Paul Bloomfield

The two most prominent modern theories of practical rationality, the Humean and the Kantian, both fall prey to what Sidgwick calls ‘the fundamental dualism of practical rationality’. Hume subordinates morality to inclination and Kant subordinates inclination to morality, and never the twain shall meet. We will do better by starting with a eudaimonist theory of morality and practical reason, which does not engender Sidgwick's dualism. Instead of a tension within practical reason between morality (the general or social point of view) and self-interest (egoism), we get a tension within the virtue of justice or _dikaiosyne_ between self-regarding and other-regarding considerations. Starting from here, the justification of morality in the face of self-interested egoism becomes a possibility, given that a naturalistic and yet moralized conception of _phronesis_ (practical rationality or prudence) makes it partly constitutive of _eudaimonia_ (happiness or the Good Life).

The question “Why is it bad to be bad?” might seem either tautologous or poorly formed. It may seem like a tautology because it seems logical to think that badness is necessarily bad and so it must, of course, follow that it is bad to be bad. It might seem to be malformed because it may seem like anyone who asks the question, “Why is it bad to be bad?” must fail to understand the meaning of the words they are using: generally, if something is X, it cannot fail to be X. If so, then it may seem as if there must be something wrong with the question itself or with the linguistic abilities of the person asking it. The inclusion of “all things considered” is crucial. Some think that there is a problem with the idea of an all-things-considered point of view since it seems to them that the plurality of values one attempts to bring together in a single perspective may be incommensurable, so there is a problem in the idea of engaging such a perspective.

Morality can be painfully demanding so much so that we sometimes question the wisdom of complying with it. Indeed, according to H. A. Prichard, making this argument work is the central preoccupation of moral philosophy. But Prichard also believes that to the extent this is true, the whole subject of moral philosophy rests on a mistake (1968, 1). Moreover, the consensus is not only that we should call these things moral but also that we should _be_ these things, which gives us a clue to the word's meaning. When a person refers to an act by saying, “That's immoral” listeners normally understand the speaker to be saying there is reason not to do the act. This way of understanding the term's use may not fully capture the term's meaning, any more than a set of injunctions to be kind, honest, and peaceful fully covers morality's extension.

There are two conceptions of “morality” currently at play in the philosophical literature and employing them differentially affects how the relationship of morality to self-interest is conceived. The first conception may be thought of as the social conception of “morality”. It begins with the question of how one ought to behave toward others. Morality is seen as having a final authority over our lives and the interests of others play a necessary role in the decision procedures we ought to use. Where the interests of others are not at issue, morality does not come into play: there is no morality for an agent stranded alone on a desert island. The other conception of morality dates back to the ancient Greeks, and takes as its starting point the question, “How ought I to live?”. It might fairly be called the “Socratic” conception of morality (see Plato's _Gorgias_, 500c; _Republic_, 344e). Answering this question will inevitably require one to consider how one will behave toward other people, but extends beyond that, to every significant aspect of a person's life, however private.

While it is quite common to find virtue epistemologists writing about the moral aspects of the intellectual virtues, it is far more rare for virtue ethicists to pay attention to the intellectual aspects of the moral virtues. Some headway on this topic is attempted and conclusions derived. A model of how the moral virtues are related to each other is developed through attending to their similar intellectual structures, such that relations between being courageous, temperate, and just are modeled on being a carpenter, a plumber, and an electrician. Practical wisdom (phronesis) provides a foundation for gaining all these traits. These ideas yield a version of the 'unity of virtues' thesis in which possessing practical wisdom is necessary but not sufficient for the possession of the other virtues; in addition to practical wisdom, experience and special knowledge in the field of the virtue are also required.

Inspired by William Lycan’s work on both naturalistic moral realism and olfaction, an inquiry is begun into the relations between moral value and smell. Surprisingly, after reflecting on the differences between smell, on one hand, and color and sound, on the other, there are reasons to think that, in certain circumstances, value can be literally smelled, in the way that fetid smells are disgusting. Relations are discussed between nutritional value, prudential value, and moral value, and how these kinds of value may be literally perceived. Recent data supporting olfaction’s role in some value-laden experiences is discussed and the most obvious objections to smelling (moral) value are dispelled.

Temperance is presented as the virtue by which non-cognitive conations — urges, appetites, desires, emotions, passions, etc. — are managed excellently: temperate conations are justified by their fittingness to their circumstances. Instead of being self-indulgent or wanton slaves of passion, temperate people master their conations, virtuously curating and integrating them into their well-lived lives. Continence, understood using Sripada's (2021) model of self-control, is a developmental step toward temperance and incontinence or weakness of will is modeled on failures of cognitive control, as found in phenomena such as the Stroop effect (1932). Contra Davidson, irrationality does not cause weakness of will but rather weakness of will causes us to act irrationally. Finally, a Platonic model of temperance is introduced in which a temperate person’s relations to their conations can be understood through the symbiotic relations between human and canine shepherds.

Plato's _Republic_ divided subsequent study of justice in two, as a virtue of people and of institutions. Here, the start of a reunification is attempted. Justice is first understood personally as the virtuous mean between arrogance and servility, where just people properly respect themselves and others. Because justice requires that like cases be treated alike and self-respect is a special instance of respect generally, justice requires a single standard for self and others. In understanding justice in terms of respect, structural analogies become apparent between “recognition” and “appraisal” respect, on the one hand, and Rawls' two principles of justice on the other. The present view is then compared to “social egalitarian” theories of justice and the essay concludes with a discussion of how mercy is related to justice and an explanation of why just people always look for reasons to mitigate blame and punishment but never to aggravate them.

There is little more common in ethics than to think pain is intrinsically bad and pleasure is intrinsically good. A Humean-style error theory of the axiology of pain and pleasure is developed against these commonsense claims. We defend the thesis that the value of pain and pleasure is always contingent and only instrumental. We survey prominent theories of both intrinsic value and pain/pleasure, all of which assume that pain and pleasure are intrinsically valuable. We base our error theory on counterexamples to this assumption, upon which these theories falter, and a theory of pain and pleasure which derives their value solely from their evolutionary function.

The semantics of “health” are discussed by way of Aquinas’ theory of analogical predication: “health” and “good” have the tripartite semantic structure in terms of a base use, causes, and signs. This tripartite structure is mapped back onto the discussion of virtue theory, deontology, and consequentialism. T. Horgan and M.Timmon's Moral Twin Earth problem for moral realism is discussed and found not to apply to the present theory. The syntax of biological function statements is explicated and found to have the same underlying structure as prescriptions. A sketch of a theory of the normativity is proffered.

The property of physical health is presented as a model for moral goodness, and a primer on being healthy follows. Healthiness is understood in terms of proper biological function. Conventionalism and relativism, two bugbears of moral realism, are discussed in relation to healthiness and found not to arouse suspicion about the reality of physical health. By analogy, these can be accommodated by moral realism. A discussion of the supervenience and reduction of goodness and health follows, and the chapter ends with a discussion of S. Blackburn's challenge to moral realism based on supervenience.

It is absurd to be a motivational internalist about the property of health; there is no magnetism or queerness in tofu despite it being healthy, and the same tack should be taken with regard to the property of moral goodness. Intuitions behind internalism are found to be confused, and problems are discussed with regard to Hume and Williams on the one hand and Kant, Nagel, and Korsgaard on the other. Externalism is defended: each of us is not as responsive to goodness as we might be, and it is contingent whether or not we motivationally respond to what we recognize is good.