Paula Reichert

This paper analyzes the ergodic hypothesis in the context of Boltzmann’s late work in statistical mechanics, where Boltzmann lays the foundations for what is today known as the typicality account. I argue that, based on the concepts of stationarity (of the measure) and typicality (of the equilibrium state), the ergodic hypothesis, as an idealization, is a consequence rather than an assumption of Boltzmann’s account. More precisely, it can be shown that every system with a stationary measure and an equilibrium state (be it a typical state with respect to the phase space or the time average) behaves essentially as if it were ergodic. I claim that Boltzmann was aware of this fact as it grounds both his notion of equilibrium, relating it to the thermodynamic notion of equilibrium, and his estimate of the fluctuation rates.

I prove a theorem on the precise connection of the time and phase-space average of the Boltzmann equilibrium showing that the behaviour of a dynamical system with a stationary measure and a dominant equilibrium state is qualitatively ergodic. Explicitly, I show that given a dynamical system with a stationary measure and a region of overwhelming phase-space measure, almost all trajectories spend almost all of their time in that region. Conversely, given that almost all trajectories spend almost all of their time in a certain region, that region is of overwhelming phase-space measure. In total, the time and phase-space average of the equilibrium state approximately coincide. Consequently, equilibrium can be defined equivalently in terms of the time or the phase-space average. Moreover, since the two averages are almost equal, the behaviour of the system is essentially ergodic. While this does not explain the approach to equilibrium, it provides a means to estimate the fluctuation rates.

AbstractBohmian mechanics grounds the predictions of quantum mechanics in precise dynamical laws for a primitive ontology of point particles. In an appraisal of the de-Broglie–Bohm theory, the paper discusses the crucial epistemological and conceptual role that a primitive ontology plays within a physical theory. It argues that quantum theories without primitive ontology fail to make contact with observable reality in a clear and consistent manner. Finally, it discusses Einstein’s epistemological model and why it supports the primitive ontology approach.

We discuss the total collision singularities of the gravitational N-body problem on shape space. Shape space is the relational configuration space of the system obtained by quotienting ordinary configuration space with respect to the similarity group of total translations, rotations, and scalings. For the zero-energy gravitating N-body system, the dynamics on shape space can be constructed explicitly and the points of total collision, which are the points of central configuration and zero shape momenta, can be analyzed in detail. It turns out that, even on shape space where scale is not part of the description, the equations of motion diverge at (and only at) the points of total collision. We construct and study the stratified total-collision manifold and show that, at the points of total collision on shape space, the singularity is essential. There is, thus, no way to evolve the solutions through these points. This mirrors closely the big bang singularity of general relativity, where the homogeneous-but-not-isotropic cosmological model of Bianchi IX shows an essential singularity at the big bang. A simple modification of the general-relativistic model (the addition of a stiff matter field) changes the system into one whose shape-dynamical description allows for a deterministic evolution through the singularity. We suspect that, similarly, some modification of the dynamics would be required in order to regularize the total collision singularity of the N-body model.

We discuss the total collision singularities of the gravitational N-body problem on shape space. Shape space is the relational configuration space of the system obtained by quotienting ordinary configuration space with respect to the similarity group of total translations, rotations, and scalings. For the zero-energy gravitating N-body system, the dynamics on shape space can be constructed explicitly and the points of total collision, which are the points of central configuration and zero shape momenta, can be analyzed in detail. It turns out that, even on shape space where scale is not part of the description, the equations of motion diverge at (and only at) the points of total collision. We construct and study the stratified total-collision manifold and show that, at the points of total collision on shape space, the singularity is essential. There is, thus, no way to evolve the solutions through these points. This mirrors closely the big bang singularity of general relativity, where the homogeneous-but-not-isotropic cosmological model of Bianchi IX shows an essential singularity at the big bang. A simple modification of the general-relativistic model (the addition of a stiff matter field) changes the system into one whose shape-dynamical description allows for a deterministic evolution through the singularity. We suspect that, similarly, some modification of the dynamics would be required in order to regularize the total collision singularity of the N-body model.

I prove a theorem on the precise connection of the time and phase-space average of the Boltzmann equilibrium showing that the behaviour of a dynamical system with a stationary measure and a dominant equilibrium state is qualitatively ergodic. Explicitly, I show that given a dynamical system with a stationary measure and a region of overwhelming phase-space measure, almost all trajectories spend almost all of their time in that region. Conversely, given that almost all trajectories spend almost all of their time in a certain region, that region is of overwhelming phase-space measure. In total, the time and phase-space average of the equilibrium state approximately coincide. Consequently, equilibrium can be defined equivalently in terms of the time or the phase-space average. Moreover, since the two averages are almost equal, the behaviour of the system is essentially ergodic. While this does not explain the approach to equilibrium, it provides a means to estimate the fluctuation rates.

We analyze the points of total collision of the Newtonian gravitational system on shape space (the relational configuration space of the system). While the Newtonian equations of motion, formulated with respect to absolute space and time, are singular at the point of total collision due to the singularity of the Newton potential at that point, this need not be the case on shape space where absolute scale doesn’t exist. We investigate whether, adopting a relational description of the system, the shape degrees of freedom, which are merely angles and their conjugate momenta, can be evolved through the points of total collision. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Even without scale, the equations of motion are singular at the points of total collision (and only there). This follows from the special behavior of the shape momenta. While this behavior induces the singularity, it at the same time provides a purely shape-dynamical description of total collisions. By help of this, we are able to discern total-collision solutions from non-collision solutions on shape space, that is, without reference to (external) scale. We can further use the shape-dynamical description to show that total-collision solutions form a set of measure zero among all solutions.

We discuss Boltzmann’s probabilistic explanation of the second law of thermodynamics providing a comprehensive presentation of what is called today the typicality account. Countering its misconception as an alternative explanation, we examine the relation between Boltzmann’s H-theorem and the general typicality argument demonstrating the conceptual continuity between the two. We then discuss the philosophical dimensions of the concept of typicality and its relevance for scientific reasoning in general, in particular for understanding the reduction of macroscopic laws to microscopic laws. Finally, we reply to various common criticisms of the typicality account.

The paper discusses recent proposals by Carroll and Chen, as well as Barbour, Koslowski, and Mercati to explain the arrow of time without a Past Hypothesis, i.e. the assumption of a special initial state of the universe. After discussing the role of the Past Hypothesis and the controversy about its status, we explain why Carroll's model - which establishes an arrow of time as typical - can ground sensible predictions and retrodictions without assuming something akin to a Past Hypothesis. We then propose a definition of a Boltzmann entropy for a classical N-particle system with gravity, suggesting that a Newtonian gravitating universe might provide a relevant example of Carroll's entropy model. This invites comparison with the work of Barbour, Koslowski, and Mercati that identifies typical arrows of time in a relational formulation of classical gravity on shape space. We clarify the difference between this gravitational arrow in terms of shape complexity and the entropic arrow in absolute spacetime, and work out the key advantages of the relationalist theory. We end by pointing out why the entropy concept relies on absolute scales and is thus not relational.