Paul Gabriel Sandu

This article argues that Heidegger’s conception of ecstatic temporality can be read as emerging, in a decisive but non-explicit way, from Nietzsche’s thought of eternal recurrence. Its central claim is twofold. First, eternal recurrence is interpreted not as a cosmological doctrine, but as an existential thought experiment that already destabilizes linear, homogeneous time: it forces a restructuring of the relation between past, present, and future by requiring the affirmation of life as a whole. In this sense, Nietzsche’s thought anticipates key formal features of Heidegger’s analysis of temporality, especially the non-successive unity of future, having-been, and present. Second, the article argues that Heidegger’s ontological formalization of this Nietzschean intuition simultaneously transforms and displaces it. What in Nietzsche remains an irreducibly singular, non-transferable ethical ordeal becomes in Heidegger an existential-ontological structure articulated through being-toward-death, repetition, and historicality. The decisive break appears when Heidegger shifts from the affirmation of one’s own contingent life to the retrieval of inherited possibilities, and ultimately to the notions of destiny (Schicksal) and communal destiny (Geschick). Thus, Heidegger both radicalizes and betrays Nietzsche: he gives conceptual form to the temporal insight opened by eternal recurrence, but only by neutralizing its most uncompromising core – the strictly singular character of affirmation.

A “Reconciliation” with Time – Speculative Figures and Metamorphoses of Temporality. This paper offers an examination of Dragoș Grusea’s work, Clipă și timp [Time and the Instant], focusing on its speculative and dialectical reconceptualization of temporality. Through close readings of Goethe’s Faust and Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the analysis foregrounds the idea of abchronism – a foundational, non-empirical temporality that underlies chronological time. Mephistopheles appears as a figure of destructive yet generative negativity, while Nietzsche’s Eternal Return challenges the will’s relation to the irreversibility of the past. Grusea proposes a dynamic, non-linear temporality in which affirmation and negation co-constitute meaning, culminating in a synthesis between Kantian aesthetics, German idealism, and a radical rethinking of time’s redemptive potentials. The main question I try to explore in this context is the overman's ability to affirm life fully by reconciling with the past – an issue that echoes Heidegger’s own reflections on temporality and historicity.

This essay reconstructs a structural tension in Western philosophy: it is repeatedly accused of being too subversive (from Socrates onward) and, at the same time, of being irrelevant—an anxiety crystallized by Karl Marx’s injunction to change the world rather than merely interpret it. Against this backdrop, the article engages Emilian Mihailov’s meta-philosophical defense of ethical “revisionism” in his Kant-focused book Arhitectonica Moralității: philosophy should educate moral thinking via conceptual clarification, discrimination, and linguistic hygiene. The central problem becomes whether such revisionism is compatible with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later view that philosophy must only describe ordinary language and “leave everything as it is.” The author argues that, if one fully accepts Wittgensteinian descriptivism (as reinforced by some analytic reconstructions and Richard Rorty’s pragmatist line), genuine revisionism collapses into mere “festivity.” Yet abandoning revisionism would amount to amputating philosophy’s critical vocation. The essay therefore defends retaining philosophy’s normative-critical capacity by challenging the assumption that language is nothing but use, and closes by contrasting Wittgenstein’s anti-metaphorical therapy with Friedrich Nietzsche’s figurative destabilization of “truth,” suggesting that Wittgenstein may still smuggle in a metaphysical ideal of correctness under the banner of ordinary language.

Acest articol reinterpretează noțiunea levinasiană de „chip” (față) plecând de la ideea de non-fenomen: chipul nu este o formă anatomică reducibilă la trăsături descriibile (ochi, nas, gură), ci evenimentul transcendenței care precedă cunoașterea, rupe spontaneitatea subiectului și îl obligă etic prin porunca originară „să nu ucizi”. Pe acest fundal, textul investighează tensiunea din declarațiile târzii ale lui Emmanuel Levinas privind „chipul animalului” și arată că suspendarea recunoașterii lui până la o „analiză mai specifică” intră în conflict cu caracterul pre-reflexiv și nemediat al interpelării etice. Printr-o lectură în paralel a poemului Torsul arhaic al lui Apollo de Rainer Maria Rilke, torsul fragmentar care „vede” cu toate părțile și enunță imperativul „Trebuie să îți schimbi viața” este tratat ca analog fenomenologic al chipului: o vizibilitate care se retrage tocmai când se adresează. Concluzia propune o mutație hermeneutică: dacă abandonăm limbajul totalității și diferența antropologică, suntem constrânși să admitem că și animalele non-umane pot „avea chip” – adică pot manifesta o exterioritate ireductibilă care ne obligă, cu consecințe pentru etica animalelor, drept și ideea de comunitate dincolo de specie.

