Patrick Effiong Ben

African philosophy of higher education is an evolving field of discourse. As a distinctively African contribution to critical pedagogy and global philosophical discourse in higher education, there is a paucity of literature for researchers to reference as a starting point to further their discourse. Much of what has been written about education so far involves the cultivation of autonomous action, moral instruction, iteration in higher pedagogy, and responsible action towards the public good or the harmonisation and promotion of collective interests. To address this paucity of research, we propose a need to rethink the African philosophy of higher education, including critical pedagogy from an alternative framework. We begin by presenting an overview of what constitutes an African philosophy of higher education in existing literature. From there, employing the method of conversational analysis, we critique the colonial foundation of higher education in Africa in its current organisation. We then deploy the same method to present a trivalent logico-ontological model of higher education as an alternative framework that can transform learners into creative, critical, and independent thinkers. We conclude by considering the potential impact of such a trivalent logico-ontological model of education on the future of African philosophy of higher education and its role in shaping critical pedagogy in and beyond Africa.

Sometimes I am with a group of people but feel socially distant because their activities make me think, ‘I don't belong here!’ However, the distance between me and them is not created by intentional acts of exclusion. It stems from my non-participation in their chosen activities—the things other members of the in-group do for fun—for personal reasons. Although we share a lot in common, such as being supporters of the same football club, staff at the same institution, students at the same university or having shared religious beliefs, we differ in the things we do for fun; not all of us are smokers, not all of us drink beer/alcohol, and not all of us speak the same languages. The feeling of social distance that one experiences when excluded from activities enjoyed by members of one's in-group is a form of discrimination. In this perspective paper, I expose this type of discrimination as acceptable within in-groups for two reasons: (1) the general lack of discriminatory intentions towards victims and (2) the spatial situatedness of the discriminatory activities. I call this acceptable type of discrimination ‘Groupcism’. I argue that groupcism is regarded as an acceptable form of discrimination not primarily because of the two reasons stated above, but because of another two: (1) other activities that the victims of groupcism share with the members of their in-group; and (2) the agency to opt in and out of the sub-group activities that engender groupcism.

In this paper, I consider the concept of ‘human minimum’ as Henry Odera Oruka proposed to obligate responsibility as an approach to eliminating extreme poverty in Africa and beyond. I aim to establish why it is morally problematic and economically counterproductive to demand equal moral responsibility from all moral agents, irrespective of their economic differences, in the fight against extreme poverty. To achieve the latter, I attempt to answer two significant questions: What are some of the moral implications of ensuring that a society attains the human minimum as an approach to eliminating extreme poverty? Who has a greater moral responsibility for ensuring the attainment of the human minimum between the government, non-governmental/nonprofit organisations and individual members of society? In Oruka’s philosophy, enforcement of a global human minimum is the equal moral obligation of all moral agents – defined as those situated above the poverty line. I will demonstrate why ignoring the economic differences – and inequalities – of those who qualify as moral agents in Oruka’s conceptualisation of extreme poverty, particularly in continental Africa, risks plunging more of those who live slightly above the human minimum threshold into extreme poverty.

In this paper, I argue that selective homage is antithetical to the collectivist ethos that characterises African societies and constitutes a major problem in Mesembe Edet’s theory of ‘Conceptual Mandelanisation’ (CM). CM as an approach to system-building is built on reverence for the “deified personage” of Nelson Mandela. In search of a practical foundation for system-building in African philosophy, Edet proposed the theory of CM as a solution to the failures of system-building projects in postcolonial African philosophy. I shall first consider what is meant by CM in Edet’s philosophy. I then establish why CM as a theory promotes a system of selective homage due to its over-glorification of the sacrifices of one individual or leader over those of the community. I conclude my analysis by arguing that a consistent system-building project that aims to appropriate the personage of Africans would, in fact, appropriate the personages of the community or the collective personage of all its outstanding leaders, rather than that of a single individual.

Some scholars have lauded “decapitation tactics” as a legitimate approach by countries such as Nigeria, the United States of America, and Israel in their struggle against the expansion and influence of terrorist groups. The decapitation tactic implies, basically, three routes: killing, capturing, or capturing and then killing the leader(s) of terrorist cells. Through a critical analysis of the arguments for such a tactic, this article contends that the approach will not stem the proliferation of terrorist groups. The elimination of the leader(s) of terrorist groups does not play a decisive role in mitigating terrorism but has rather contributed to its surge in places with links to cells like Al-Qaeda. Also, the article defends the position that it is morally unjustified to kill terrorist leaders without a fair trial in a competent court of law. Using Boko Haram and Hamas as illustrations, the article contends that targeted killings subvert the existence and essence of the criminal justice system. Taking inspiration from deterrence theory, this article suggests that the decapitation tactic has served as a basis for escalation and proliferation of terrorist groups rather than serving as deterrence against the possibility of recurrence.

