Pamela Lomelino

Given the increase in research in less developed countries and the necessary reliance on informed consent guidelines, we should pay close attention to the extent to which these guidelines address important cross-cultural differences. I argue that the current underlying conception of autonomy that is reflected in informed consent guidelines fails to adequately address important cultural differences—namely differences in conceptions of the person. Since this conception directly influences one’s conception of autonomy, the narrowness of the current guidelines demands attention. In examining a conception of the person that is popular in Africa—a less developed country in which much research is currently being conducted—I argue that the current foundation for informed consent should rest on strong relational autonomy in order to be more globally applicable. This revision, in turn, calls for changes to the policies for informed consent.

Currently, the universal human rights model relies on the notion of individual human rights. According to Michael Ignatieff, this is based on the fact that universal human rights are necessarily individual rights. However, there are cultures in which persons define themselves as relational beings (firmly believing that the foundation of their value as persons rests in their being an integral part of a larger whole rather than their being identified as an individual self). Thus, the problem arises as to whether universal human rights can apply to such persons. In this paper, I will argue that Ignatieff is mistaken; there can be (both theoretically and practically) collective human rights. Moreover, respect for human agency requires us to incorporate collective human rights into the universal human rights model so as to make these rights applicable to all human beings—individuals and relational beings.

Given the increase in research in less developed countries and the necessary reliance on informed consent guidelines, we should pay close attention to the extent to which these guidelines address important cross-cultural differences. I argue that the current underlying conception of autonomy that is reflected in informed consent guidelines fails to adequately address important cultural differences —namely differences in conceptions of the person. Since this conception directly influences one’s conception of autonomy, the narrowness of the current guidelines demands attention. In examining a conception of the person that is popular in Africa—a less developed country in which much research is currently being conducted—I argue that the current foundation for informed consent should rest on strong relational autonomy in order to be more globally applicable. This revision, in turn, calls for changes to the policies for informed consent

Currently, the universal human rights model relies on the notion of individual human rights. According to Michael Ignatieff, this is based on the fact that universal human rights are necessarily individual rights. However, there are cultures in which persons define themselves as relational beings (firmly believing that the foundation of their value as persons rests in their being an integral part of a larger whole rather than their being identified as an individual self). Thus, the problem arises as to whether universal human rights can apply to such persons. In this paper, I will argue that Ignatieff is mistaken; there can be (both theoretically and practically) collective human rights. Moreover, respect for human agency requires us to incorporate collective human rights into the universal human rights model so as to make these rights applicable to all human beings—individuals and relational beings.