University of Virginia
Corcoran Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2005
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Aesthetics
  •  6
    Editor's Introduction
    American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2): 139-149. 2025.
  •  14
    Chesterton and Policing
    American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2): 315-335. 2025.
    Philosophers are increasingly interested in studying policing, often with an eye to reforming it or even abolishing it. In this paper, I bring together some of G. K. Chesterton’s scattered remarks on the subject. I show that Chesterton anticipates many of the ideas current in the policing literature. Having tried to bring some order to these disparate comments, I then try to construct a preliminary philosophy of policing based on them. I connect Distributist thought to ideas in a recent book by …Read more
  •  47
    A thomistic argument for the containment view of pregnancy
    Philosophical Quarterly. forthcoming.
    The ‘containment view’ of pregnancy is widely held, but it has recently been subjected to sustained criticism by Elselijn Kingma. According to the containment view, human foetuses (among others) are animals in their own right, contained within their mothers. Kingma's alternative to this is the ‘parthood view,’ according to which a foetus is a maternal part. Despite the prevalence of the containment view, there are not a great many arguments in its favour, and Kingma has searchingly criticized se…Read more
  •  18
    The Political Economy of Distributism: Property, Liberty, and the Common Good by Alexander William Salter
    American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3): 365-368. 2024.
  •  90
    Hylemorphic animalism and conjoined twins
    Philosophical Studies 181 (1): 205-222. 2024.
    Animalism is the doctrine that you and I are animals. Like any substantive philosophical position, animalism faces objections. For example, imagine a case of conjoined twins, where there are two heads, but only one “body,” and where each head seems to have its own typically human and fully discrete mental life. It would be natural to assume that each of the twins is a thing like you and me—each twin is one of us. But it appears that each twin cannot be a distinct human animal, since it appears i…Read more
  •  58
    “Stand Your Ground”: A Clarification
    Criminal Justice Ethics 41 (3): 215-237. 2022.
    “Stand Your Ground” (SYG) laws are subject to controversy within both the philosophical literature and the legal literature; and of course they are hotly debated outside of academia as well. In this paper I show that a great part of these discussions is predicated on often very serious errors about what SYG is or isn’t, and I explain them in the context of self-defense law. Though my main purpose is clarification and the correction of some errors in the literature, I close with some brief though…Read more
  •  51
    Eternal Life and Human Happiness in Heaven: Philosophical Problems, Thomistic Solutions
    American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4): 667-670. 2022.
  •  56
    This is a critical study of Fabrizio Amerini’s recent book, ‘Aquinas on the Beginning and End of Human Life.’ It briefly summarizes the book’s main line of argument, and then raises some objections, principally to Amerini’s contention that St Thomas’s metaphysical views should lead the Thomistically-inclined philosopher to accept delayed hominization even given modern embryological knowledge. The topics discussed include abortion and euthanasia, although the first of these is dealt with at great…Read more
  •  126
    St. Thomas Aquinas on Mixture and the Gappy Existence of the Elements
    History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 18 (1): 255-268. 2015.
    When elements join together in a mixture, those elements remain in the mixture, but only virtually. They are present with their powers, but without their substantial forms. When the mixture corrupts, the elements come to be actually present. And so my question: according to St. Thomas, are the elements that come to be actually present as a result of the corruption of the mixed body numerically identical with the elements that came together to create the mixture? I answer yes. This answer entails…Read more
  •  43
    Is Distributism Agrarian?
    Quaestiones Disputatae 8 (1): 88-107. 2017.
  •  35
    Editor’s Introduction
    Quaestiones Disputatae 8 (1): 3-6. 2017.
  •  43
    Reading ‘is’ Existentially in Republic 476–80
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (2): 171-183. 2011.
    An existential reading of ‘is’ in the argument at Republic 476–480 is widely thought to be objectionable because it commits Plato to belief in degrees of existence. In this paper, I argue that neither proposed alternative—the veridical reading or the predicative reading—can be reconciled with the text, thus forcing the existential reading upon us. Further, I show that when Plato's doctrine of existence is properly understood, his commitment to degrees of existence is not at all absurd.
  •  266
    St. Thomas Aquinas on death and the separated soul
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4): 587-599. 2010.
    Since St. Thomas Aquinas holds that death is a substantial change, a popular current interpretation of his anthropology must be mistaken. According to that interpretation – the ‘survivalist’ view – St. Thomas holds that we human beings survive our deaths, constituted solely by our souls in the interim between death and resurrection. This paper argues that St. Thomas must have held the ‘corruptionist’ view: the view that human beings cease to exist at their deaths. Certain objections to the corru…Read more
  •  98
    On Merricks’s Dictum
    Journal of Philosophical Research 33 293-297. 2008.
    Consider the claim that if there were macrophysical objects, they would cause things. Trenton Merricks takes this to be an obviously true claim, and he puts it to work in his argument for eliminating some (alleged) macrophysical objects. In this short paper, I argue that the claim in question—Merricks’s Dictum—is not obviously true, and may even be false.
  •  167
    Hylemorphism, remnant persons and personhood
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1): 76-96. 2014.
    Animalism is the doctrine that we human beings are – are identical with – animals. Hylemorphism is a form of animalism. In this paper, I defend hylemorphism by showing that while other forms of animalism fall prey to the problem of ‘Remnant Persons,’ hylemorphism does not. But hylemorphism's account of personhood seems to have some very implausible implications. I address one of those implications, and argue that it isn't nearly as objectionable as it might at first appear.
  •  80
    An Old Argument Against Co-location
    Metaphysica 8 (1): 45-51. 2007.
