Pavel Butakov

The success of the atheistic hiddenness argument depends on the “consciousness constraint” it imposes on the divine-human loving relationship: namely, that this relationship requires human conscious awareness of being in the relationship with God. I challenge the truth of this proposition by introducing the concept of a physical relationship with God that is not subject to this constraint. I argue, first, that a physical relationship with God is metaphysically possible; second, that its plausibility is supported by natural theology; and third, that a perfectly loving God would prefer physical relationships with human beings over consciousness-constrained relationships, because a perfectly loving God would prefer to preserve the integrity of human freedom of participation and allow inclusion of all people regardless of their natural cognitive capabilities. I also offer an interpretation of apparent divine hiddenness in the light of the idea of God’s openness for physical relationships.

Religious people are expected to believe in their religious creeds faithfully and firmly. How can one acquire such belief? In order to answer that question, I propose a model for all belief-like propositional attitudes. The model differentiates, firstly, between voluntary and involuntary, and, secondly, between categorical and quantitative belief-like attitudes. The whole variety of belief-like attitudes is then reduced into two main groups. The first group combines all voluntary and categorical attitudes, and the second group combines all involuntary and quantitative attitudes. The resultant first-group attitude is called “judgment,” and the second-group attitude—“confidence.” Thus, judgment is the generic voluntary categorical propositional attitude, which can have only two values: “true” or “false.” Confidence is the generic involuntary quantitative attitude, which can have any value between “certainly false” and “certainly true.” A religious person can form the creedal judgment simply by her act of will, while her confidence depends upon the actual content of her doxastic system. However, a person can indirectly increase her confidence in the creedal statement via relevant factors that control her doxastic system. Such factors include corroboration, desirability, and ethicality of the proposition, and also its centrality and entrenchment in the doxastic system. I suggest several practical guidelines for increasing the relevant factors. I claim that the suggested model and the practical guidelines for acquiring the “faithful and firm belief” can be used not only within the religious context, but can also be applied to any propositional beliefs.

The atheistic Hiddenness Argument contains a controversial premise that a perfectly loving God would love every single person. J. L. Schellenberg, the author of the Argument, claims that this premise is necessarily true. However, many ancient theologians would disagree with the truth of this premise. In this paper, I provide evidence of the variety of alternative theological views from antiquity concerning the proper object of perfect divine love. The list of alternatives includes 1) the whole humanity as a collective subject, 2) humanity as a universal, 3) divine image reflected in human beings, 4) the community of the faithful, 5) a chosen people. Based on the disagreement between Schellenberg and the ancient theologians concerning the proper object of perfect divine love, I argue that the aforementioned premise of the hiddenness argument, even if true, is not necessarily true. Therefore, the key premise of the hiddenness argument turns out to be without support, and the Argument turns out to be unsound.

The core of a Trinitarian model is the internal layout of intra-Trinitarian relations. Depending on different metaphysical interpretations of the nature of the relations, various patristic authors have produced different and oftentimes incompatible Trinitarian models, and, consequently, conflicting expositions of the doctrine of the Trinity. In order to elucidate the differences in their Trinitarian theologies, I demonstrate the divergence in their understanding of the divine relations using the contemporary philosophical taxonomy of relations. I analyze the models of Basil of Caesarea, Gregory Nazianzen, and Boethius, and their attempted synthesis by Thomas Aquinas. Each of the patristic Trinitarian models, in spite of being fully orthodox, uses completely different types of relations, which makes them incompatible. One of the results of this incompatibility is the problem of the filioque, which cannot be resolved without addressing the metaphysics of relations.

