Patrick Lee

Robert George of Princeton University challenges the fundamental dogma of contemporary political philosophy, namely, that it is wrong to "legislate morality." George's positive argument for morals legislation is in the tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas. "The idea that public morality is a public good, and that immoral acts--even between consenting adults--can therefore do public harm, has not been refuted by liberal critics of the central tradition". Chapter 1 defends this, arguing that a healthy political society has a moral environment or "ecology" which encourages virtue and is inhospitable to such vices as pornography, prostitution, drug abuse, and so on.

ABSTRACT This article defends the following argument: what makes you and I valuable so that it is wrong to kill us now is what we are (essentially). But we are essentially physical organisms, who, embryology reveals, came to be at conception/fertilisation. I reply to the objection to this argument (as found in Dean Stretton, Judith Thomson, and Jeffrey Reiman), which holds that we came to be at one time, but became valuable as a subject of rights only some time later, in virtue of an acquired characteristic. I argue against this position that the difference between a basic, natural capacity and some degree of development of such a capacity is a mere difference in degree, that this position logically implies the denial of equal personal dignity, and that the selection of the required degree of development of a capacity is necessarily arbitrary.

The reovirus cell attachment protein σ1 is a lollipopshaped structure with the fibrous tail anchored to the virion. Since it interacts with the cell receptor, σ1 is a major determinant of reovirus infectivity and tissue tropism. Studies on its structure‐function relationships have been facilitated by the fact that protein σ1 produced in any expression system is capable of binding to cell receptors. The use of site‐specific and deletion mutants has led to the identification and characterization of its virion anchorage and receptor binding domains. Studies on the oligomeric status of σ1 have revealed that σ1 is a homotrimer and that two independent trimerization events at different loci (the N‐ and C‐terminal halves, respectively) of the protein, are involved in its generation. This also accounts for a clearly demonstrable dominant negative effect by a mutant subunit in a wild‐type/mutant σ1 heterotrimer. Current efforts are focused on the involvement of chaperones in the generation of σ1 and on events that take place upon σ1 binding to the cell receptor. Protein σ1 has therefore become an excellent model system for the study of both virus attachment and protein oligomerization and folding mechanisms.

I reply to Steven Jensen’s article, “Phoenix Rising from the Ashes: Recent Attempts to Revive New Natural Law Action Theory,” which appeared in this journal in 2020. His arguments helpfully clarify where the disagreements between the strict and broad views of intention lie but, I argue, fail to refute the arguments and explanations he criticizes. I argue he misinterprets the strict view’s reference to necessity in its criterion for what is intended. I also argue against what he labels as the “identity thesis,” and against his attempt to show that the strict view (or New Natural Law theory of action) leads to the absurdity that most acts of adultery are not actually adultery.

New natural law theory holds that the basic moral principles are prescriptions to pursue the goods to which our nature orients us. Since God is the author of our nature and intelligence, these moral principles are part of his plan for creation. These principles can be known prior to knowing that God exists and prior to knowing that they are in fact directives from him. Nevertheless, since God’s plan includes our active cooperation, morally good acts cooperate with God’s providence, and morally bad acts substitute one’s subjective preference for God’s truth. Thus natural law principles direct us to a unified ultimate end, namely, the fulfillment of God’s plan. Therefore God and our relationship with him have a central place in NNLT.

Tanzania’s Oldupai Gorge is a flagship human origins research destination, yet less recognised is that the Maasai inhabit the region. This thesis uses actor-network-theory to ethnographically compare palaeoanthropological and Maasai epistemology and ontology in Oldupai, and to understand why collaboration between the groups has been sporadic. Researchers and locals constructed knowledge in equally logical forms, combining established facts and artefacts with novel data to produce new facts and artefacts. Instead of fundamental epistemic disparities, the content of each group’s knowledge differed, and this content was tied to subsistence strategies and culture. Scientists and the Maasai acquired resources in non-scientific and non-pastoral worlds to support their respective livelihoods, and multiplied ontologies by enacting composite – yet conflicting – versions of hybrid drought. Even though both groups dug in Oldupai, palaeoanthropological and Maasai subsistence exigencies have precluded meaningful collaboration. However, mutually beneficial partnerships are emerging in the birthplace of humanity.

