Patrick H. Hutton

The works of three well-remembered French historians- Jules Michelet, Alphonse Aulard, and François Furet - raise the issue of memory's relationship to history, but each treats it in a different way. History for Michelet concerned the sustaining of tradition. His conceptions of the past grew directly out of a living tradition, from which he established comparatively little distance. For Aulard, history meant consecrating its events in the guise of science. History for Furet demanded the deconstruction of the commemorative forms in which the history of the Revolution had been enshrined. Today's historians may not wish to commemorate the past, but a historiography that dismisses the significance of a tradition of understanding the passions of the past is likely to lose its appeal to posterity. The writings emanating from this tradition hold great power to reveal the meaning the Revolution held for its participants. Overlooking the potency of these writings in order to underscore their power to shape the form of the Revolution's commemoration would be to deprive the event itself of enduring appeal

The "history of mentalities" considers the attitudes of ordinary people to everyday life. The approach is closely identified with the work of the Annales school. However, whereas the Annales historians refer to the material factors which condition human life, historians investigating mentalities examine psychological underpinnings. Historians who first developed guidelines for the history of mentalities were Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch, who were both concerned with collective systems of belief. Later, Philippe Ariès and Norbert Elias identified and developed theories on early childhood. Finally, Michel Foucault considered the psychology of social deviants and nonconformists. This mode of interpretation provides a means of examining those aspects of life which the linear approach cannot address, such as the pressure of conformity, the sense of accelerating time, and the preoccupation with self

In his new book, How Modernity Forgets, Paul Connerton seeks to show a relationship between the workings of late capitalism and the institutionalization of forgetfulness in ever more abstract conceptions of space and time. He uses this argument to explain why the topic of collective memory has waxed so large in contemporary historical scholarship. I interpret his argument in light of his earlier work on habit memory and his still earlier critique of Frankfurt School social theory. I close with some comments on his study in the context of recent work on mnemonic practices in modern culture.