• Explaining Freedom in Thought and Action
    In Violetta L. Waibel, Margit Ruffing & David Wagner (eds.), Natur Und Freiheit. Akten des Xii. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, De Gruyter. pp. 185-208. 2018.
  •  6
    A Final Accounting: Philosophical and Empirical Issues in Freudian Psychology
    Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (1): 268-271. 1999.
  •  5
    I agree with Dyck’s basic claim that Kant follows the methodology of Rational Psychology in setting up his critique of it: He starts as it starts, with an existential proposition ‘I think.’ On the other hand, I am not convinced of Dyck’s use of the Dreams essay in establishing a timeline for the development of Kant’s views on inner sense. That essay is evidence that Kant thinks that Schwendenborg’s metaphysics is ungrounded, because he has a crazy sort of inner sense, but it does not show that K…Read more
  • The Self: A History (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
  •  1
    Matter in Mind: A Study of Kant's Transcendental Deduction (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 43 (4): 851-851. 1990.
    Richard Aquila's study tackles a number of difficult and important issues in the Transcendental Deduction, issues that are frequently slighted. In recent decades, the fashion has been to read Kant as if his primary target were skepticism and his primary weapon "transcendental" arguments that turn on the meaning of certain key terms in our conceptual scheme. As Aquila notes, this cannot be the entire or essential story of the Transcendental Deduction, for it offers a theory of the formation of co…Read more
  •  298
    In defense of intentional psychology
    Journal of Philosophy 81 (February): 89-106. 1984.
  •  2
    The Evolution of the Soul
    Noûs 23 (5): 708. 1989.
  •  49
    A Kantian Argument for the Formula of Humanity
    Kant-Studien 108 (2): 218-246. 2017.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 108 Heft: 2 Seiten: 218-246.
  •  2
    Kant’s Intuitionism: A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic (review)
    Philosophical Review 107 (1): 155-158. 1998.
    Wonderfully clear, scholarly, and well argued, Kant’s Intuitionism offers a bold new interpretation of the thesis of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Falkenstein reads Kant as a “formal intuitionist.” That is, he takes Kant to have maintained that the forms of intuition, space, and time were given along with sensations. They were neither preexisting representations, nor intellectual or imaginative constructions out of sensations. In this context “given” contrasts with “constructed”; subjects’ repre…Read more
  • The Problem of Personal Identity
    Dissertation, Princeton University. 1974.
  •  135
    Marr's computational theory of vision
    Philosophy of Science 55 (March): 1-24. 1988.
    David Marr's theory of vision has been widely cited by philosophers and psychologists. I have three projects in this paper. First, I try to offer a perspicuous characterization of Marr's theory. Next, I consider the implications of Marr's work for some currently popular philosophies of psychology, specifically, the "hegemony of neurophysiology view", the theories of Jerry Fodor, Daniel Dennett, and Stephen Stich, and the view that perception is permeated by belief. In the last section, I conside…Read more
  •  144
    Narrow taxonomy and wide functionalism
    Philosophy of Science 52 (March): 78-97. 1985.
    Three recent, influential critiques (Stich 1978; Fodor 1981c; Block 1980) have argued that various tasks on the agenda for computational psychology put conflicting pressures on its theoretical constructs. Unless something is done, the inevitable result will be confusion or outright incoherence. Stich, Fodor, and Block present different versions of this worry and each proposes a different remedy. Stich wants the central notion of belief to be jettisoned if it cannot be shown to be sound. Fodor tr…Read more
  •  27
    Kant versus the Asymmetry Dogma
    Kant Yearbook 5 (1). 2013.
    One of the most widely accepted contemporary constraints on theories of self-knowledge is that they must account for the very different ways in which cognitive subjects know their own minds and the ways in which they know other minds. Through the influence of Peter Strawson, Kant is often taken to be an original source for this view. I argue that Kant is quite explicit in holding the opposite position. In a little discussed passage in the Paralogisms chapter, he argues that cognitive subjects ha…Read more
  •  39
    Connecting intuitions and concepts at B 160n
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (S1): 137-149. 1987.
  •  47
    Kant on the faculty of apperception
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (3): 589-616. 2017.
    Although I begin with a brief look at the idea that as a faculty of mind, apperception must be grounded in some power of the soul, my focus is on claims about the alleged noumenal import of some of Kant’s particular theses about the faculty of apperception: it is inexplicable, immaterial, and can provide evidence that humans are members of the intelligible world. I argue that when the claim of inexplicability is placed in the context of Kant’s standards for transcendental psychological explanati…Read more
  •  98
    What Is a Maxim?
    Philosophical Topics 31 (1/2): 215-243. 2003.
  •  10
    Empirical Consciousness
    In Georg Mohr, Jürgen Stolzenburg & Marcus Willaschek (eds.), Kant-Lexikon, De Gruyter. 2009.
  •  26
    Wonderfully clear, scholarly, and well argued, Kant’s Intuitionism offers a bold new interpretation of the thesis of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Falkenstein reads Kant as a “formal intuitionist.” That is, he takes Kant to have maintained that the forms of intuition, space, and time were given along with sensations. They were neither preexisting representations, nor intellectual or imaginative constructions out of sensations. In this context “given” contrasts with “constructed”; subjects’ repre…Read more
  • On appealing to the extraordinary
    Metaphilosophy 9 (2): 99-107. 1978.
  •  1
    Discussion: How to reduce a functional psychology?
    Philosophy of Science 47 (March): 134-140. 1980.
  •  4
    Kant's real self
    In Allen W. Wood (ed.), Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy, Cornell University Press. pp. 113--47. 1984.
  •  19
    Natural Kinds and Unnatural Persons
    Philosophy 54 (210). 1979.
    Most people believe that extraterrestrial beings or porpoises or computers could someday be recognized as persons. Given the significant constitutional differences between these entities and ourselves, the general assumption appears to be that ‘person’ is not a natural kind term. David Wiggins offers an illuminating challenge to this popular dogma in ‘Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness: and Men as a Natural Kind’. Wiggins does not claim that ‘person’ actually is a natural kind term; b…Read more