter by the editors on the demarcation between philosophy and psychology. Essential reading for all students of philosophy of mind, science and psychology, _The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology _will also be of interest to anyone studying psychology and its related disciplines.

To what extent can plants be considered cognitive from the perspective of embodied cognition? Cognition is interpreted very broadly within embodied cognition, and the current evidence for plant intelligence might find an important theoretical background here. However, embodied cognition does stress the presence of animal-like perception-action coupling as a key feature for cognitive systems to arise. In this paper, we discuss whether, or to what extent, plants may qualify as cognitive systems, given this criterion.

An asymmetry between the demands at the computational and algorithmic levels of description furnishes the illusion that the abstract profile at the computational level can be multiply realized, and that something is actually being shared at the algorithmic one. A disembodied rendering of the situation lays the stress upon the different ways in which an algorithm can be implemented. However, from an embodied approach, things look rather different. The relevant pairing, I shall argue, is not between implementation and algorithm, but rather between algorithm and computation. The autonomy of psychology is a result of the failure to appreciate this point.

The mechanism underlying action potentials is routinely used to explicate the mechanistic model of explanation in the philosophy of science. However, characterisations of action potentials often fixate on neurons, mentioning plant cells in passing or ignoring them entirely. The plant sciences are also prone to neglecting non-neuronal action potentials and their role in plant biology. This oversight is significant because plant action potentials bear instructive similarities to those generated by neurons. This paper helps correct the imbalance in representations of action potentials by offering an overview of the mechanism for plant action potentials and highlighting their similarity to those in neurons. Furthermore, it affirms the role of plant action potentials in discovering the evolution and function of mechanisms of action potentials more broadly. We stress the potential of plants for producing generalisations about action potentials and the possible role of plants as experimental organisms.

According to F. Adams [this journal, vol. 68, 2018] cognition cannot be realized in plants or bacteria. In his view, plants and bacteria respond to the here-and-now in a hardwired, inflexible manner, and are therefore incapable of cognitive activity. This article takes issue with the pursuit of plant cognition from the perspective of an empirically informed philosophy of plant neurobiology. As we argue, empirical evidence shows, contra Adams, that plant behavior is in many ways analogous to animal behavior. This renders plants suitable to be described as cognitive agents in a non-metaphorical way. Sections two to four review the arguments offered by Adams in light of scientific evidence on plant adaptive behavior, decision-making, anticipation, as well as learning and memory. Section five introduces the ‘phyto-nervous’ system of plants. To conclude, section six resituates the quest for plant cognition into a broader approach in cognitive science, as represented by enactive and ecological schools of thought. Overall, we aim to motivate the idea that plants may be considered genuine cognitive agents. Our hope is to help propel public awareness and discussion of plant intelligence once appropriately stripped of anthropocentric preconceptions of the sort that Adams' position appears to exemplify.

It remains at best controversial to claim, non-figuratively, that plants are cognitive agents. At the same time, it is taken as trivially true that many animals are cognitive agents, arguably through an implicit or explicit appeal to natural science. Yet, any given definition of cognition implicates at least some further processes, such as perception, action, memory, and learning, which must be observed either behaviorally, psychologically, neuronally, or otherwise physiologically. Crucially, however, for such observations to be intelligible, they must be counted as evidence for some model. These models in turn point to homologies of physiology and behavior that facilitate the attribution of cognition to some non-human animals. But, if one is dealing with a model of animal cognition, it is tautological that only animals can provide evidence, and absurd to claim that plants can. The more substantive claim that, given a general model of cognition, only animals but not plants can provide evidence, must be evaluated on its merits. As evidence mounts that plants meet established criteria of cognition, from physiology to behavior, they continue to be denied entry into the cognitive club. We trace this exclusionary tendency back to Aristotle, and attempt to counter it by drawing on the philosophy of modelling and a range of findings from plant science. Our argument illustrates how a difference in degree between plant and animals is typically mistaken for a difference in kind.

‘Plant neurobiology’ has emerged in recent years as a multidisciplinary endeavor carried out mainly by steady collaboration within the plant sciences. The field proposes a particular approach to the study of plant intelligence by putting forward an integrated view of plant signaling and adaptive behavior. Its objective is to account for the way plants perceive and act in a purposeful manner. But it is not only the plant sciences that constitute plant neurobiology. Resources from philosophy and cognitive science are central to such an interdisciplinary project, if plant neurobiology is to maintain its target well-focused. This manifesto outlines a road map for the establishment and development of a new subject—the Philosophy of Plant Neurobiology—, a new field of research emerging at the intersection of the philosophy of cognitive science and plant neurobiology. The discipline is herewith presented, introducing challenges and novel lines of engagement with the empirical investigation, and providing an explanatory framework and guiding principles that will hopefully ease the integration of research on the quest for plant intelligence.

Some empirical evidence in the artificial language acquisition literature has been taken to suggest that statistical learning mechanisms are insufficient for extracting structural information from an artificial language. According to the more than one mechanism (MOM) hypothesis, at least two mechanisms are required in order to acquire language from speech: (a) a statistical mechanism for speech segmentation; and (b) an additional rule-following mechanism in order to induce grammatical regularities. In this article, we present a set of neural network studies demonstrating that a single statistical mechanism can mimic the apparent discovery of structural regularities, beyond the segmentation of speech. We argue that our results undermine one argument for the MOM hypothesis