From the standpoint of a Christian philosopher, heeding the teaching and exhortations of Pope John Paul II and previous popes, I examine three directions in which the recent philosophical debate has developed. In the last seven or eight years there has been 1) a renewed focus on the biological issue of when a human individual comes to be, 2) new arguments for the proposition that personhood is a characteristic acquired after birth, and 3) refinements of the early argument of Judith Thomson. Replying to these developments, I defend, on philosophical grounds, the pro-life position. I argue that a distinct, whole (though immature) human individual comes to be at conception, that he or she is a person, with full moral worth, from the moment he or she comes to be, and the mothers and fathers have a special responsibility to their children which entails (at least) that they ought not to choose to abort them. I conclude by briefly indicating, from the standpoint of Christian faith, why Christian philosophers should vigorously pursue this debate.

I defend the position argued previously by Germain Grisez and me that total brain death is a valid criterion of death on the grounds that a human being is essentially a rational animal, and a brain-dead body lacks the radical capacity for rational actions. I reply to Josef Seifert’s objection that our positions rest on a reductionist view of the human person, and to other objections concerning the inter-relation between the human soul, its powers, and functions of the brain. I argue that a brain-dead body lacks the material dispositions needed for having the form or soul of a human being.

We argue that all human beings have a special type of dignity which is the basis for (1) the obligation all of us have not to kill them, (2) the obligation to take their well-being into account when we act, and (3) even the obligation to treat them as we would have them treat us, and indeed, that all human beings are equal in fundamental dignity. We give reasons to oppose the position that only some human beings, because of their possession of certain characteristics in addition to their humanity (for example, an immediately exercisable capacity for self-consciousness, or for rational deliberation), have full moral worth. What distinguishes human beings from other animals, what makes human beings persons rather than things, is their rational nature, and human beings are rational creatures by virtue of possessing natural capacities for conceptual thought, deliberation, and free choice, that is, the natural capacity to shape their own lives.

The paper by Magill and Neaves in this issue of the Journal attempts to rebut the "natural potency" position, based on recent advances in direct reprogramming of somatic cells to yield "induced pluripotent stem" (iPS) cells. As stated by the authors, the natural potency position holds that because "a human embryo directs its own integral organismic function from its beginning . . . there is a whole, albeit immature, and distinct human organism that is intrinsically valuable with the status of inviolability and deserving full moral respect" (p. 26). The authors boldly assert that "The recent production of iPS . . . highlights a prima facie absurdity for the natural potentiality argument" (p. 29). Yet the argument against natural potency is both logically flawed and based on a characterization of the scientific evidence that is factually inaccurate.

Although there is a significant number of books and essays in which Aquinas's thought is examined in some detail, there are still many aspects of his writings that remain unknown to those outside the field of Thomistic studies; or which are generally misunderstood. An example is Aquinas's account of the origins of individual human life. This is the subject of a chapter in a recent book by Robert Pasnau on Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature (Cambridge: CUP, 2001). Since there will be readers whose only knowledge of the issues in question will come from Pasnau's account, and since that account is contentious in substance, and advanced in advocacy of a particular moral interest, it is necessary to provide another, and, we believe, more credible account of the issue of when human life begins, as this may be determined on the basis of known empirical facts and Aquinas's metaphysics, and a more accurate representation of how (and how extensively) this matter has been treated hitherto. The morality of abortion turns on two important sets of issues: the first metaphysical, concerning the beginnings of human life and the specific status of the embryo; the second, ethical, having to do with the nature and scope of value and associated moral requirements. Besides engaging in exegesis we address both issues in philosophical terms.