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Paul Warren

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    15
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Areas of Specialization
Value Theory
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Other Academic Areas
Areas of Interest
Value Theory
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Other Academic Areas
  • All publications (15)
  •  86
    Collinear facilitation and contour integration in autism: evidence for atypical visual integration
    with Stephen Jachim, Niall McLoughlin, and Emma Gowen
    Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9. 2015.
    Philosophy of Neuroscience
  •  74
    Why three heads are a better bet than four: A reply to Sun, Tweney, and Wang (2010)
    with Ulrike Hahn
    Psychological Review 117 (2): 706-711. 2010.
    Chinese Neo-Confucianism
  •  113
    Why contextual preference reversals maximize expected value
    with Andrew Howes, George Farmer, Wael El-Deredy, and Richard L. Lewis
    Psychological Review 123 (4): 368-391. 2016.
    Preferences in Decision Theory
  •  84
    Perceptions of randomness: Why three heads are better than four
    with Ulrike Hahn
    Psychological Review 116 (2): 454-461. 2009.
  •  64
    Postscript: All together now: “Three heads are better than four”
    with Ulrike Hahn
    Psychological Review 117 (2): 711-711. 2010.
  •  63
    Are perceptuo-motor decisions really more optimal than cognitive decisions?
    with Andreas Jarvstad, Ulrike Hahn, and Simon K. Rushton
    Cognition 130 (3): 397-416. 2014.
  • The Robustness of Anchoring in a Naturalistic VR‐Based Task
    with Jinjin Wu, George Farmer, and Olivia Pready-James
    Cognitive Science 50 (6). 2026.
    Anchoring occurs when a quantitative estimate is biased toward an initially presented value (the anchor). Anchoring occurs both in high‐level explicit estimation of numeric quantities and in lower‐level perceptual tasks and persists even when reliable information about the quantity being estimated is directly available at the point of judgment. This suggests anchoring might derive from generic processing underpinning estimation. Such tasks, however, are almost exclusively lab‐based, and the info…Read more
    Anchoring occurs when a quantitative estimate is biased toward an initially presented value (the anchor). Anchoring occurs both in high‐level explicit estimation of numeric quantities and in lower‐level perceptual tasks and persists even when reliable information about the quantity being estimated is directly available at the point of judgment. This suggests anchoring might derive from generic processing underpinning estimation. Such tasks, however, are almost exclusively lab‐based, and the information required to complete the task is rarely available to the participant in a way that reflects how such information is sampled in real‐life. To address this, across two experiments, we immersed participants in a virtual world on a platform that could be placed at any height. After an anchor was presented, participants subsequently estimated their height naturally, by interpreting sensory and cognitive cues from the 3D environment in which they were immersed. We manipulated the amount of information directly available to the participant for making their judgment as well as the offset between the anchor and the actual height. To modulate the extent to which task‐relevant information was acquired naturally from the environment, we also contrasted anchoring effects in and out of VR. Although participants clearly used the available perceptual and cognitive information to make height estimates, anchoring effects were evident, displayed similar properties to those reported in previous lab‐based studies, and were consistent both in and out of VR. Our design also allowed us to recover a novel subjective anchoring measure that facilitated a particularly parsimonious descriptive model of our anchoring data. We conclude that anchoring is a generic feature of all estimation tasks, even when task‐relevant information is acquired naturally, as in real‐life estimation. These results emphasize the potential for this cognitive bias to have a significant impact on performance in any real‐world task requiring quantitative estimation.
    Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  •  142
    The Objective Structured Clinical Examination and student collusion: marks do not tell the whole truth
    with R. Parks, K. M. Boyd, H. Cameron, A. Cumming, and G. Lloyd-Jones
    Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (12): 734-738. 2006.
