Paul Lopez

Over the last several years, predictive processing approaches to computational neuropsychiatry have been gaining explanatory traction. According to these accounts, some of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia arise from aberrant precision-weighting during hierarchical Bayesian inference. In contrast to computational approaches, the phenomenological tradition in psychiatry holds that disruptions or alterations of the self (Ichstörungen) lie at the core of schizophrenia. In this article, we aim to integrate these approaches. We align ourselves with the phenomenological insight that self-disturbances lie at the core of schizophrenia and with the hierarchical conception of the self-model that emerges from the predictive processing architecture. We suggest that disruptions of the “hard core” of the narrative self-model might be partially involved in the generation of aberrant experiences and hyperreflexivity, and in some aspects of the sense of self-alienation and ambiguity that is characteristic of the phenomenology of schizophrenia.

In 2021, Chile became the first country to discuss two initiatives addressing the potential misuse of neurotechnologies: a constitutional amendment (Bill 13827-19) and a bill to create neurorights (Bill 13828-19). While the constitutional reform was swiftly approved, the bill for the creation of specific neurorights remains under discussion in the Chamber of Deputies. Despite initial support, both initiatives currently face criticism. Meanwhile, Chile has advanced in regulating AI systems through legislative proposals (Bills 16821-19/15869-19). A study by (Humeres et al. in Big Data Society, 12(1), 2025) identifies three key controversies in Chile’s AI regulation process: deflection of technology liability, instrumentalization of policy, and moralization of technology use. This chapter explores how this analysis focused on sources of controversy could inform the neurorights debate currently in need of a systematic socio-political analysis. Applying this framework could help categorize the diverse positions within the discussion, providing a more comprehensive understanding of its development.

La Genealogía de los Reyes de España es la última obra de renombre publicada por Alfonso de Cartagena (ca. 1385-1456) antes de su fallecimiento. Su rica tradición textual se muestra en que tanto la obra latina original como su traducción castellana han sido glosadas. Este trabajo pretende analizar, tomando como punto de referencia el episodio de la batalla de Roncesvalles en el capítulo dedicado al rey Alfonso II, la técnica mediante la que el glosador -o glosadores- estructuraba las adiciones de la obra. Se ha seleccionado este punto concreto por la singularidad que supone la presentación y contraposición de las distintas fuentes historiográficas, en algún punto contradictorias, y el modo de lidiar con opiniones contradictorias de autoridades eclesiásticas.

This chapter introduces and contextualizes some of the main debates regarding the impact of neurotechnological developments in Latin America over the last years. In its first part, the chapter makes sense of core conceptual lessons that local researchers have learnt from their active involvement in the discussion of these issues in their local governments and academic communities. In its second part, the chapter focuses on a number of practical cases derived from the Latin American experience on discussions about neuroprotection, neurorights, neurolaw regulations, and artificial intelligence policy.

In October of 2021, Chile became the first country in the world to approve a constitutional reform that explicitly integrates legal safeguards against the misuses of medical and commercial neurotechnological applications (Law N° 21.383). This legislative initiative was aimed to show the Chilean government’s explicit concern about how neurotechnological progress could negatively impact society if not properly regulated. Due to its novelty and nature, this constitutional amendment has been the target of heated debate over the last years. The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, after specifying the ethical concerns that gave rise to the Chilean constitutional reform, we clarify the conceptual and legal foundations contained in the core message of the bill proposed and discussed by the Senate of Chile (Bulletin 13.827–19). After, we offer some critical considerations about the content of the bill and the way in which it is aimed to incorporate the so-called ‘neurorights’ to the Chilean legal order.

This chapter offers a brief commentary on the main contributions of Latin American researchers to debates about the ethical, socio-economic, and geopolitical impact of the use of neurotechnologies. Latin America’s vulnerability to limited access and development of neurotechnologies underscores the risk of exacerbating existing inequalities. Yet, this vulnerability also provides valuable insights into the consequences of rushed regulation, the importance of interdisciplinary collaboration, and the need for technological education to address socio-economic and epistemic disparities.

Some have advocated for creating new fundamental neurorigths with universal validity such that national legislations worldwide should adapt to enforce them. Others have brought into question such a movement warning against rights inflation. We argue that we should avoid introducing new fundamental rights in any legal framework whenever possible. We call this the situated approach since whether it is possible to protect the mind without introducing new rights is a question that should be asked in each legal framework separately. We show that in the case of Chile, that can be done, and we propose how. Specifically, we provide a critical assessment of local regulatory proposals and show that, as a result of the local legislative debate, they have evolved from a universalist stance towards a much more situated view. However, we suggest that in their current state, they still are insufficiently grounded in the Chilean legal system, which we regard as providing enough protection against neurotechnological harm in most relevant cases.

Over the last years, 4E approaches to cognition have attempted to overcome the limitations of brain-centered conceptions of psychiatric disorders by emphasizing the enactive, embodied, embedded, and extended nature of the mind. However, even though all 4E approaches reject the claim that mental health conditions can be fully explained as brain disorders, the conceptual and disciplinary plurality within the framework has led to internal disparities when it comes to establishing the exact way in which mental health (and illness) should be reconceptualized. We do not think this is necessarily a bad thing. As pointed out in our target paper, these theoretical disparities show the conceptual richness of the 4E framework... Read More.