The main point in this chapter is that SDG 4 targets cannot be achieved without education justice, which entails that every child, young person and adult benefit from quality education and lifelong learning. There is no justification for the injustices arising from poor-quality education and exclusion as they exist today. Accordingly, tackling the problem of social, political and economic exclusion that emerges from the education sector, and the limitations they impose on the prospects of some individuals, must be prioritised to expedite the realisation of SDG 4. That entails, among other things, ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all. Drawing a nexus between education justice in basic education and higher education, the chapter exposes the nature of the challenges that sustain the injustices of educational exclusion and poor-quality education. These include the knock-on effects that injustices in basic education have on higher education, especially for students from marginalised schools. Interventions that seek to advance education justice towards attaining SDG 4 are also discussed.

In this dissertation, I consider a hitherto underexplored concept of ‘human minimum’ as proposed by H. Odera Oruka to obligate responsibility as an approach to tackling extreme poverty in Africa and beyond. I aim to establish, among other things, why it is morally problematic and economically counterproductive to demand equal moral responsibility from all moral agents irrespective of their economic differences to ensure the implementation of the human minimum or the elimination of extreme poverty. To achieve the aforementioned, I attempt to answer two significant questions, to wit: What are some of the moral implications of ensuring that a society attains the human minimum as an approach to fighting extreme poverty? Who has a greater moral responsibility for ensuring the attainment of the human minimum between the government, non-governmental/nonprofit organisations, and individual members of society? In Oruka’s philosophy, enforcement of a global human minimum is the equal moral obligation of all moral agents—all those situated above the poverty line. I will demonstrate why ignoring the economic differences – and inequalities – of those who qualify as moral agents in Oruka’s conceptualisation of extreme poverty, particularly in continental Africa, risks plunging more of those who live a little above the human minimum threshold into poverty. I then argue that a disproportionate distribution of responsibility that is sensitive to the economic disparities that exist among the non-poor population holds a better promise for success in the fight against extreme poverty in Africa.

I aim to establish in this article why Aribiah Attoe, like other determinists before him, got it wrong in arguing for the possibility of predeterminism in a materially evolving universe. I will do this by proving two things: I will first establish the inconsistency of the idea of predeterminism in an evolving universe. Then, I argue that the adirectionality presupposed by an evolutionary universe gives room for free will and negates the argument for a predeterministic universe. I aim to achieve the above by exposing why the view which upholds the universe and all existents within it as lacking free will – or the possibility of adirectionality – stems from a category error on the part of the determinists. Lastly, I defend the position that for predeterminism to stand a chance against the free will of animate things-in-the-world, it must deny the possibility of an evolving/expanding universe that is adirectional and suggestive of boundlessness, and the possibility that some events are not fundamentally necessary reactions to previous states of affairs.

In this paper, I argue that the cause of morally self-defeating acts at the collective level is greed and, at the individual level, an unrestrained impulse for pleasure beyond Innocent Asouzu’s primordial instinct for self-preservation and ignorance. In investigating why humans act in self-defeating ways, Asouzu came up with two possible factors responsible for self-defeating acts: The primordial instinct for selfpreservation and ignorance. Besides Asouzu’s explanation, I here argue that the problem of self-defeating acts goes beyond the primordial instinct for selfpreservation and ignorance to reveal a flaw characteristic of the human condition. At the collective level, the flaw responsible for self-defeating acts is greed and the unrestrained impulse for pleasure at the individual level. I employ the conversational method to interrogate the different views on self-defeating acts from Socrates to Asouzu and show why my explanation offers a better understanding of the problem.

Ada Agada is one of the most vocal voices of the Conversational School of Philosophy (CSP). In Consolationism and Comparative African Philosophy: Beyond Universalism and Particularism, Agada aims to provide clarity on the philosophical tenets of Consolationism, his project on system building that is central to the future direction and development of African philosophy. The book is divided into three parts: The first part focuses on the universalism-particularism conundrum in African philosophy, the second part is concerned with explicating the basic preoccupations of Consolation philosophy, and the third part focuses on cross-cultural and comparative philosophy which is one of the central themes of conversational philosophy.