Paul O'Grady

New Books on Philosophy of Religion Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God Speaks By Nicholas Wolterstorff, Cambridge University Press, 1995. Pp. 326. ISBN 0–521–47557–0. $18.95 (pbk). The Historical Christ and the Jesus of Faith: The Incamational Narrative as History By C. Stephen Evans, Oxford University Press, 1996. Pp. 386. ISBN 0–19–826397‐X $17.95 (pbk). Consciousness and the Mind of God By Charles Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. 349. ISBN 0–521–46173–1. $65.00 (hbk). Wittgenstein and Quine By Robert L. Arrington and Hans‐Johann Glock (eds) Routledge, 1996. Pp. xvii + 286. ISBN 0–415–09676–6. £40.00. Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas's Pragmatics By Maeve Cooke, MIT Press, 1997 (hbk 1994). Pp. 232. ISBN 0–262–53145–3. £12.00 (pbk). Form and Good in Plato's Eleatic Dialogues By Kenneth Dorter, University of California Press, 1994. Pp. x + 156. ISBN 0–520–08331–8. $45.00 Plotin über Sein, Zahl und Einheit By Christoph Horn, B. G. Teubner, 1995. Pp. 368. ISBN 3–519–07611‐X. The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas's Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles I By Norman Kretzmann, Clarendon Press, 199. Pp. 000. 0–19–823660–3. Price £35.00. Reason, Truth and Self: The Postmodern Reconditioned By Michael Luntley, Routledge, 1995. Pp. xv + 248, ISBN 0–415–11853–0. £11.99 Approaches to Intentionality By William Lyons, Clarendon Press, 1995. Pp. 261. ISBN 0–19–823526–7. £30.00 Benacerraf and his Critics Edited by Adam Morton and Stephen P. Stich, Blackwell, 1996. Pp. xi + 271. ISBN 0–631–19268–9. £45.00. Atheism and Theism By Jack J. C. Smart and John J. Haldane, Blackwell Publishers, 1996. Pp. 234. ISBN 0–631–19291–3 (hbk). £40.00. ISBN 0–631–19292–1 (pbk). £12.99. Human Lives: Critical Essays on Consequentialist Bioethics Edited by David S. Oderberg and Jacqueline A. Laing Macmillan Press, 1997. Pp. viii + 244. ISBN 0–333–62980–0. £40 Freedom within Reason By Susan Wolf, Oxford University Press, 1993. Pp. 162. ISBN 0–19–508565–5. £13.99 (pbk). An Introduction to Political Philosophy By Jonathan Wolff, Opus, Oxford University Press, 1996. Pp. 230 + index. ISBN 19–289251–7 £8.99.

The chapter begins with a brief preliminary investigation of the nature and role of theory in psychotherapy in general. Then, it introduces Gestalt therapy in an institutional and historical context. The distinctive theoretical tenets of Gestalt psychotherapy are outlined next. The chapter looks at some of the philosophical underpinnings of this theory and notes how such underpinnings tend toward subjectivism and an anti‐theory stance. It also suggests some alternative underpinnings, which could lead to a more integrated outlook on the relation of theory to practice and a resolution of the objectivity‐subjectivity tension.

The issue of relativism looms large in many contemporary discussions of knowledge, reality, society, religion, culture and gender. Is truth relative? To what extent is knowledge dependent on context? Are there different logics? Do different cultures and societies see the world differently? And is reality itself something that is constructed? This book offers a path through these debates. O'Grady begins by clarifying what exactly relativism is and how it differs from scepticism and pluralism. He then examines five main types of cognitive relativism: alethic relativism, logical relativism, ontological relativism; epistemological relativism, and relativism about rationality. Each is clearly distinguised and the arguments for and against each are assessed. O'Grady offers a welcome survey of recent debates, engaging with the work of Davidson, Devitt, Kuhn, Putnam, Quine, Rorty, Searle, Winch and Wittgenstein, among others, and he offers a distinct position of his own on this hotly contested issue.

The issue of relativism looms large in many contemporary discussions of knowledge, reality, society, religion, culture and gender. Is truth relative? To what extent is knowledge dependent on context? Are there different logics? Do different cultures and societies see the world differently? And is reality itself something that is constructed? This book offers a path through these debates. O'Grady begins by clarifying what exactly relativism is and how it differs from scepticism and pluralism. He then examines five main types of cognitive relativism: alethic relativism, logical relativism, ontological relativism; epistemological relativism, and relativism about rationality. Each is clearly distinguised and the arguments for and against each are assessed. O'Grady offers a welcome survey of recent debates, engaging with the work of Davidson, Devitt, Kuhn, Putnam, Quine, Rorty, Searle, Winch and Wittgenstein, among others, and he offers a distinct position of his own on this hotly contested issue.

Does the biography of a philosopher have any relevance to assessing their philosophy? After considering and rejecting three distinct treatments of this question, a different answer is articulated here. Distinguishing between the content and approach of a philosophical text, this article argues that biography is relevant to assessing the approach of the text in three ways: in its socio-historical context, its philosophical context, and its personal context in the life of the philosopher. Such a strategy offers new ways of comparing very different texts and assessing them in terms of the aims of the philosopher writing them.

