• The Philosophy of Westworld
    In Cybermedia: New Approaches to Sound, Music and Media. pp. 207-222. 2021.
    What exactly does an android experience? Could an android have experiences as rich as humans, or are there limits? The Westworld T V series (Jonathan Noland, 2016- ) offers the opportunity to explore philosophical questions related to human and android experiences through its depiction of a fictional Wild West theme park with androids playing the main characters. Among the most fascinating scenes in the Westworld TV series are the interviews between the android characters Bernard Lowe and Dolore…Read more
  •  27
    Information and Mind
    CSLI Press. 2020.
    This volume examines a selection of topics that Fred Dretske addressed in his philosophical career. The topics range from one of the earliest problems Dretske analyzed, the nature of seeing an object, to epistemological issues that he worked on from mid-career onwards, to issues he focused on later in his career, including information, mental representation, and conscious experience. The papers in the volume are by former colleagues and students from the University of Wisconsin and Stanford Univ…Read more
  •  121
    I, zombie
    Consciousness and Cognition 11 (1): 1-9. 2002.
    Certain recent philosophical theories offer the prospect that zombies are possible. These theories argue that experiential contents, or qualia, are nonphysical properties. The arguments are based on the conceivability of alternate worlds in which physical laws and properties remain the same, but in which qualia either differ or are absent altogether. This article maintains that qualia are, on the contrary, physical properties in the world. It is shown how, under the burden of the a posteriori id…Read more
  •  261
    Sensing Qualia
    Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience 16 1-16. 2022.
    Accounting for qualia in the natural world is a difficult business, and it is worth understanding why. A close examination of several theories of mind—Behaviorism, Identity Theory, Functionalism, and Integrated Information Theory—will be discussed, revealing shortcomings for these theories in explaining the contents of conscious experience: qualia. It will be argued that in order to overcome the main difficulty of these theories the senses should be interpreted as physical detectors. A new theor…Read more
  •  10
    Observing a superposition
    Synthese 199 (3-4): 7107-7129. 2021.
    The bare theory is a no-collapse version of quantum mechanics which predicts certain puzzling results for the introspective beliefs of human observers of superpositions. The bare theory can be interpreted to claim that an observer can form false beliefs about the outcome of an experiment which produces a superpositional result. It is argued that, when careful consideration is given to the observer’s belief states and their evolution, the observer does not end up with the beliefs claimed. This re…Read more
  • Introspection and Superposition
    In J. De Barros & Carlos Montemayor (eds.), Quanta and Mind, Springer Verlag. 2019.
  •  35
    Temperature, Color and the Brain: An Externalist Reply to the Knowledge Argument
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2): 287-299. 2018.
    It is argued that the knowledge argument fails against externalist theories of mind. Enclosing Mary and cutting her off from some properties denies part of the physical world to Mary, which has the consequence of denying her certain kinds of physical knowledge. The externalist formulation of experience is shown to differ in vehicle, content, and causal role from the internalist version addressed by the knowledge argument, and is supported by results from neuroscience. This means that though the …Read more
  • A theory of structural content is developed and applied to various systems which learn, including neural networks and human agents. This content is carried by internal structural states of the system; states which are formed through causal encounters with the environment. The content of the structural state is that a certain type of history formed, or installed, that state. This history is a time-ordered sequence of events linked causally. The state is structural because after successful learnin…Read more
  •  54
    Networks with Attitudes
    Artificial Intelligence and Society 22 (3): 461-470. 2007.
    Does connectionism spell doom for folk psychology? I examine the proposal that cognitive representational states such as beliefs can play no role if connectionist models - - interpreted as radical new cognitive theories -- take hold and replace other cognitive theories. Though I accept that connectionist theories are radical theories that shed light on cognition, I reject the conclusion that neural networks do not represent. Indeed, I argue that neural networks may actually give us a better work…Read more
  •  34
    Naturalizing the Mind
    Mind and Language 11 (4): 452-457. 1996.
  •  24
    The right kind of content for a physicalist about color
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6): 790-790. 2003.
    Color experiences have representational content. But this content need not include a propositional component, particularly for reflectance physicalists such as Byrne & Hilbert (B&H). Insisting on such content gives primacy to language where it is not required, and makes the extension of the argument to nonhuman animals suspect.
  •  50
    Information, belief, and causal role
    In Lawrence Moss, Gizburg S., Rijke Jonathaden & Maarten (eds.), Logic, Language and Computation Vol, Csli Publications. 1999.
  •  24
    Networks with attitudes
    AI and Society 23 (4): 461-470. 2009.
    Does connectionism spell doom for folk psychology? I examine the proposal that cognitive representational states such as beliefs can play no role if connectionist models—interpreted as radical new cognitive theories—take hold and replace other cognitive theories. Though I accept that connectionist theories are radical theories that shed light on cognition, I reject the conclusion that neural networks do not represent. Indeed, I argue that neural networks may actually give us a better working not…Read more
  •  78
    Can computers carry content "inexplicitly"?
    Minds and Machines 4 (3): 333-44. 1994.
    I examine whether it is possible for content relevant to a computer''s behavior to be carried without an explicit internal representation. I consider three approaches. First, an example of a chess playing computer carrying emergent content is offered from Dennett. Next I examine Cummins response to this example. Cummins says Dennett''s computer executes a rule which is inexplicitly represented. Cummins describes a process wherein a computer interprets explicit rules in its program, implements th…Read more
  •  32
    Neural computation, architecture, and evolution
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1): 80-80. 1997.
    Biological neural computation relies a great deal on architecture, which constrains the types of content that can be processed by distinct modules in the brain. Though artificial neural networks are useful tools and give insight, they cannot be relied upon yet to give definitive answers to problems in cognition. Knowledge re-use may be driven more by architectural inheritance than by epistemological drives.
  •  51
    One Philosopher is Correct (Maybe)
    Australian Journal of Logic 9 (1): 1-3. 2010.
    It is argued that there may be a philosopher who is correct.
  •  118
    Structural content: A naturalistic approach to implicit belief
    Philosophy of Science 71 (3): 362-369. 2004.
    Various systems that learn are examined to show how content is carried in connections installed by a learning history. Agents do not explicitly use the content of such states in practical reasoning, yet the content plays an important role in explaining behavior, and the physical state carrying that content plays a role in causing behavior, given other occurrent beliefs and desires. This leads to an understanding of the environmental reasons which are the determinate content of these states, and …Read more
  •  20
    How do we satisfy our goals?
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2): 224-224. 1994.