Paul B. Woodruff

Socrates seeks wisdom through self-ridicule, which is a product of self-questioning. The questions he asks others are questions that he asks of himself, questions that we should be asking of ourselves. They are mischievous questions in that they bring to light comfortable presuppositions that will not stand up to investigation; taking them seriously helps us reach an understanding of our ignorance, an understanding that is the basis of human wisdom. What Socrates calls his _daimonion_, an uncanny ability to avoid wrongdoing, is a product of his self-questioning. Because he has become clear about his ethical commitments, he is able to honor them consistently. Uncanny this may be, but it is not beyond human reach.

How does one talk about moral thought and moral action as a religious naturalist? We explore this question by considering two human capacities: the capacity for mindfulness, and the capacity for virtue. We suggest that mindfulness is deeply enhanced by an understanding of the scientific worldview and that the four cardinal virtues—courage, fairmindedness, humaneness, and reverence—are rendered coherent by mindful reflection. We focus on the concept of mindful reverence and propose that the mindful reverence elicited by the evolutionary narrative is at the heart of religious naturalism. Religious education, we suggest, entails the cultivation of mindful virtue, in ourselves and in our children.

Like Plato, Protagoras held that young children learn virtue from fine examples in poetry. Unlike Plato, Protagoras taught adults by correcting the diction of poets. In this paper I ask what his standard of correctness might be, and what benefit he intended his students to take from exercises in correction. If his standard of correctness is truth, then he may intend his students to learn by questioning the content of poems; that would be suggestive of Plato’s program in Republic III. But his standard is more likely to be the accurate use of language; in that case he would intend his students to learn to express their thoughts clearly enough that their audience would understand what they were saying. That standard would be independent of the truth of what they are saying; and that would be a precursor to modern techniques by which we try to teach speaking and writing. Truth is not so easy to escape, however, and we shall see that Protagoras’ exercise must assume that the poet is trying to tell the truth.

Virtue ethics can be practical if we give it a new start, working from Socrates' approach to ethics as represented in Plato. This approach is more promising than that of most recent virtue ethicists, who begin from Aristotle. It is also more practical than modern ethical theories. Socrates asks us to nurture the moral health of our souls all our lives, whereas Aristotle teaches us to acquire virtues as traits. Traits are not reliable however, and false confidence in one's virtue is a major cause of moral error and the moral injury that results from error. I must never think with any certainty that I have a virtue. It is especially dangerous for me to think that I have the wisdom or moral knowledge that would keep me on the right path. Socrates sets an example by recognizing his ignorance through self-examination and by making that recognition a cornerstone of human wisdom. But Socrates does not explain how we can seek virtue when we do not know for sure what it is. This book goes beyond what we know of Socrates in order to show how we can seek virtue without having knowledge. Using real-life examples, some of them from warfare, the book shows how we can nurture our souls and avoid moral injury so far as possible. The outcome of a life on this Socratic model is beauty of soul and a special kind of happiness.

Plato represents Socrates as believing in the unity of the virtues, quarreling with those who, like Protagoras or Meno, wish to treat the virtues as distinct objects of inquiry. On the other hand, there is good reason to deny that Plato's Socrates believed in the numerical identity of the virtues. What Socrates did believe, I shall argue, is that the various virtues are one in essence. I shall show what this means and how it clears up prima facie inconsistencies among Plato's early dialogues.If I am right, Socrates’ theory has startling consequences. Since essence is exactly what Socrates wants a definition to state, it follows that all virtues will have one and the same definition. And if this is so, no wonder the quest for separate definitions of virtues fails in every case! For example in the Laches the generals are baffled by Courage because Courage has no private essence and cannot be marked off from the other virtues by stating its essence. Its essence is Virtue entire. That is a radical view, but there are good reasons for attributing it to Socrates.