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126Realization, Reduction And Psychological AutonomySynthese 126 (3): 383-405. 2001.It is often thought that the computational paradigm provides a supporting case for the theoretical autonomy of the science of mind. However, I argue that computation is in fact incompatible with this alleged aspect of intentional explanation, and hence the foundational assumptions of orthodox cognitive science are mutually unstable. The most plausible way to relieve these foundational tensions is to relinquish the idea that the psychological level enjoys some special form of theoretical sovere…Read more
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2226Advaita and the philosophy of consciousness without an objectPrabuddha Bharata or Awakened India 125 (No. 1): 146-154. 2020.The paper explores Śaṅkara's position on autonomous consciousness, or cit, as the fundamental reality. As such, cit transcends subject/object duality, and Śaṅkara holds that consciousness is ultimately nirviṣayaka or non-intentional. I compare and contrast the Advaita view with the contemporary Phenomenological account, wherein consciousness is held to be essentially intentional, so that consciousness is always of or about some object or content, and where consciousness without an object is deem…Read more
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400Triviality Arguments ReconsideredMinds and Machines 29 (2): 287-308. 2019.Opponents of the computational theory of mind have held that the theory is devoid of explanatory content, since whatever computational procedures are said to account for our cognitive attributes will also be realized by a host of other ‘deviant’ physical systems, such as buckets of water and possibly even stones. Such ‘triviality’ claims rely on a simple mapping account of physical implementation. Hence defenders of CTM traditionally attempt to block the trivialization critique by advocating add…Read more
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3975Sāṃkhya-Yoga Philosophy and the Mind-Body ProblemPrabuddha Bharata or Awakened India 124 (1): 232-242. 2019.The relationship between the physical body and the conscious human mind has been a deeply problematic topic for centuries. Physicalism is the 'orthodox' metaphysical stance in contemporary Western thought, according to which reality is exclusively physical/material in nature. However, in the West, theoretical dissatisfaction with this type of approach has historically lead to Cartesian-style dualism, wherein mind and body are thought to belong to distinct metaphysical realms. In the current dis…Read more
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701Computation in Physical Systems: A Normative Mapping AccountIn Matteo Vincenzo D'Alfonso & Don Berkich (eds.), On the Cognitive, Ethical, and Scientific Dimensions of Artificial Intelligence, Springer Verlag. pp. 27-47. 2019.The relationship between abstract formal procedures and the activities of actual physical systems has proved to be surprisingly subtle and controversial, and there are a number of competing accounts of when a physical system can be properly said to implement a mathematical formalism and hence perform a computation. I defend an account wherein computational descriptions of physical systems are high-level normative interpretations motivated by our pragmatic concerns. Furthermore, the criteria of …Read more
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569Cognitive Computation sans RepresentationIn Thomas M. Powers (ed.), Philosophy and Computing: Essays in epistemology, philosophy of mind, logic, and ethics, Springer. pp. 65-84. 2017.The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) holds that cognitive processes are essentially computational, and hence computation provides the scientific key to explaining mentality. The Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) holds that representational content is the key feature in distinguishing mental from non-mental systems. I argue that there is a deep incompatibility between these two theoretical frameworks, and that the acceptance of CTM provides strong grounds for rejecting RTM. The focal poin…Read more
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409Artificial Brains and Hybrid MindsIn Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence 2017, Springer. pp. 81-91. 2017.The paper develops two related thought experiments exploring variations on an ‘animat’ theme. Animats are hybrid devices with both artificial and biological components. Traditionally, ‘components’ have been construed in concrete terms, as physical parts or constituent material structures. Many fascinating issues arise within this context of hybrid physical organization. However, within the context of functional/computational theories of mentality, demarcations based purely on material structure …Read more
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24Mind/Consciousness Dualism in Sānkhya-Yoga PhilosophyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4): 845-859. 1993.
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84The Elimination of Meaning in Computational Theories of MindIn Alexander Hieke & Hannes Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain, Ontos Verlag. pp. 117-134. 2009.
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164The truly total Turing testMinds and Machines 8 (2): 263-272. 1998.The paper examines the nature of the behavioral evidence underlying attributions of intelligence in the case of human beings, and how this might be extended to other kinds of cognitive system, in the spirit of the original Turing Test. I consider Harnad's Total Turing Test, which involves successful performance of both linguistic and robotic behavior, and which is often thought to incorporate the very same range of empirical data that is available in the human case. However, I argue that the TTT…Read more
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216The Externalist Foundations of a Truly Total Turing TestMinds and Machines 22 (3): 191-212. 2012.The paper begins by examining the original Turing Test (2T) and Searle’s antithetical Chinese Room Argument, which is intended to refute the 2T in particular, as well as any formal or abstract procedural theory of the mind in general. In the ensuing dispute between Searle and his own critics, I argue that Searle’s ‘internalist’ strategy is unable to deflect Dennett’s combined robotic-systems reply and the allied Total Turing Test (3T). Many would hold that the 3T marks the culmination of the dia…Read more
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333Mind/consciousness dualism in sankhya-yoga philosophyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4): 845-859. 1993.
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16Siderits, Mark, "Indian Philosphy of Language" (review)International Philosophical Quarterly 33 (n/a): 373-376. 1993.
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103Intentionality, qualia, and mind/brain identityMinds and Machines 4 (3): 259-82. 1994.The paper examines the status of conscious presentation with regard to mental content and intentional states. I argue that conscious presentation of mental content should be viewed on the model of a secondary quality, as a subjectiveeffect of the microstructure of an underlying brain state. The brain state is in turn viewed as the instantiation of an abstract computational state, with the result that introspectively accessible content is interpreted as a presentation of the associated computatio…Read more
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64Physicalism, functionalism and conscious thoughtMinds and Machines 6 (1): 61-87. 1996.In this paper, I provide further elaboration of my theory of conscious experience, in response to the criticisms made by David Cole, and I directly address a number of the issues he raises. In particular, I examine Cole's claim that functionalism rather than neurophysiology is the theoretical key to consciousness. I argue that weak type-physicalism provides an analysis which is more fine grained, makes weaker assumptions, and allows more scope for empirical methods
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31A syntactical approach to modalityJournal of Philosophical Logic 21 (1). 1992.The systems T N and T M show that necessity can be consistently construed as a predicate of syntactical objects, if the expressive/deductive power of the system is deliberately engineered to reflect the power of the original object language operator. The system T N relies on salient limitations on the expressive power of the language L N through the construction of a quotational hierarchy, while the system T Mrelies on limiting the scope of the modal axioms schemas to the sublanguage L infM +, w…Read more
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47Momentary consciousness and buddhist epistemologyJournal of Indian Philosophy 22 (1): 81-91. 1994.
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37Blind grasping and Fregean sensesPhilosophical Studies 62 (3). 1991.The foregoing considerations have shown that on the Fregean model, no descriptive rendition of the meaning of a word, and no feature of the subject's psychological state, will be sufficient to answer the question of how reference takes place. Reference is determined by an independent semantical object, and the mind is limited by its perceptual access to this external semantical realm. The psychological and epistemic states of the language user will be causally influenced by this perceptual conta…Read more
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