Over the last years, 4E Cognition approaches have emerged in an attempt to overcome the limitations of neuro-reductionism about mental disorders, that is, the view that mental disorders can be fully explained as brain disorders. Instead, 4E approaches emphasize in varying degrees the situated, embodied, embedded, and enactive features of psychopathological conditions. Despite its growing popularity, the development of this alternative framework is not characterized by a distinguishable conceptual unity. This paper examines and classifies the main current 4E approaches to mental health, outlining their core commitments, differences, and implications. Two main strands are distinguished: strongly situated or extended views, comprising applications of the classical and social versions of the extended mind hypothesis, and strongly embodied and enactive views, involving applications of the so-called autopoietic enactivism. We examine the main claims of such approaches regarding two conceptual issues: i) _the location problem_, that is, whether mental disorders are predicable of individuals, social contexts, or the relation between them, and ii) _the boundary problem_, that is, how to distinguish psychopathology from non-pathological diversity such as cases of mere social deviance and the like. In the final section, we offer an overview of some of the main practical implications of the 4E turn in mental health research.

Over the last years, 4E Cognition approaches have emerged in an attempt to overcome the limitations of neuro-reductionism about mental disorders, that is, the view that mental disorders can be fully explained as brain disorders. Instead, 4E approaches emphasize in varying degrees the situated, embodied, embedded, and enactive features of psychopathological conditions. Despite its growing popularity, the development of this alternative framework is not characterized by a distinguishable conceptual unity. This paper examines and classifies the main current 4E approaches to mental health, outlining their core commitments, differences, and implications. Two main strands are distinguished: strongly situated or extended views, comprising applications of the classical and social versions of the extended mind hypothesis, and strongly embodied and enactive views, involving applications of the so-called autopoietic enactivism. We examine the main claims of such approaches regarding two conceptual issues: i) the location problem, that is, whether mental disorders are predicable of individuals, social contexts, or the relation between them, and ii) the boundary problem, that is, how to distinguish psychopathology from non-pathological diversity such as cases of mere social deviance and the like. In the final section, we offer an overview of some of the main practical implications of the 4E turn in mental health research.

A 43-year-old man was admitted into the emergency room at our hospital after presenting with a tonic-clonic seizure. MRI showed a right-side operculo-insular tumor. This was treated by performing a craniotomy under general anesthesia with intraoperative monitoring. Tumor resection was started by exploring the temporal and frontal opercula without problems. However, during the resection of the insular compartment, a sudden loss of MEPs was observed. Surgery was stopped immediately, and all the relevant anesthetic parameters, vital signs, anesthetic drugs were reviewed. No retractors had been used at that time, so vasospasm was suspected as the underlying cause of the signal change. An ICG bolus injection confirmed vasospasm in one of the M2 branches running over the insula. A direct vessel massage was performed yet resulted in no apparent improvement in the appearance of the vessel when ICG was injected. Therefore, repeated massage with nimodipine was performed, which resulted in the resolution of the vasospasm. MEPs progressively recovered to base line levels, and surgery could then be finished without further incident. During the postoperative recovery period, no focal deficit was identified, and the postoperative MRI showed a planned subtotal resection without apparent ischemia. The goal of this report is to review the potential causes of such a loss of intraoperative MEPs and its best management in order to prevent postoperative motor deficit and to manage the situation should it occur.

This book presents an informed-by-experience insights of Latin-American-based research on the debate about how to protect citizens from the risks raised by neurotechnological applications. Written by researchers in philosophy, law, and ethics of neuroprotection, the chapters of this book reports on their individual experiences and case studies. They offer a timely snapshot of practical, conceptual, and legal ideas and challenges emerged in Latin American countries, which may inspire researchers and professionals all over the world.

With a higher prevalence in schizophrenia, delusions of thought insertion (TI) are regarded as one of the most severe symptoms of psychosis. Patients suffering from TI report that external agents are able to place thoughts into their minds or skulls. A version of the doxastic approach characterizes delusions as abnormal beliefs rooted in anomalous experiences. Nonetheless, the exact role of these experiences in determining the content and the way in which delusional beliefs are fixated is still under debate. While _endorsement_ models claim that the abnormal experience comprises the very content of the delusional beliefs, _explanationist_ approaches claim that delusional beliefs emerge as explanations for abnormal experiences with less specific content. This paper combines conceptual analysis with phenomenological data to examine the merits of both endorsement and explanationist approaches to TI. I propose that potential solutions to the dispute could lay in finding a middle ground between the two approaches, and non-exhaustive ways in which hybrid doxastic approaches to TI could be formulated.

Este artículo examina el debate acerca de si el delirio de inserción de pensamiento constituye un contraejemplo para el denominado principio de inmunidad al error a través de la mala identificación. Luego de distinguir diferentes formulaciones del principio en la literatura, concluimos que el fenómeno delirante en cuestión no constituye un contraejemplo para el principio examinado. En la parte final se clarifica el concepto de autoadscripción psicológica y su uso relativo a los pronombres de primera persona en el contexto del debate acerca de la relación entre inserción de pensamiento e inmunidad al error a través de la mala identificación.