Parsa Teymuri

I articulate and defend a structural principle governing agent–event relations: whenever an agent coexists with a bad event that the agent does not prevent, at least one of three conditions must obtain—ignorance, indifference, or incapacity. I formalize this “Triadic Constraint” and show that it generates a logical incompatibility between the existence of bad events and any agent defined as omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. I further argue that if such an agent is denied these agentive predicates, discourse about it becomes semantically ungrounded. The result is a general ontological limitation on meaningful language concerning maximal agents.

This paper introduces Neo-Absolutism, a philosophical position asserting that no rational agent truly adheres to relativism. While relativistic language is common in contemporary discourse, the structure of human belief, communication, and action presupposes objective truth. Drawing from performative contradiction theory and the psychology of conviction, I argue that all meaningful claims—even those that deny objectivity—are themselves treated as objectively true by their proponents. Neo-Absolutism reframes the relativism-absolutism debate by revealing the inescapable role of objective commitment in rational life. The paper situates this view within the tradition of Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, Peirce, and Heidegger, offering a post-relativist ethos that affirms truth not as dogma, but as a lived necessity.