•  4
    Anthology of Philosophical Studies (edited book)
    ATINER. 2014.
  • An anthology of philosophical studies, vol. 14 (edited book)
    Athens Institute for Education and Research. 2020.
  •  4
    An Anthology of Philosophical Studies: Volume 9 (edited book)
    Athens Institute for Education and Research. 2015.
  • An Anthology of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 5 (edited book)
    Athens Institute of Education and Research. 2011.
  •  1
    An Anthology of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 3 (edited book)
    ATINER. 2009.
  •  13
    The Limits of Relativism in the Late Wittgenstein
    with Bernard Harrison
    In Steven D. Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism, Wiley-blackwell. 2010.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Introduction Anti ‐ Realism and Meaning Two Types of Anti ‐ Realism What Functions Are “Language ‐ Games” Supposed to Serve? Realism and (Dummett's) Anti ‐ Realism Resisting Transcendentalism Wittgensteinian Realism References.
  •  62
    Must thinking bats be conscious?
    Philosophical Investigations 13 (October): 350-55. 1990.
  •  1
    An Anthology of Philosophical Studies, vol. 14. (edited book)
    Athens Institute for Education and Research. forthcoming.
  •  41
    Sorts, Ontology, and Metaphor (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 36 (3): 719-720. 1983.
    In this interesting study, Shalom Lappin argues that any adequate theory of sortal incorrectness must meet four requirements. First, it must account for the truth valuelessness of sortally incorrect sentences. Second, it must provide a means of distinguishing truth valuelessness arising from sortal incorrectness from other sources of truth valuelessness. Third, it must be able to capture inferences which depend on sortal factors, while preserving those implications and formulae of classical logi…Read more
  •  97
    Linguistic competence and Kripke's puzzle
    Philosophia 28 (1-4): 171-189. 2001.
    In "A Puzzle About Belief" (_Meaning and Use, A. Margalit (ed.), D. Reidel (1979), pp. 239-283), Saul Kripke argues that linguistic moves to all appearances normal in reporting the beliefs of others can be shown to generate paradox. In this paper, I argue that the supposed paradox is one in appearance only, and that the appearance rests on a covert vacillation in Kripke's paper between two conceptions of linguistic understanding, a weak, or 'minimal' one, and a 'strong' one. Only the weak concep…Read more
  •  38
    On sameness and necessity
    Philosophical Investigations 4 (2): 91-103. 1981.
  •  70
    Realism without Empiricism
    Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 17 65-73. 2008.
    In his later writings, Wittgenstein is generally taken as committed to anti-realism. In this paper, I argue that this is mistaken. Although he is committed to ontic anti-realism, this does not preclude his acceptance of epistemic realism. I argue that the possibility of using practices to fix meanings and to provide aframework for conceptual differentiation of our experiences rests upon a version of realism, which I call "praxial realism", which does not presuppose anything like a Kantian noumen…Read more
  •  24
    The Unity of Linguistic Meaning
    Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260): 567-569. 2015.
  •  134
    Swimming and speaking spanish
    Philosophia 34 (3): 267-285. 2006.
    The dominant view of the status of knowledge of language is that it is theoretical or what Gilbert Ryle called knowledge-that. Defenders of this thesis may differ among themselves over the precise nature of the knowledge which underlies language, as for example, Michael Dummett and Noam Chomsky differ over the issue of unconscious knowledge; however, they all agree that acquisition, understanding and use of language require that the speaker have access to a theory of language. In this paper, I a…Read more
  •  54
    This important book proposes a new account of the nature of language, founded upon an original interpretation of Wittgenstein. The authors deny the existence of a direct referential relationship between words and things. Rather, the link between language and world is a two-stage one, in which meaning is used and in which a natural language should be understood as fundamentally a collection of socially devised and maintained practices. Arguing against the philosophical mainstream descending from …Read more
  •  111
    In “Practical Knowledge of Language”, C.-h. Tsai criticizes the arguments in “Swimming and Speaking Spanish” (this issue, pp. 331–341), on the grounds that its account of knowledge of language as knowledge-how is mistaken. In its place, he proposes an alternative account in terms of Russell’s concept “knowledge-by-acquaintance”. In this paper, I show that this account succeeds neither in displacing the account in Swimming and Speaking Spanish nor in addressing Tsai’s main concern: solving the “d…Read more