Paul Knights

Environmental problems driven by unsustainable consumption are lending new importance to an ancient question: are there bounds to the goods required for a happy or flourishing life? A standard assumption in recent economics is that there are no such bounds. Many further argue that markets, technological change, and resource substitution can deliver sustainability while allowing consumption of final goods by consumers to increase. This chapter criticizes this approach and considers two much older traditions, the Epicurean and Aristotelian, which do recognize the existence of limits to the goods required for the good life. Their revival has been used to argue that consumption can be reduced without loss of well-being. This chapter argues that the promise found by environmentalists in the recent hedonic revival of the Epicurean tradition is misplaced, and that the Aristotelian tradition provides a richer account of why the future—and therefore consuming sustainably—matters to our well-being.

This paper proposes an answer to what Sandler calls ‘the problem of inconsequentialism’; the problem of providing justification for the claim that individuals should engage in unilateral reductions of their personal consumption, even though doing so will make an inconsequential contribution to mitigating the harmful impacts of the global environmental problems that the aggregate of such consumption causes. I provide an answer to this problem by developing a virtue ethics-based argument that a limited but significant class of consumption actions performed by typical consumers in rich, industrialised economies in the global North are moral wrongdoings, and the corresponding unilateral reductions in personal consumption are morally obligatory. I make this argument by drawing an analogy between a typical Northern consumer and a member of a golf club who has discovered that his club causes harm—by dumping used golf balls into a nature reserve—to which he inconsequentially contributes. I advance a moral evaluation of remaining a member of a harming group, based on the attitudes to the harm expressed by so remaining, and on Sandler’s virtue-grounded agent-relative target principle of right action. I examine a number of objections to this argument. I use Elizabeth Cripps’s notion of a ‘harming putative group’ to respond to the objection that the set of individuals whose aggregated consumption causes environmental problems is merely an arbitrary abstract set, membership of which is not justifiable grounds for moral evaluation. I then present two responses to the objection that withdrawal from this harming putative group—by refraining to perform those consumption actions which constitute membership—is unduly demanding.

Species are ordinarily conceived of as being native or non-native to either a geographical location or an ecological community. I submit that species may also be native or non-native to human communities. I argue, by way of an analogy with varieties of domesticated and cultivated species, that this sense of nativity is grounded by the cultural relationships human communities have with species. A further analogy is drawn with the motivations of varietal nativists – who seek to protect native varieties of domesticated and cultivated species for the sake of their cultural value – to argue for the consideration of the cultural value of native species in environmental policy decisions regarding invasive non-native species.

Eco-minimalism is an emerging approach to building design, construction, and retrofitting. The approach is exemplified by the work of architect Howard Liddell and sustainable water management consultant Nick Grant. The fundamental tenet of this approach is an opposition to the use of inappropriate, unnecessary, and ostentatious eco-technology—or “eco-bling”—where the main emphasis is on being seen to be green. The adoption of the principles of the eco-minimalist approach offers, they argue, a significant opportunity to improve sustainability in construction. However, a critical examination of eco-minimalism as a design philosophy shows that eco-minimalism needs to be further developed within the framework of virtue ethics. The focus should be on two main themes: (1) incommensurabilities arising in relation to eco-minimalism’s goals of minimizing environmental impact and maximizing human benefit, which cannot be resolved from the principles Liddell and Grant have articulated, and (2) the practical importance of cultivating settled dispositions to act eco-minimally on the part of those who design, construct, and use buildings. A strong emphasis needs to be placed on the role of practical wisdom when navigating challenging decisions of the kind facing eco-minimalists in practice.