În acest articol articol discut natura philia-ei (prietenie–iubire) la Platon și Aristotel, pornind de la lectura propusă de Mircea Dumitru: prietenia autentică nu poate fi înțeleasă separat de metafizica substanței și de ideea că persoana iubită este prețuită ca individ, nu doar ca purtătoare a unor calități generale. Textul răspunde criticilor moderne (de tip Gregory Vlastos și Julia Annas) potrivit cărora philia ar fi, la grecii clasici, o „iubire a proprietăților” și ar face prietenii substituibili. Autorul arată, prin recurs la dialogurile platonic-socratice, că iubirea/prietenia are o dimensiune ek-statică: cunoașterea de sine nu este un exercițiu solitar, ci se constituie prin relație, confruntare și „oglindire” în celălalt. În continuare, pe linia aristotelică, se argumentează că philia este atât condiția vieții virtuase și politice (temei al coeziunii polis-ului), cât și scopul ei – o „meta-virtute” care face posibilă exersarea virtuților și eudaimonia. În final, reinterpretând formula „prieten cu Platon, dar mai prieten cu adevărul”, articolul susține că „prietenia cu adevărul” nu e o posesie individuală, ci o căutare-împreună: adevărul se naște din dialog și comunitate filosofică, astfel încât, într-un sens fertil, „a greși împreună cu Platon” poate păstra vie chiar exigența adevărului.

Empathy – Interpretation – (Interpreting) Apperception. Attempts to Explain Husserl’s First Steps Towards a Theory of Intersubjectivity. The aim of this paper is to investigate Husserl’s first steps towards a theory of intersubjectivity and his early attempts to solve the intricate questions pertaining to the constitution of alter ego. The starting point of this investigation is Husserl’s critical examination of the concept of empathy theorized by Th. Lipps and his contention that empathy cannot be a passive and rather quasi-instinctive activity of the ego, but must be grounded in a kind of analogy between my own body and that of the other. This first attempt to explain in phenomenological terms how an ego can be aware of and perceive other thigs as egos is marred by difficulties that force Husserl to constantly rethink the question of the constitution of the alter ego and propose new ways of conceiving the special kind of apperception that opens up the possibility of perceiving the others as alter egos.

Husserls Theorie der Intersubjektivitat ist alles andere als ein abgeschlossenes, endgultiges System. Sie ist vielmehr eine riesige begriffliche Baustelle, bei der die Baugeruste verschiedenartiger phanomenologischer Versuche und Ansatze uberall zu sehen sind. Die Grundabsicht der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es daher, die Perspektive auf die Problemkonstellation der Intersubjektivitat so weit wie moglich zu erweitern, um sowohl Husserls erste Versuche, dieses Problemfeld zu umgrenzen, als auch seinen spaten Entwurf einer transzendentalen Intersubjektivitatstheorie ins Auge zu fassen und als Etappen eines einheitlichen Bemuhens zu sehen. Dabei wird auch der Schlusselcharakter des Intersubjektivitatsthemas deutlich, das eine Transformation der Husserlschen Transzendentalphilosophie veranlasst und vorangetrieben hat.

Husserls Theorie der Intersubjektivitat ist alles andere als ein abgeschlossenes, endgultiges System. Sie ist vielmehr eine riesige begriffliche Baustelle, bei der die Baugeruste verschiedenartiger phanomenologischer Versuche und Ansatze uberall zu sehen sind. Die Grundabsicht der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es daher, die Perspektive auf die Problemkonstellation der Intersubjektivitat so weit wie moglich zu erweitern, um sowohl Husserls erste Versuche, dieses Problemfeld zu umgrenzen, als auch seinen spaten Entwurf einer transzendentalen Intersubjektivitatstheorie ins Auge zu fassen und als Etappen eines einheitlichen Bemuhens zu sehen. Dabei wird auch der Schlusselcharakter des Intersubjektivitatsthemas deutlich, das eine Transformation der Husserlschen Transzendentalphilosophie veranlasst und vorangetrieben hat.