Paul O'Grady

The chapter begins with a brief preliminary investigation of the nature and role of theory in psychotherapy in general. Then, it introduces Gestalt therapy in an institutional and historical context. The distinctive theoretical tenets of Gestalt psychotherapy are outlined next. The chapter looks at some of the philosophical underpinnings of this theory and notes how such underpinnings tend toward subjectivism and an anti‐theory stance. It also suggests some alternative underpinnings, which could lead to a more integrated outlook on the relation of theory to practice and a resolution of the objectivity‐subjectivity tension.

Van Fraassen begins with a swingeing attack on metaphysics in general and analytical metaphysics in particular. This is reasonably familiar territory, as he is best known for his antimetaphysical understanding of science. His chief complaint is that metaphysics purports to be a factual enterprise, but under examination it turns out to be mere word play. Analytic metaphysics offers a formal parallel with scientific inquiry—it offers “explanations” which mimic scientific explanations but which have no real purchase on us. No one offers genuine probabilities, specificities, or achievable goals; it is idle word play. However, such word play exerts a deep pull on philosophers: “Even analytic metaphysicians uninterested in religion succumb to this fascination with the logical problem of theodicy. But I point to it only as an instructive parallel. The constructed God is not so different from the constructed world. Both are abstract simulacra of something real and important whose appeal lies mainly in the logical problems they engender and the virtuoso displays of ingenuity we can enjoy”.

Wisdom has not been widely discussed in analytical epistemology. An interesting recent analysis comes from Stephen Grimm who argues that wisdom requires knowledge and that the traditional dichotomy between theoretical and practical wisdom doesn’t hold. I note a tension between these aspects of his work. He wishes to maintain that traditional exemplars of wisdom may still be termed ‘wise’ by his theory. But his knowledge condition seems to require that only a subset of those who hold conflicting views are really wise. I consider a number of possible responses to this and endorse a non-indexical contextualist approach which will allow the knowledge condition and also allow the traditional exemplars to be termed ‘wise’.

There is a general presumption that epistemology does not have anything to do with wellbeing. In this paper I challenge these assumption, by examining the aftermath of the Gettier examples, the debate between internalism and externalism and the rise of virtue epistemology. In focusing on the epistemic agent as the locus of normativity, virtue epistemology allows one to ask questions about epistemic goods and their relationship to other kinds of good, including the good of the agent. Specifically it is argued that emotion has a positive role to play in epistemology, an example from Aquinas is used to illustrate this and to illustrate the different kinds of good involved in cognition.

Aquinas’s actual response to a naturalistic challenge at ST I.2.3 is one which most naturalists would find unimpressive. However, I shall argue that there is a stronger response latent in his philosophical system. I take Quine as an example of a methodological naturalist, examine the roots of his position and look at two critical responses to his views (those of BonJour and Boghossian). If one adjusts some of the problematical aspects of their responses and establishes a hybrid position on the epistemology and metaphysics of an antinaturalistic stance, it turns out to be the position Aquinas himself takes on meaning and knowledge

IntroductionPaul Williams is professor of Indian and Tibetan philosophy at the University of Bristol in England. He is the author of four earlier books on Buddhist thought and numerous scholarly papers. In The Unexpected Way (Edinburgh, T&T Clarke, 2002), his fifth book, Williams departs from the normal academic genre and writes a partly autobiographical, partly apologetic account of his conversion from Tibetan Buddhism to Roman Catholicism. The title anticipates the pretty standard response that traffic is typically in the opposite direction. The book is a mixture of philosophical discussion, personal musings, ‘analytical meditations’, and catechetical-style instruction that seeks to convince the reader that his choice was rational, warranted and personally enriching.

Paul O'Grady clearly distinguishes five main kinds: relativism about truth, relativism about logic, ontological relativism, epistemological relativism, and, finally, relativism about rationality. In each case he shows what makes a position relativist and how it differs from a sceptical or pluralist position. He ends by presenting a thoroughly integrated position that rejects some forms while defending others. The book includes discussion of recent work by Putnam, Devitt, Searle, Priest, and Quine and offers a succinct survey of contemporary debates. This lively discussion of the issue will be welcome reading for all those involved in philosophical inquiry.

New Books on Philosophy of Religion Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God Speaks By Nicholas Wolterstorff, Cambridge University Press, 1995. Pp. 326. ISBN 0–521–47557–0. $18.95. The Historical Christ and the Jesus of Faith: The Incamational Narrative as History By C. Stephen Evans, Oxford University Press, 1996. Pp. 386. ISBN 0–19–826397‐X $17.95. Consciousness and the Mind of God By Charles Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. 349. ISBN 0–521–46173–1. $65.00. Wittgenstein and Quine By Robert L. Arrington and Hans‐Johann Glock Routledge, 1996. Pp. xvii + 286. ISBN 0–415–09676–6. £40.00. Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas's Pragmatics By Maeve Cooke, MIT Press, 1997. Pp. 232. ISBN 0–262–53145–3. £12.00. Form and Good in Plato's Eleatic Dialogues By Kenneth Dorter, University of California Press, 1994. Pp. x + 156. ISBN 0–520–08331–8. $45.00 Plotin über Sein, Zahl und Einheit By Christoph Horn, B. G. Teubner, 1995. Pp. 368. ISBN 3–519–07611‐X. The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas's Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles I By Norman Kretzmann, Clarendon Press, 199. Pp. 000. 0–19–823660–3. Price £35.00. Reason, Truth and Self: The Postmodern Reconditioned By Michael Luntley, Routledge, 1995. Pp. xv + 248, ISBN 0–415–11853–0. £11.99 Approaches to Intentionality By William Lyons, Clarendon Press, 1995. Pp. 261. ISBN 0–19–823526–7. £30.00 Benacerraf and his Critics Edited by Adam Morton and Stephen P. Stich, Blackwell, 1996. Pp. xi + 271. ISBN 0–631–19268–9. £45.00. Atheism and Theism By Jack J. C. Smart and John J. Haldane, Blackwell Publishers, 1996. Pp. 234. ISBN 0–631–19291–3. £40.00. ISBN 0–631–19292–1. £12.99. Human Lives: Critical Essays on Consequentialist Bioethics Edited by David S. Oderberg and Jacqueline A. Laing Macmillan Press, 1997. Pp. viii + 244. ISBN 0–333–62980–0. £40 Freedom within Reason By Susan Wolf, Oxford University Press, 1993. Pp. 162. ISBN 0–19–508565–5. £13.99. An Introduction to Political Philosophy By Jonathan Wolff, Opus, Oxford University Press, 1996. Pp. 230 + index. ISBN 19–289251–7 £8.99