Paul Warren

In 1982 John Roemer published A General Theory of Exploitation and Class in which he developed a "property relations" theory of Marxian exploitation. Among the virtues Roemer claimed for the property relations theory was that it clarified the ethical imperative underlying Marxian exploitation. For Roemer that imperative called for the elimination of the inequalities in productive assets that were the source of exploitation. However, Roemer did not justify that ethical imperative. In this thesis I consider the possibility that the ethical imperative underlying Marxian exploitation can be justified by Rawls' Difference Principle. In other words, I consider whether a "marriage" of Rawlsian justice and Roemerian exploitation is possible. ;My answer is that such a "marriage" is not possible. If Rawls is right about justice and Roemer is right about Marxian exploitation, then Marxian exploitation is not unjust. The argument for this conclusion focuses on three problem cases in which, for different reasons, Marxian exploitation and Rawlsian injustice fail to correspond. The conclusion that I draw from this failure of correspondence is that the ethical concerns of Marxists should not be with the existence of exploitation, but instead with the issue of whether economic structures satisfy the Difference Principle. ;In order to maintain this position it is necessary to rebut Jeffrey Reiman's alternative conclusion that the problem cases show that Roemer is wrong about exploitation, not that the ethical concerns of Marxists should focus on the Difference Principle rather than exploitation. I argue that the problem cases apply to Reiman's definition as well; moreover, his definition of Marxian exploitation has the added difficulty that it is not adequately general. ;The apparent divergence of Marxian ethical judgements from those of Rawls' does not pose a problem for my claim that Marxists should focus directly on the Difference Principle. A difficulty only arises if when applying the Difference Principle we fail to take into account the counterfactual claims that historical materialism supports. Historical materialism and not the Marxian concept of exploitation is essential to a "Marxian" reading of Rawls' Difference Principle

This paper focuses on the claim that luck egalitarianism is incompatible with Marxian theory because it allows for the possibility of a ‘clean path’ to capitalism. It explores the nature and structure of the clean path argument generally and critically discusses luck egalitarian versions of the argument. It contends that the Marxian theory of exploitation can meet the challenge of the clean path to capitalism argument, that luck egalitarianism and the Marxian theory of exploitation are not incompatible, and that luck egalitarianism can explain why Marxian exploitation is unjust.

A common theme of libertarians is that there is a conflict between the values of liberty and equality. Achieving equality, so libertarians often argue, would require frequent interference in individuals’ lives, creating constraints on freedom and obstacles to the development of individuality. Although not himself endorsing a libertarian conception of liberty, Oxford philosopher G.A. Cohen recently has advanced the surprising thesis that there is a tension in Marxist normative thought that in an interesting way parallels the often heard libertarian challenge to egalitarianism.