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10Affect, Representation, and the Standards of Practical ReasonDissertation, University of Michigan. 2016.How does human agency relate to the good? According to a thesis with ancient pedigree, the connection is very tight. Known as “the Guise of the Good” (GG), it states that human action or motivation to act, of some special kind or another, is only possible insofar as the agent performs or is motivated to perform the act because of the good she sees in so acting. But how might agents see their actions as good? Recent research in moral psychology, the philosophy of mind, and the cognitive sciences …Read more
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893Intelligibility and the Guise of the GoodJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (1): 1-31. 2018.According to the Guise of the Good, an agent only does for a reason what she sees as good. One of the main motivations for the view is its apparent ability to explain why action for a reason must be intelligible to its agent, for on this view, an action is intelligible just in case it seems good. This motivation has come under criticism in recent years. Most notably, Kieran Setiya has argued that merely seeing one’s action as good does not suffice to make the action intelligible. In this paper, …Read more
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183Making sense of unpleasantness: evaluationism and shooting the messengerPhilosophical Studies 173 (11): 2969-2992. 2016.Unpleasant sensations possess a unique ability to make certain aversive actions seem reasonable to us. But what is it about these experiences that give them that ability? According to some recent evaluationist accounts, it is their representational content: unpleasant sensations represent a certain event as bad for one. Unfortunately evaluationism seems unable to make sense of our aversive behavior to the sensations themselves, for it appears to entail that taking a painkiller is akin to shootin…Read more
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30Review of Nada Gligorov: Neuroethics and the Scientific Revision of Common Sense: Dordrecht: Springer, 2016. 169 pp. USD $99.99 , $79.99 (review)Neuroethics 10 (2): 319-323. 2017.This ambitious book aims to make a substantive contribution to six separate debates within neuroethics — the existence of free will, the impact of cognitive enhancement and of memory management on personal identity, the nature of mental privacy, the supposed subjectivity of pain, and the proper definition of death — all in the context of a framing argument concerning the relation between common sense psychological concepts and scientific concepts. Gligorov means to rebut skepticism about folk me…Read more
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
PhD, 2016
Montréal, Quebec, Canada
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Pain and Pain Experience |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Social and Political Philosophy |