    I defend an old argument against co-location—the view that human animals are distinct from, but co-located with human persons. The argument is drawn from St. Thomas Aquinas. In order to respond to the argument, co-locationists have to endorse at least one of a trio of claims, none of which is obviously correct. Further, two of the options do not seem to be the sort of positions that should be flowing out of the acceptance of a general metaphysical position. I conclude that co-locationism is more…Read more
  •  109
    Transubstantiation, essentialism, and substance
    Religious Studies 47 (2): 217-231. 2011.
    According to the Eucharistic doctrine of Transubstantiation, when the priest consecrates the bread and wine, the whole substance of the bread and wine are converted into the body and blood of Christ. The of the bread and wine, however, remain present on the altar. This doctrine leads to a clutch of metaphysical problems, some of which are particularly troubling for essentialists. In this paper, I discuss some of these problems, which have recently been pressed by Brian Ellis and Justin Broackes.…Read more
  •  85
    Reading ‘is’ Existentially in Republic 476–80
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (2): 171-183. 2011.
    An existential reading of ‘is’ in the argument at Republic 476–480 is widely thought to be objectionable because it commits Plato to belief in degrees of existence. In this paper, I argue that neither proposed alternative—the veridical reading or the predicative reading—can be reconciled with the text, thus forcing the existential reading upon us. Further, I show that when Plato's doctrine of existence is properly understood, his commitment to degrees of existence is not at all absurd.
  •  227
    On Aristotelianism and Structures as Parts
    Ratio 26 (2): 148-161. 2012.
    Aristotelian substance theory tells us that substances have structures (read: forms) as proper parts. This claim has recently been defended by Kathrin Koslicki who dubbed it the ‘Neo-Aristotelian Thesis.’ Strangely, Aristotelianism has not yet been universally embraced by philosophers – partly because some of its claims, such as the Neo-Aristotelian Thesis – are viewed by some as counterintuitive at best. In this paper, I argue for Aristotelianism by showing its philosophical usefulness: specifi…Read more
  •  222
    Emergent substance
    Philosophical Studies 141 (3). 2008.
    In this paper, I develop an ontological position according to which substances such as you and I have no substantial parts. The claim is not that we are immaterial souls. Nor is the claim that we are “human atoms” co-located with human organisms. It is, rather, that we are macrophysical objects that are, in the relevant sense, simple. I contend that despite initial appearances, this claim is not obviously false, and I defend it by showing how much work it can do.
  •  195
    St. Thomas Aquinas on punishing souls
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 71 (2): 103-116. 2012.
    The details of St. Thomas Aquinas’s anthropological view are subject to debate. Some philosophers believe he held that human persons survive their deaths. Other philosophers think he held that human persons cease to exist at their death, but come back into being at the general resurrection. In this paper, I defend the latter view against one of the most significant objections it faces, namely, that it entails that God punishes and rewards separated souls for the sins or merits of something else:…Read more
  •  160
    On Substance
    American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1): 25-48. 2010.
    In this paper, I offer a theory of substance. There are three steps in the argument. First, I present and explain my definition of substance. Second, I argue that the definition yields the right results: that is, my definition rules that (among other things) events and universals, privations and piles of trash, are not substances, but at least some ordinary physical objects are. Third, I defend the definition by rebutting two obvious objections to it.
  •  200
    Independence accounts of substance and substantial parts
    Philosophical Studies 155 (1). 2011.
    Traditionally, independence accounts of substance have held pride of place. Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes and Spinoza—among many others—accepted independence accounts in one form or another. The general thrust of such views is that substances are those things that are apt to exist in themselves. In this paper, I argue that several contemporary independence theories of substance—including those of Kit Fine, E.J. Lowe and Michael Gorman—include an ad hoc element that renders them unacceptable. I'l…Read more
  •  65
    Beauty and Being: Thomistic Perspectives. By Piotr Jaroszyński. Translated by Hugh McDonald (review)
    American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4): 786-788. 2013.
  •  63
    The prayer of the molinist
    Heythrop Journal 49 (6): 940-947. 2008.
    According to the ‘Power of Prayer’ objection to Molinism, the insights of the Church's great saints and spiritual directors regarding how best to grow in the spiritual life conflict with Molinism: spiritual growth is best achieved by praying from a Thomistic attitude towards Providence. Thomas Flint has recently replied to this objection as it was raised by Fr. Reginald Garrigou‐Lagrange. In this paper, I respond on behalf of Garrigou‐Lagrange.
  •  46
    In this brief note, Toner discusses Adam Reed's reply ("Not Even False," The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Spring 2008) to his earlier paper, "Objectivist Atheology" (The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Spring 2007). He argues that Reed's criticisms do not hold up under scrutiny
  •  52
    On Departing Hominization
    American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2): 175-194. 2015.
    It is a matter of dispute whether St. Thomas Aquinas accepted the doctrine of “departing hominization.” Departing hominization is the view that in the process of human death, the rational soul departs first, leaving a mere animal ensouled by a sensitive soul, and then the sensitive soul departs, leaving a corpse. This would be a surprising thing for St. Thomas to believe, but he does appear to endorse the view in at least one place. I argue that he does not, in fact, accept departing hominizatio…Read more
  •  80
    Fashionable Nihilism (review)
    American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77 (2): 307-310. 2003.
  •  137
    St. Thomas Aquinas on the Problem of Too Many Thinkers
    Modern Schoolman 89 (3-4): 209-222. 2012.
    It has been argued that St. Thomas Aquinas’s anthropological views fall prey to the problem of “Too Many Thinkers.” The worry, roughly, is that his views entail that I—a human person—am able to think, but that my soul—which is not a human person—is also able to think. Hence, too many thinkers: there are too many ofus having my thoughts. In this paper, I show why this is not a problem for St. Thomas. Along the way, I also address Peter Unger’s argument for substance dualism.
  •  116