Paul Hoyningen-Huene

We first discuss Chang’s criticism of the correspondence theory of truth and of what he calls ‘correspondence realism’. We think that correspondence can be rescued if properly reshaped. We then take up Chang’s alternative to the correspondence theory of truth, his ‘truth-by-operational-coherence’, which we think does not fit many truths from social life. The topic of realism, implicitly present already in the previous topics, is subsequently explicitly treated. What Chang calls realism is, in effect, very close to what has customarily been called anti-realism. Finally, we discuss the tension that exists in Chang’s book between his vigorous defense of pluralism on the object-level and his apparently taken-forgranted monism on the metalevel, namely pragmatism.

In the last few decades, nursing scholars have drawn on philosophy to establish the scientific status of nursing. However, well‐known philosophical accounts of science, such as those by Popper and Kuhn, are primarily targeted at the pure natural sciences. Accordingly, the application of such accounts to nursing has led to dubious results. In this paper, we propose a fresh start and apply Hoyningen‐Huene's recent account of science to nursing. According to Hoyningen‐Huene, knowledge about a given topic such as nursing is scientific if, and only if, it is more systematic than other knowledge about this topic. Here, systematicity manifests in various dimensions such as description, explanation, and defense of knowledge claims. In our application of Hoyningen‐Huene's account of science to nursing, we focus on current nursing practice and compare it with the state of nursing before the so‐called Consensus Statement on Emerging Nursing Knowledge. Upon examining the dimensions considered by Hoyningen‐Huene, we find that the knowledge currently used and gained by nurses is more systematic than it was before the Consensus Statement. For instance, in the dimension of prediction, knowledge has become more systematic through the use of classification systems. In the dimension of defending knowledge claims, systematicity has increased due to the use of measurement devices. According to our analysis, the scientific status of current nursing knowledge is partly due to the fact that nurses draw on knowledge from nursing science, a discipline that is organized like other scientific disciplines. Still, it is also the case that knowledge‐gaining practices in nursing are more systematic than they were before the Consensus Statement.

The book addresses the question of what the nature of science is. Throughout the book, “science” is taken in a very wide sense, including not only the natural sciences, but also mathematics, the social sciences, and the humanities. The question “What is science?” is answered by the following thesis: Scientific knowledge is primarily distinguished from other forms of knowledge, especially from everyday knowledge, by being more systematic. This thesis is developed in nine dimensions in which it is claimed that science is more systematic than other forms of knowledge, especially everyday knowledge: regarding descriptions, explanations, predictions, the defense of knowledge claims, critical discourse, epistemic connectedness, an ideal of completeness, knowledge generation, and the representation of knowledge. The thesis is argued by exemplifying it in its nine dimensions with numerous examples from very diverse disciplines. Furthermore, the thesis is compared with the most important positions in the philosophy of science regarding the question “What is science?” from antiquity to today. Finally, some consequences of the thesis are drawn, concerning the genesis and dynamics of science, the relationship of science and common sense, normative implications of the thesis, and the demarcation criterion between science and pseudo-science.

We first discuss Chang’s criticism of the correspondence theory of truth and of what he calls ‘correspondence realism’. We think that correspondence can be rescued if properly reshaped. We then take up Chang’s alternative to the correspondence theory of truth, his ‘truth-by-operational-coherence’, which we think does not fit many truths from social life. The topic of realism, implicitly present already in the previous topics, is subsequently explicitly treated. What Chang calls realism is, in effect, very close to what has customarily been called anti-realism. Finally, we discuss the tension that exists in Chang’s book between his vigorous defense of pluralism on the object-level and his apparently taken-for-granted monism on the metalevel, namely pragmatism.