The appropriationist approach to history of philosophy is often accused of being antihistorical and thus unreliable. The appropriationists are only concerned with their own philosophical problems, and they make discriminating use of the historical data as far as it serves their needs. Its rival, the contextualist approach, claims to be an honest, dedicated and reliable treatment of history. The contextualists are willing to make use of the tedious methodology of Classical studies as long as it promises to uncover the true historical data. In this paper I present a case where the contextualists have failed to surpass their rival appropriationists in their quest for veracity. The case is the debate about Aristotle’s De Interpretatione 9, which took place in 1950-1980s. In this debate the contextualists were unable to offer any other results except for those which have already been suggested by the appropriationists. In addition I demonstrate how the contextualists selectively used the arsenal of Classical methodology not to uncover the truth, but to justify their own preconceived interpretations.

I argue that evidentialist ethics of belief requires believing in every promise, because any promise always has sufficient evidence. In order to combine evidentialism with ethics of belief, I distinguish two belief-like propositional attitudes. The first is categorical belief, which I call “opinion,” the second is quantitative belief, which I call “credence.” I accept doxastic voluntarism about opinions, and doxastic involuntarism about credences. Opinion has two values—affirmative and negative—and the subject has control over which one to choose. Credence can have any value between 0 and 1; it is formed solely on the basis of the available evidence, and the subject has no control over it. The requirement of evidentialist ethics of belief is that one should have opinion that p when his credence that p is between 0.5 and 1, and opinion that ¬p when the credence is below 0.5. My main argument has two premises. The first premise is that if one accepts a promise, then his credence that “the promise will be fulfilled” is higher than 0.5. The second premise claims that nothing can decrease that credence. The main explanation for the second premise is that any potential evidence against the fulfillment of the promise turns out to be evidence against its validity, not the evidence against the propositional content of the credence. The final conclusion is that if an evidentialist accepts a promise, then he should always have the opinion that “the promise will be fulfilled,” i.e., always believe in the promise.

It is often claimed that Plato’s definition of knowledge as “true opinion with an account” is in agreement with the contemporary analysis of knowledge as “justified true belief”. Some scholars disagree with the attribution of JTB to Plato. I analyze three influential arguments against the assumption of Plato’s agreement with JTB, and refute them. Then I provide my own argument against the assumption. I argue that the contemporary interpretation of the JTB formula understands “belief” not in the sense of an “opinion,” but rather of a “degree of confidence.” Accordingly, “justification” is understood not as applying to the opinion itself, but rather to the person having a certain degree of confidence. I support this claim by showing the difference between the traditional and the contemporary understanding of “evidence,” the former referring to a property of the proposition, while the latter meaning the body of reasons, which supports the person’s confidence to a certain degree. Thus, I conclude that Plato understands knowledge as “correct opinion validated by a rational explanation,” and it has very little in common with the contemporary understanding of knowledge as “sufficiently supported subjective degree of confidence in the truth of a proposition.”

Alvin Plantinga has played a pivotal role in bringing theological questions and ideas into the broad philosophical, predominantly non-theistic community. His “Advice to Christian Philosophers” (1983) was the turning point in the history of philosophical theology. In his “Advice” Plantinga talks about how best to be a Christian in philosophy. He suggests that Christian intellectuals should become more autonomous from the rest of philosophical world, display more unity, and express greater Christian self-confidence. These advices, however, are addressed not to just any intellectual of a Christian affiliation. He addresses them to those 1) who have graduated from a conservative Christian college, 2) who have obtained a PhD in philosophy, and 3) who continue their career as professional philosophers. That means that the person should be well acquainted with the traditional Christian doctrine and practice, should be well versed in the contemporary analytic philosophy, and should be an acknowledged member of the established philosophical community. It would be a mistake to apply Plantinga’s “Advice” to a person who does not meet all of the three requirements. The present day situation in Russia is such that there is a dramatic shortfall of those intellectuals who satisfy all of the three Plantinga’s requirements. It is still premature for Russian Christian philosophers to become autonomous from the rest of the philosophical community, to establish Christian philosophical clusters, and to display Christian self-confidence in the face of the non-theistic majority. Philosophical theology in Russia is currently in its “pre-Plantingan” phase. In order to improve this situation I suggest reversing Plantinga’s advices into their opposites. Russian Christian philosophers ought to learn how to operate within the broad philosophical community. They should familiarize themselves with the contemporary analytic philosophy and its methods, and they should become acknowledged members of the established professional circles. Then, and only then, philosophical theology in Russia can enter its post-Plantingan era.

