Pauline Westerman

This book features essays that investigate the nature of legal validity from the point of view of different traditions and disciplines. Validity is a fascinating and elusive characteristic of law that in itself deserves to be explored, but further investigation is made more acute and necessary by the production, nowadays, of soft law products of regulation, such as declarations, self-regulatory codes, and standardization norms. These types of rules may not exhibit the characteristics of formal law, and may lack full formal validity but yet may have a very real impact on people's lives. The essays focus on the structural properties of hard and soft legal phenomena and the basis of their validity. Some propose to redefine validity: to allow for multiple concepts instead of one and/or to allow for a gradual concept of validity. Others seek to analyze the new situation by linking it to familiar historical debates and well-established theories of law. In addition, coverage looks at the functions of validity itself. The discussion considers both international law as well as domestic law arrangements. What does it mean to say that something is valid? Should we discard validity as the determining aspect of law? If so, what does this mean for our concept of law? Should we differentiate between kinds of validity? Or, can we say that rules can be "more" or "less" valid? After reading this book, practitioners, scholars and students will have a nuanced understanding of these questions and more. Chapter 6 is available open access under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License via link.springer.com.

If we want to know whether a particular legal construct (rule, contract) is valid, we are interested in ascertaining its relevance. We want to know whether a certain rule can be trusted to have the effect it claims to have. This question in itself rests on the background assumption and collective agreement that in general such legal constructs do matter and make a difference. This article investigates the conditions under which such collective agreement can wax or wane. To that end, the validity of rules is compared with the reputation of persons. Personal reputation is not only dependent on one’s pedigree and upbringing but is also informed by present conduct and company, as well as by anticipated future performance. The same applies to the legal order, which is equally informed by considerations concerning past, present, and future. It is explained how these considerations move in circles of interaction and can be self-reinforcing, as well as self-defeating.

We argue in this note that the principles of validity need fresh understanding to explain the elements of private ordering exhibited in the vast swathes of informal markets around the world. Informal markets, by definition, lie outside formal legal systems and yet display a tenacious stability in their norms. We show that these norms are valid because they are driven by reputation rather than any higher order of law. In doing so, reputation drives efficacy into validity. By remolding Kelsen’s ideas on validity into Hart’s internal point of view, we show how reputation drives efficacy into validity. We illustrate this idea through a case study on a centuries-old footwear cluster in Agra (India).

Rundle criticizes the command conception of law by means of Fuller’s and Arendt’s concept of human agency. However, neither of these two authors derive law from human agency, as Rundle seems to think. Instead they stress that personhood can only be attributed to physical human beings on the basis of law. Moreover, their theories cannot be understood as answers to Rundle’s question – whatever that may be – but as answers to their own questions and concerns. In the case of Arendt and Fuller, these concerns were so different that the enterprise to reconcile them seems futile. Rundle’s approach can be understood as the attempt to deal with philosophy as if it were legal doctrine.

Moet er strenger gestraft worden of juist niet? Mag de rechter door de wetgever aan banden worden gelegd? In hoeverre mag de overheid ingrijpen in het privéleven van haar burgers? Deze vragen zijn inzet van menig opiniërend krantenartikel of discussieprogramma. Ook degenen die zich beroepshalve met het recht bezighouden zullen zich van tijd tot tijd moeten bezinnen op taak en functie van het recht. Moeten we regels toepassen als ze tot onrechtvaardige uitkomsten leiden? Leiden regels wel tot het doel waarvoor ze zijn opgesteld? Dit zijn allemaal vragen over het recht waarop door het recht zelf geen antwoorden kunnen worden gegeven. Betekent dit dat discussies over deze kwesties zinloos zijn omdat zij ontaarden in politieke welles-nietes spelletjes? Deze inleiding in de rechtsfilosofie beoogt te laten zien dat dit niet hoeft.

This article investigates the implications of goal-legislation for legal argumentation. In goal-regulation the legislator formulates the aims to be reached, leaving it to the norm-addressee to draft the necessary rules. On the basis of six types of hard cases, it is argued that in such a system there is hardly room for constructing a ratio legis. Legal interpretation is largely reduced to concretisation. This implies that legal argumentation tends to become highly dependent on expert (non-legal) knowledge

Brouwer defended the view that the autonomy of the individual citizen is furthered by articulated, precise and clear legislation. The question arises whether all kinds of rules can be said to enhance such autonomy. It is argued that a distinction should be drawn between rules that dictate desirable outcomes, on the one hand, and rules that determine the way the game is played, on the other. Rules of the game often reflect the way they were drafted and can be seen as the embodiment of power relations between rule-makers. Rules that dictate outcomes, on the other hand, are often drafted by experts who analyse the goals to be reached. The view is defended that only rules of the game – potentially – enhance the autonomy of the citizen, whereas outcome-rules are potentially manipulative, tending to exclude those who are ill-equipped to realize the prescribed outcomes. The virtues of rules therefore do not merely reside in their clear and precise nature, but are largely derived from their capacity to regulate the relations amongst citizens who were included in the process of rulemaking