Paulina Siemieniec

The article proposes an agency turn in animal law, following in the footsteps of the political agency turn in animal ethics. The law currently operates on the assumption that animals are passive non-agents, which is reflected in the nature of their legal representation as voiceless and incompetent. We challenge this assumption by identifying three alternative standards for legally representing animals and their interests in the decision-making processes that affect them. According to the: (i) Interest Representation Standard, the best interests of animals are considered; (ii) Listening Standard, animals have a voice, and their input is solicited; and (iii) Empowerment Standard, animals are enabled to make decisions with legal effect. Each standard involves a varying degree of human and animal involvement in legal decision making. It is argued that scholars should reassess the assumption that animals are passive, and seriously consider the extent to which animal law could move towards an agency-affirming paradigm.

Although there is widespread agreement that the property status of nonhuman animals is indefensible, the debate about how to remedy their situation is ongoing. This paper explores three possibilities for approaching the issue of legal status: (1) extending the existing concept of personhood beyond the human to other animals; (2) developing an alternative legal subjectivity for nonhuman animals that is neither property nor personhood; (3) redefining personhood in animal terms while retaining the rights-bearing significance of personhood and decentering the human from animal subjectivity in law. I offer a critique of the first two strategies and defend the third on both conceptual and political grounds, as most responsive to the requirements of a genuinely liberatory politics. I call this the "centering animality" approach and apply it to the legal context through my proposal of animal personhood.

Political and legal theories of animal rights tend to raise the issue of domesticated animals’ sexuality and reproduction as a matter of population management and therefore concentrate too narrowly on providing justification for fertility restrictions. In this article, I argue that the normative logic underpinning the historical evolution and conceptual development of the fundamental right to health in international law, in its paradigm shift from population control to health rights, is consistent with initiating a similar transition in the domesticated animal case. Without the relevant legal rights protections in place, individual interests in having control over, and making decisions about, their sexuality and reproduction get subordinated to the imperative of achieving sustainable population goals, resulting in the violation of bodily integrity and self-determination. What is missing from the present discussion of domesticated animals’ sexuality and reproduction is a rights-based discourse. I seek to address this gap in the literature by drawing on the existing human rights law norms to develop a conception of sexual and reproductive rights for domesticated animals as a shared yet differentiated fundamental right to health. I show that the realization of this right for domesticated animals is conditional upon a set of freedoms and entitlements, such as the freedom of choice, association, and mobility, as well as access to a range of health facilities, goods, and services. The aim is to introduce a new way of thinking about domesticated animals’ sexuality and reproduction as a rights and agency issue not just a population and fertility control dilemma.