Van Fraassen begins with a swingeing attack on metaphysics in general and analytical metaphysics in particular. This is reasonably familiar territory, as he is best known for his antimetaphysical understanding of science. His chief complaint is that metaphysics purports to be a factual enterprise, but under examination it turns out to be mere word play. Analytic metaphysics offers a formal parallel with scientific inquiry—it offers “explanations” which mimic scientific explanations but which have no real purchase on us. No one offers genuine probabilities, specificities, or achievable goals; it is idle word play. However, such word play exerts a deep pull on philosophers: “Even analytic metaphysicians uninterested in religion succumb to this fascination with the logical problem of theodicy. But I point to it only as an instructive parallel. The constructed God is not so different from the constructed world. Both are abstract simulacra of something real and important whose appeal lies mainly in the logical problems they engender and the virtuoso displays of ingenuity we can enjoy”.

Wisdom has not been widely discussed in analytical epistemology. An interesting recent analysis comes from Stephen Grimm who argues that wisdom requires knowledge and that the traditional dichotomy between theoretical and practical wisdom doesn’t hold. I note a tension between these aspects of his work. He wishes to maintain that traditional exemplars of wisdom may still be termed ‘wise’ by his theory. But his knowledge condition seems to require that only a subset of those who hold conflicting views are really wise. I consider a number of possible responses to this and endorse a non-indexical contextualist approach which will allow the knowledge condition and also allow the traditional exemplars to be termed ‘wise’.

Aquinas’s actual response to a naturalistic challenge at ST I.2.3 is one which most naturalists would find unimpressive. However, I shall argue that there is a stronger response latent in his philosophical system. I take Quine as an example of a methodological naturalist, examine the roots of his position and look at two critical responses to his views (those of BonJour and Boghossian). If one adjusts some of the problematical aspects of their responses and establishes a hybrid position on the epistemology and metaphysics of an antinaturalistic stance, it turns out to be the position Aquinas himself takes on meaning and knowledge

There is a general presumption that epistemology does not have anything to do with wellbeing. In this paper I challenge these assumption, by examining the aftermath of the Gettier examples, the debate between internalism and externalism and the rise of virtue epistemology. In focusing on the epistemic agent as the locus of normativity, virtue epistemology allows one to ask questions about epistemic goods and their relationship to other kinds of good, including the good of the agent. Specifically it is argued that emotion has a positive role to play in epistemology, an example from Aquinas is used to illustrate this and to illustrate the different kinds of good involved in cognition.

IntroductionPaul Williams is professor of Indian and Tibetan philosophy at the University of Bristol in England. He is the author of four earlier books on Buddhist thought and numerous scholarly papers. In The Unexpected Way (Edinburgh, T&T Clarke, 2002), his fifth book, Williams departs from the normal academic genre and writes a partly autobiographical, partly apologetic account of his conversion from Tibetan Buddhism to Roman Catholicism. The title anticipates the pretty standard response that traffic is typically in the opposite direction. The book is a mixture of philosophical discussion, personal musings, ‘analytical meditations’, and catechetical-style instruction that seeks to convince the reader that his choice was rational, warranted and personally enriching.

Michel Foucault's Force of Flight: Toward an Ethics of Thought By James W. Bernauer Humanities Press International, 1990. Pp. 261. ISBN 0–391–03740–4. $15.00 pbk. Hipparchia's Choice, An Essay Concerning Women, Philosophy, Etc. By Michèle Le Doeuff, translated by Trista Selous Basil Blackwell, 1991. Pp. vii + 364. ISBN 0–631–17639‐X. £45. Psychology Edited by Stephen Everson Cambridge University Press, 1991. Pp. 269. ISBN 0–521–35338–6. £32.50. On the Nature and Existence of God By Richard M. Gale Cambridge University Press, 1991. Pp. 422. ISBN 0–521–40300–6. £35. The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State Edited by Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit Basil Blackwell, 1989, pbk 1991. Pp. vii + 207. ISBN 0–631–18088–5. £14.95 pbk. Language, Saussure and Wittgenstein: How to play games with words By Roy Harris Routledge, 1988, pbk 1990. Pp. xv +136. ISBN 0–415–05225–4. £9.99 pbk. Plausible Worlds: Possibility and Understanding in History and the Social Sciences By Geoffrey Hawthorn Cambridge University Press, 1991. Pp. xiii + 192. ISBN 0–521–40359–6. £27.50. Freedom, Truth and History: An Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy By Stephen Houlgate Routledge, 1991. Pp. 288. ISBN 0–415–06658–1. £35. Locke on Money. Volumes I and II By Patrick Hyde Kelly Clarendon Press, 1991. Vol. 1 Pp. xv + 342. ISBN 0–19–82456–7. £50.00 Vol. II Pp. vii + 322. ISBN 0–19–824837–7 £45.00. L'Union substantielle. I. Blondel et Leibniz By Marc Leclerc Culture et Vérité, 1991. Pp. v + 415. ISBN 2–87299–014–3. Plato's Parmenides By C. C. Meinwald Oxford University Press, 1991. Pp. 192. ISBN 0–1–506445–3. £27.50. Idee und Weltwille: Schopenhauer als Kritiker Hegels By Alfred Schmidt Carl Hanser Verlag, 1988. Pp. 175. ISBN 3–446–15161–3.