The Greek model of the Trinity, based on the Theological Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus, treats the Trinitarian relations as connections between the Father and the two other persons: the Son and the Holy Spirit. The two relations have to be heteronymous, and have to be interpreted from the extreme realistic position. The Latin Trinitarian model, based on Boethius’ De Trinitate, treats relations as three subsistent persons. The relations have to be unidirectional: from the Father to the Son, and from both of them to the Holy Spirit. Both models are adequate and effective, but incompatible. One of the consequences of this incompatibility is the problem of filioque: the introduction of an additional relation of procession into the Greek model as well as the exclusion of this relation from the Latin model result in the inadequacy of the models. From the point of view of the complementability of a model, the Greek model allows introduction of new elements, while the Latin model does not. The soteriological consequences are such that the Greek model welcomes a human person to establish a unique relation with the person of the Father, which leads to the theosis of a creature. The Latin model requires the saving relation to be established with the whole Trinity, and theosis is not supported.

Available manuscripts of Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians have a variant reading of Jesus’ words at the Last Supper in 11:24. The longer reading contains “take, eat” while the shorter reading does not. The two readings have a noticeable difference in meaning. The longer one highlights the individual value of the Eucharist; the shorter version, however, favors its institutional significance. The existence of the two readings can be interpreted as evidence for ideological dynamics in the early church. Depending on which of the two readings is considered prior, the church history would be seen either as an increase of clerical authority, or as an increase of value of the individual.

The Greek word ‘schesis’ in the works of Gregory Nazianzen has generally been translated as ‘relation’ and interpreted as a programmatic term for his doctrine of Trinitarian relations. Although this may be a valid interpretation of the terminology of other 4th century theologians, this is not true of Gregory. His usage of the word ‘schesis’ does not correspond with the traditional Aristotelian or Stoic ways of designating a relation. It denotes a status or a disposition, it may even mean a place in a relation, but it is not the relation itself, and not a disposition towards another. Therefore all the interpretations of Gregory’s teaching on the Trinitarian relations are to be revisited and reformulated more carefully, keeping in mind the peculiarity of his usage of ‘schesis.’

The paper discusses the peculiarities of the analytic approach to the history of Ancient philosophy in the context of other, more popular approaches and genres. This approach is based on finding out an implicit argumentation and problems in the philosophical texts, and establishing logical connections between them. The paper also considers the perspectives of application of this approach to patristic texts. In addition, it shows the necessity of formalization and symbolization in the analytic history of philosophy.

The paper is a part of the panel discussion with John Greco about his theory of the transmission of religious knowledge. My goal here is not to argue with Greco's theory, but to find out whether it requires any adjustment. I argue that Greco's theory of the social transmission of knowledge requires the transmitted knowledge to be socially verifiable, that is, to be subject to those means of confirmation that pertain to the social system. Unfortunately, some kinds of religious knowledge are not socially verifiable; therefore, they cannot be transmitted via Greco's social mechanism. I conclude that Greco's theory turns out to be applicable to the socially verifiable religious testimonies, and not applicable to the rest.

Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox theologians claim that the unique event of Christ’s sacrifice on Calvary is present in Eucharistic liturgies. A popular explanatory strategy for this miraculous presence suggests that due to its supernatural character the Eucharist “conquers time,” transcends its boundaries, and allows for temporal coincidence of two chronologically distant events. I discuss the four main approaches within this strategy that can be discovered in contemporary theological writings. The first approach implies a time travel of the Calvary event. The second suggests the time travel of Eucharistic participants. The third eliminates the chronological distance by relocating one of the events into a timeless reality. The fourth assumes multilocation of the event across time. I argue that each of these approaches is untenable on philosophical or theological grounds.