Patrick Monaghan

Computer-based logic proofs are a form of unnatural language in which the process and structure of proof generation can be observed in considerable detail. We have been studying how students respond to multimodal logic teaching, and performance measures have already indicated that students' pre-existing cognitive styles have a significant impact on teaching outcome. Furthermore, a large corpus of proofs has been gathered via automatic logging of proof development. This paper applies a series of techniques, including corpus statistical methods, to the proof logs. The results indicate that students' cognitive styles influence the structure of their logical discourse, via their differing methods of handling abstract information in diagrams, and transferring information between modalities.

Researchers from diverse disciplines, including organismal and cellular physiology, sports science, human nutrition, evolution and ecology, have sought to understand the causes and consequences of the surprising variation in metabolic rate found among and within individual animals of the same species. Research in this area has been hampered by differences in approach, terminology and methodology, and the context in which measurements are made. Recent advances provide important opportunities to identify and address the key questions in the field. By bringing together researchers from different areas of biology and biomedicine, we describe and evaluate these developments and the insights they could yield, highlighting the need for more standardisation across disciplines. We conclude with a list of important questions that can now be addressed by developing a common conceptual and methodological toolkit for studies on metabolic variation in animals.

ABSTRACT: Many of the results of Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits depend upon his argument that many, if not all, of our mental states fail to be luminous in the sense that if we are in them, then we are in a position to know that we are in them. The purpose of this article is to show that his argument is unsound. I conclude by distinguishing between partial and total luminosity, and by arguing that even if mental states are not totally luminous, they are at least partially so.RÉSUMÉ: Plusieurs des résultats du livre de Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits dépendent de son argument à l'effet que la plupart, sinon tous nos états mentaux ne sont pas lumineux au sens où tout en se trouvant dans un tel état, nous sommes en position, de savoir que tel est notre état. Cet article a pour objectif de démontrer que ce raisonnement ne tient pas. Nous concluons par une distinction entre luminosité partielle ou complète et soutenons que, même si les états mentaux ne sont pas entièrernent clairvoyants, ils le sont en partie

I often tell my students that the only thing that is not controversial in philosophy is that everything else in it is controversial. While this might be a bit of an exaggeration, it does contain a kernel of truth, as many exaggerations do: philosophy is a highly contentious discipline. So it is remarkable the extent to which there is agreement in the philosophy of religion amongst theists, agnostics, and atheists alike that John Mackie’s argument for atheism is either invalid or unsound. As a result, the focus has entirely shifted from the logical problem of evil to the so-called evidential one. But I think that this is a mistake, not necessarily because I think Mackie’s argument is sound, but rather because I reject an assumption made by apparently all parties to the debate, which is that there is only one logical problem of evil. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to defend a deductive argument that God* does not exist. As far as I can tell, the basic idea of this argument is a novel one: while Mackie’s argument has a more or less consequentialist framework, mine has a deontological one. The evil of which I will speak is that of our having been thrown into the world.

In several recent issues of this journal, I argued for an account of property possession as strict, numerical identity. While this account has stuck some as being highly idiosyncratic in nature, it is not entirely something new under the sun, since as I will argue in this paper, it turns out to have a historic precedent in Plato⠀™ s theory of forms. Indeed, the purpose of this paper is twofold. The first is to show that my account of property possession can be utilized to provide a novel interpretation of Plato⠀™ s theory of forms. And the second is to show that once it has been divorced from a variety of implausible doctrines with which it has historically been wedded, Plato⠀™ s central insight that all properties possess themselves, far from being of mere historical interest, is independently plausible, ironically enough, even from an empirical point of view