Paul Benjamin Cherlin

One is tempted to claim that “nature” and “existence” can be understood in an infinity of ways. It is a mistake to see either term as denoting some abstract and universal object of contemplation that cuts across cultures. Every depiction and characterization of the universe comes packaged with an entire way of living, so much so that it is rather impossible to say that our metaphysical views shape how we live without also accepting that how we live shapes our metaphysics. We do not all gaze upon the same Moon as we lay awake at night, and we do not all wake to the same Sun.

“Prefigurations of Dewey’s Metaphysics: 1903–1916” highlights the major thematic elements of Dewey’s work between 1903 and 1916, providing guidance for understanding the metaphysical theory that would be more fully developed within the 1925 publication of Experience and Nature. More specifically, the chapter focuses upon three recurring interpretive strategies that are continually employed throughout Dewey’s Middle Works: continuity, double-movement, and tensional exchange. It is proposed that Dewey’s eventual metaphysical theory grew organically out of the insights of this earlier period.

“Generic Traits of Existence” discusses the meaning, import, and function of Dewey’s generic traits of existence, existential features that constitute the backbone of Dewey’s metaphysical theory. Drawing especially from Experience and Nature, it is argued that generic traits are best thought of as the pervasive and necessary patterns or rhythms of nature, a set of tensional relationships that are ultimately inseparable from one another. Extended analyses are provided for two of Dewey’s generic traits: the precarious-and-stable and the qualitative.

John Dewey’s Metaphysical Theory provides an overview and technical exposition of Dewey’s mature ontological theory. In particular, “nature,” “experience,” and their relationship, are given extended treatment through a close reading of primary texts. Following Dewey’s metaphysical postulates and conclusions, the book suggests how experience may reveal the fundamental traits of nature. In addition, the book reveals how Dewey understood the ways in which all phenomena may relate within an inclusive economy of existence, what it means to have an “identity,” what constitutes “selfhood” or personality, and how metaphysics relates to the ideals of democracy and social ethics.

In John Dewey’s logical theory, qualities or qualitative relations account for the capacity to distinguish and associate the objects of reflective thought; they are antecedent to reflective analysis and necessary for coherent processes of inquiry. In Dewey’s writings that are specifically “metaphysical” in orientation, he is much more vague about the function of qualities, but does call them “generic traits of existence.” As such, they appear to be central to his mature ontological theory. In order to more fully understand the metaphysical import of qualitative relations, I first examine the details of Dewey’s logical theory, and then generalize those details in accordance with Dewey’s larger theory of nature. The end result is a novel interpretation of Dewey’s metaphysics.

The essay that follows discusses an ordered series of situated environmental “fields” that comprise John Dewey’s “emergent naturalism.” These fields include nature, experience, mind, subconscious, consciousness, and cognitive thought. I propose an order to these fields, and provide an overview of the ways in which fields that are larger in scope stand as the conditions for those that are more limited. I also suggest ways in which cognitive thought further emerges through the process of inquiry. This emergent scheme culminates in a type of inquiry where an agent actively creates conflict in order to enrich experience.

Emergentism is an important and yet underexplored component of John Dewey’s metaphysical program, and concerns the ways in which existences relate, operate, and grow in coordination with a more inclusive environment. Through an emergent account, Dewey addresses continuities among the generic traits of nature, inanimate substance, biological life, and experiential “fields” such as mind and consciousness. The notion of a field is especially important for depicting the ways in which existences serially interact in accordance with some particular purpose or set of functions. Apart from an emergent scheme that contextualizes the interactive contexts of experience, phenomena such as “mind” and “consciousness” remain enigmatic occurrences. Moreover, cognition, and with it instances of “knowing,” remain susceptible to merely “subjective” characterizations that reinforce a misleading dualism between mind and nature. In addition to its role in addressing naturalistic continuities, Dewey’s emergentism suggests a non-reductive philosophical methodology that directly challenges contemporary varieties of realism and materialism.

The 1925 publication of Experience and Nature marks a new period in John Dewey's thought: he had become interested in developing a naturalistic metaphysics. Despite his new metaphysical orientation, Dewey's mature philosophy is compatible with and builds upon works that fall within his Middle Period, from 1903–1924.1 While this is usually accepted as true, my more substantial claim is that we cannot get a clear picture of Dewey's metaphysics apart from what came before. More than simply showing that Dewey's characterization of specific topics, such as "logic," or specific terms, such as "belief," are compatible with his later discussions, this article will demonstrate that the broader dynamics, themes, and...