    Objective: To determine whether the marks in the third year Objective Structured Clinical Examination were affected by the collusion reported by the students themselves on an electronic discussion board.Design: A review of the student discussion, examiners’ feedback and a comparison of the marks obtained on the 2 days of the OSCE.Participants: 255 third year medical students.Setting: An OSCE consisting of 15 stations, administered on three sites over 2 days at a UK medical school.Results: 40 stu…Read more
    Objective: To determine whether the marks in the third year Objective Structured Clinical Examination were affected by the collusion reported by the students themselves on an electronic discussion board.Design: A review of the student discussion, examiners’ feedback and a comparison of the marks obtained on the 2 days of the OSCE.Participants: 255 third year medical students.Setting: An OSCE consisting of 15 stations, administered on three sites over 2 days at a UK medical school.Results: 40 students contributed to the discussion on the electronic discussion board. The main points raised were perceived inequity between students who did, or did not, have prior knowledge of the station content, and the lack of honesty and professionalism of their peers. Most contributors claimed to have received, or knew of others receiving, prior knowledge, but none confessed to passing on information. No significant difference was observed in the overall mark for the OSCE on day 1 ) and day 2 ). On day 2, marks were considerably greater for four stations and markedly lower for three stations. It was not obvious why collusion should affect these station marks. A clear indication of the effects of collusion could only be obtained from a single subsection of an individual station where 82 students on day 2 incorrectly gave the diagnosis from day 1.Conclusion: Marks do not provide a sound inference of student collusion in an OSCE and may mask the aspects of professional development of students
    Biomedical Ethics
  •  37
    Minoan Political Structure (review)
    The Classical Review 50 (1): 178-180. 2000.
  •  95
    Minoan political structure R. hägg: The function of the 'Minoan Villa'. Proceedings of the eighth international symposium at the swedish institute at athens, 6–8 June, 1992 . Pp. 245, ills, maps. Stockholm: Paul åströms forlag, 1997. Sek 450. Isbn: 91-7916-034- (review)
    The Classical Review 50 (01): 178-. 2000.
    Classics
  •  202
    The Aegean and the Near East Janice L. Crowley: The Aegean and the East: an Investigation into the Transference of Artistic Motifs between the Aegean, Egypt, and the Near East in the Bronze Age. (Studies in Mediterranean Archaeology and Literature, Pocket-book 51.) Pp. xii + 507; 3 tables, 2 maps, 544 monochrome plates. Jonsered: Paul Åströms, 1989. Paper (review)
    The Classical Review 41 (02): 431-433. 1991.
    Classics
  •  92
    Gender stereotypes across the ages: On-line processing in school-age children, young and older adults
    with Anna Siyanova-Chanturia, Francesca Pesciarelli, and Cristina Cacciari
    Frontiers in Psychology 6. 2015.
    Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  •  114
    The pop out of scene-relative object movement against retinal motion due to self-movement
    with Simon K. Rushton and Mark F. Bradshaw
    Cognition 105 (1): 237-245. 2007.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePerceptionSensory Modalities
  •  46
    Two Marxist Objections to Exploitation
    The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 42 181-186. 1998.
    I argue that we can find in Marx two objections to exploitation: an entitlement objection according to which it is wrongful because of the unjust distribution of benefits and burdens it generates; and an expressivist objection according to which it is objectionable because of the kind of social relation it is. The expressivist objection is predicated on a communitarian strand in Marx's thought, whereas the entitlement objection is grounded in a more liberal account of the wrongfulness of capital…Read more
    I argue that we can find in Marx two objections to exploitation: an entitlement objection according to which it is wrongful because of the unjust distribution of benefits and burdens it generates; and an expressivist objection according to which it is objectionable because of the kind of social relation it is. The expressivist objection is predicated on a communitarian strand in Marx's thought, whereas the entitlement objection is grounded in a more liberal account of the wrongfulness of capitalist exploitation. I conclude by connecting my analysis to the current debate between proponents and critics of market socialism. While market socialism could be a vehicle for realizing the values associated with the entitlement objection, this is not true for the expressivist objection. Furthermore, because the entitlement objection does not depend on a thick conception of the human good, it is in accord with the liberal ideal of political neutrality whereas the expressivist objection is not.
  •  85
    Levels of perceptual representation and process in lexical access: Words, phonemes, and features
    with William Marslen-Wilson
    Psychological Review 101 (4): 653-675. 1994.
    Philosophy of Psychology
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