This paper addresses the question of what the heart (or the “nature”) of science is. After a short introduction, I will first make a few preliminary historical and systematic remarks. Next, in answering the main question, I shall propose the following thesis: Scientific knowledge is primarily distinguished from other forms of knowledge, especially from everyday knowledge, by being more systematic. This thesis has to be qualified, clarified, developed and justified. In particular, I will develop the thesis in nine dimensions in which it is claimed that science is more systematic than everyday knowledge: regarding descriptions, explanations, predictions, the defense of knowledge claims, critical discourse, epistemic connectedness, an ideal of completeness, knowledge generation and the structure and representation of knowledge. Finally, I will compare my answer with alternative answers.

In Systematicity, Paul Hoyningen-Huene answers the question "What is science?" by proposing that scientific knowledge is primarily distinguished from other forms of knowledge, especially everyday knowledge, by being more systematic. "Science" is here understood in the broadest possible sense, encompassing not only the natural sciences but also mathematics, the social sciences, and the humanities. The author develops his thesis in nine dimensions in which it is claimed that science is more systematic than other forms of knowledge: regarding descriptions, explanations, predictions, the defense of knowledge claims, critical discourse, epistemic connectedness, an ideal of completeness, knowledge generation, and the representation of knowledge. He compares his view with positions on the question held by philosophers from Aristotle to Nicholas Rescher. The book concludes with an exploration of some consequences of Hoyningen-Huene's view concerning the genesis and dynamics of science, the relationship of science and common sense, normative implications of the thesis, and the demarcation criterion between science and pseudo-science.

I begin the chapter with biographical remarks, especially, when and how Feyerabend and Kuhn met. Then, I discuss the concept of incommensurability. Perhaps surprisingly, Feyerabend and Kuhn did disagree about several aspects of this concept, which has often not been seen appropriately in the literature. I first discuss their agreements, and then the main differences in their understanding of incommensurability. Then I discuss Feyerabend’s general criticism of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Feyerabend’s criticism is rather harsh, explicitly accusing Kuhn of propaganda. Feyerabend is especially enraged about Kuhn’s positive evaluation of Kuhn’s normal science. However, a closer analysis of Feyerabend’s arguments against normal science reveal that they are not very strong and somewhat biased. The chapter ends with some remarks about Feyerabend’s and Kuhn’s reconciliation in the late 1980s.

This paper discusses seven of Melogno’s papers on Kuhn from 2019 to 2024. It analyzes Melogno’s arguments about the relationship between Kuhn’s early and late historiography, his rejection of the discovery-justification distinction, and his move towards questions of meaning and semantics in the 1980s. This paper argues that Melogno made vital contributions to “Kuhn studies,” carefully tracing developments in Kuhn’s thought over time. However, it also engages critically with some of Melogno’s central claims, like his argument that _The Structure of Scientific Revolutions_ represented a sharp break from Kuhn’s earlier historiographical work. Overall, the paper concludes that Melogno’s research significantly advanced understanding of Kuhn’s philosophy and deserves to influence future scholarships on Kuhn substantially.

This paper discusses seven of Melogno’s papers on Kuhn from 2019 to 2024. It analyzes Melogno’s arguments about the relationship between Kuhn’s early and late historiography, his rejection of the discovery-justification distinction, and his move towards questions of meaning and semantics in the 1980s. This paper argues that Melogno made vital contributions to “Kuhn studies,” carefully tracing developments in Kuhn’s thought over time. However, it also engages critically with some of Melogno’s central claims, like his argument that _The Structure of Scientific Revolutions_ represented a sharp break from Kuhn’s earlier historiographical work. Overall, the paper concludes that Melogno’s research significantly advanced understanding of Kuhn’s philosophy and deserves to substantially influence future scholarships on Kuhn.

In the first part of this article we will formulate postulates, which must be satisfied by a reasonable concept of emergence. The postulates will articulate conditions of adequacy for an appropriate explication of the concept of emergence. These conditions of adequacy are based primarily upon the philosophical and scientific history of the concept of emergence, in which the intended role of the concept is expressed. In the second part we will discuss and evaluate some candidates for the concept of emergence in light of these conditions of adequacy.