Paolo Piccari

In this paper we focus on argumentation as sequence of idemes that, from a neurophisiological point of view, are neuromental configurations correlated by inherent bonds. Such sequence of idemes, in turn, is encoded in a sequence of arguments on the basis of bonds among sememes: so the linguistic-propositional structure reflects the semiotic structure, and the latter reflects the idetic structure of argumentation. We propose to analyse the argumentative structure from different perspectives: the linguistic-propositional perspective, which concerns syntactic bonds among the propositions, the semiotic perspective which regards sememes’ nature and their function within the arguments, and the idetic-inherent perspective which refers to bonds among idemes involved in argumentation

The combination of current cosmology, physical theories, ancient cosmogonies, theologies, and metaphysics poses three main questions: Why is there something rather than nothing? Why does being take many forms? What is the origin of everything? Many different answers have been given in various different fields to these questions. In theological, creationist metaphysics, the only answer is the existence of a creator who has given rise not only to everything, but also to the laws that govern existence. Non-theological metaphysics, instead, has engaged in the determination of some first principles (archái), from which derives the reality in its various forms. Science, for a long time, evaded these questions, focusing instead on particular aspects of reality by formulating explanations of natural phenomena. In the course of their current development, physics (including quantum theory) and cosmology have posed questions concerning the origin of the whole universe and the reasons for its existence. They believe it is possible to formulate a theory of everything, just as metaphysical cosmologists and theologians thought. The papers collected in this volume offer interesting contributions to the debates surrounding this ultimate "why" question.

Many philosophers reduce ordinary knowledge to sensory or, more generally, to perceptual knowledge, which refers to entities belonging to the phenomenic world. However, ordinary knowledge is not only the result of sensory-perceptual processes, but also of non-perceptual contents that are present in any mind. From an epistemological point of view, ordinary knowledge is a form of knowledge that not only allows epistemic access to the world, but also enables the formulation of models of it with different degrees of reliability. Usually epistemologists focus their attention on scientific knowledge, believing that ordinary knowledge does not, or cannot, have an epistemology for it is not in any way rigorous. The papers collected in this volume analyse different aspects of ordinary knowledge and of its epistemology.