Pavel Hobza

In the case of Anaximander, there are two sources of indirect reports or of what Diels called testimonia: 1) Aristotle’s works and 2) Theophrastus’ lost writing Physikai Doxai, which is to be reconstructed by means of reports in other doxographers. Usually, it is assumed that both sources of testimonia complement each other. However, at least as regards Anaximander’s alleged principle of the Apeiron, there is a deep gap between Aristotle’s and Theophrastus’ testimonies, as while Aristotle interprets Anaximander in pluralistic terms (not mentioning the Apeiron anywhere), Theophrastus attributes a monistic concept of the Apeiron to him. The comparison of how Aristotle and Theophrastus approached Anaximander suggests that both tried to categorise or conceptualise the original cosmogonical mass by means of principles. Thus, it was only Theophrastus who introduced the concept of the Apeiron as a designation of the original mass from which the world subsequently developed.

Although our notion of induction stems from the Aristotelian epagoge, it was probably Cicero who first translated it into Latin as inductio. I argue that, despite occasional similarities, Aristotle’s epagoge is different from induction. In the first part, I point out the differences in epagoge’s function and nature. (1) Unlike induction, epagoge can proceed both from particulars to universals and the other way round, being an application of universals to particulars. (2) While induction is taken to be a means for how to obtain universals, epagoge finds universals already at its disposal before starting to work. (3) Although, like induction, epagoge may in some contexts be considered a kind of logical inference, it is rather an intuitive or perception-like ability or capacity providing the connection between particulars and universals. In the second part, I deal with what Aristotle calls καθόλου and καθ’ ἕκαστον. Although they are usually rendered as ‘universal’ and ‘particular’, on closer inspection, they turn out to be different from these modern terms. Their relationship is to be understood as that between a whole and parts.

Anaximenes is usually considered to be a material monist recognizing transparent atmospheric air as a principle (ἀρχή). In the cosmogonic explanation of the origin of the earth and the heavenly bodies, the Greek term ἀήρ turns out to mean rather ‘opaque damp mist’. However, Not only does it accord with archaic usage, but also with how it was used in his mentor, Anaximander. Yet, in cosmology ἀήρ means ‘air’ serving as stuff on which the earth and the heavenly bodies float. Hence, in keeping with contemporary usage, Anaximenes recognised two kinds of ἀήρ, distinguishing them functionally. Whereas mist is conceived of as a generating substance, air functions only as carrying stuff.