I aim to sketch a view of a methodology for metaphysics, suggested by Hookway's reading of C.S. Peirce, that allows one to hold realist metaphysical views. It is named for Peirce’s ‘Critical Commonsensism’, and uses pragmatic transcendental arguments to defend realism about non-optional basic commitments, e.g. inquiry and agency. It is critical because we are entitled to hope that the presuppositions of our most basic non-optional commitments obtain, and commonsensical because we begin with our …
Read moreI aim to sketch a view of a methodology for metaphysics, suggested by Hookway's reading of C.S. Peirce, that allows one to hold realist metaphysical views. It is named for Peirce’s ‘Critical Commonsensism’, and uses pragmatic transcendental arguments to defend realism about non-optional basic commitments, e.g. inquiry and agency. It is critical because we are entitled to hope that the presuppositions of our most basic non-optional commitments obtain, and commonsensical because we begin with our current practices and proceed with anti-sceptical fallibilism. I consider a number of objections to the proposed methodology, including concerns associated with our identification of presuppositions, with the basic non-optional commitments they are presuppositions of, and the community who are so committed. These questions, I will claim, are open to empirical and anthropological investigation, but can begin with careful observation of human practices of agency and inquiry. I will defend the view we end up with as realist, against concerns it lacks the appropriate humility, and against the quietist position that one can make such presuppositions without engendering metaphysical commitments.
