Paweł Rojek

Georges Florovsky, in 1936, called for a revival of the teaching of the Church Fathers. At the same time, Fr. Joseph Bocheński formulated the program for the renewal of Thomism by means of formal logic. In this paper, I propose to integrate these two projects. Analytic Patristics aims at expressing and developing patristic thought with the tools of analytic philosophy. The broad program of the logic of religion formulated by Bocheński included semiotics, methodology, and the formal logic of religion. I present here three examples of the integration of analytic philosophy and patristics in these three areas. I discuss first Basil Lourié’s paraconsistent interpretation of Dionysius the Areopagite’s theory of the divine names, then Richard Swinburne’s efforts to revive Orthodox natural theology, and finally Beau Branson’s reconstruction of Gregory of Nyssa’s metaphysics of the Trinity. These examples perfectly illustrate how analytic philosophy can contribute to the development of patristics, and how the tradition of the Church Fathers can inspire contemporary analytic philosophy of religion.

In Russian culture, there was neither Scholasticism nor Renaissance, and the problem of faith and reason was formulated, most of all, on the ground of Patristic tradition. This collection of essays explores various dimensions of this alternative Russian account. The book shows the peculiarities of the Orthodox interpretation of faith. It traces the interrelations between Eastern and Western thinkers, and it investigates the heritage of Russian religious philosophy, with a special attention to Pavel Florensky, Sergius Bulgakov, and Georges Florovsky. *** Librarians: ebook available on ProQuest and EBSCO [Subject: Philosophy, Religious Studies, Russian Studies]

Peter Chaadaev (1794-1856) is rightfully considered to be one of the forerunners of modern Russian philosophy. There is a famous scene from his life that may help us to understand both his own thought as well as the whole subsequent tradition of Russian religious philosophy. When Chaadaev finished his studies of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, he crossed out the title on the cover and wrote beneath it Apologete adamitischer Vernunft (An Apology for Adamic Reason). Russian religious philosophy was supposed to be a critique of such secular reason. In this book we seek a contemporary interpretation of Chaadaev's thought and its influence. Our authors, including such scholars as Andrzej Walicki and Boris Tarasov, investigate his views on religion, society, history, politics, and Russian fate. Chaadaev turns out to be a crucial figure who continues to influence Russian religious philosophy to this day. ""Nicolas Berdiaev credited Chaadaev with 'the awakening of independent original Russian thought.' Indeed, his main themes have ever since been at the center of Russian philosophy. As a Christian philosopher Chaadaev cherished love of truth over love of fatherland, which, he said, 'feeds national hatreds' and 'sometimes covers the earth with mourning.' This volume is an important contribution to the study of his enduring legacy, for Russia and the world."" --Randall A. Poole, Professor of History, College of St. Scholastica ""Modern Russian religious thought begins with Chaadaev. While his output was small, its impact was far-reaching. Khomiakov, Kireevsky, Herzen, Soloviev, Berdiaev and many others were indebted to Chaadaev in one way or another. He merits the careful attention the authors of this volume devote to him."" --Paul Valliere, Professor Emeritus, Butler University Artur Mrowczyński-Van Allen is Professor at the International Center for the Study of the Christian Orient and Instituto de Filosofia ""Edith Stein,"" Granada, Spain. He is the author of Between the Icon and the Idol: The Human Person and the Modern State in Russian Literature and Thought (Cascade, 2013). Teresa Obolevitch is Professor at the Pontifical University of John Paul II in Krakow, Poland. Recently she published La philosophie religieuse russe (2014) in French and Semen Frank: Shtrikhi k portretu filosofa in Russian (2017). Pawel Rojek is Assistant Lecturer at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland.

Is Russia a neoimperial or postimperial state? In this paper, I compare two interpretations proposed by political commentators Marcel Van Herpen and Dmitri Trenin. Van Herpen holds that the Russian empire is literally being rebuilt, whereas Trenin believes that Russia is just ceasing to be an empire. I argue that, contrary to popular belief, the current war against Ukraine cannot be interpreted as an attempt to restore the Russian empire. This is because being an empire requires a universalistic ideology that can be accepted by other nations. Meanwhile, the ideological foundation of the current war is an obviously nationalistic conception of the “Russian world.” Polish historians Andrzej Nowak and Włodzimierz Marciniak brilliantly argued that it was Russian nationalism that had previously led to the collapse of both Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. Under this interpretation the current war in Ukraine can be seen not as the rebirth but rather as the dramatic end of Russian imperialism.

W swojej książce Tropy i uniwersalia: Badania ontologiczne zaproponowałem systematyczną i historyczną analizę problemu uniwersaliów. Odróżniłem trzy podstawowe pojęcia powszechników, rozumianych kolejno jako wspólne własności, wspólne aspekty i wspólne całości, a następnie zastosowałem je do szczegółowej analizy teorii Romana Ingardena, św. Tomasza z Akwinu i Georga Wilhelma Friedricha Hegla. W tym tekście przedstawiam założenia metodologiczne mojej pracy, przyjmowane przeze mnie rozumienie powszechników i główne rezultaty moich interpretacji. Następnie omawiam krótko dyskusje, jakie wywołała moja książka. Katarzyna Barska i Marek Piwowarczyk kwestionowali moje odczytanie teorii Ingardena, a Tomasz Tiuryn i Michał Głowala krytykowali moją interpretację stanowiska św. Tomasza. Na koniec pokazuję, w jaki sposób Karol Kleczka ciekawie rozwinął interpretację pojęcia konkretnego powszechnika w ramach współczesnej teorii uprawdziwiania.

Filozofowie analityczni zwykle uważają, że dyskutowany przez nich problem uniwersaliów jest tym samym problemem, którym zajmowano się w starożytności i średniowieczu. Historycy filozofii pokazują jednak, że dawny spór o uniwersalia dotyczył wielu różnych kwestii i wcale nie skupiał się na dyskutowanym obecnie problemie wspólnych własności. W swojej książce Tropy i uniwersalia przyjmowałem, że pojęcie powszechników miało zawsze mniej więcej to samo znaczenie i interpretowałem stanowisko św. Tomasza z Akwinu jako rodzaj współczesnego realizmu. Moja interpretacja wywołała interesujące polemiki ze strony historyków filozofii, Tomasza Tiuryna i Michała Głowali. W tym artykule staram się zbadać podobieństwa i różnice między współczesnym a średniowiecznym rozumieniem powszechników i odpowiedzieć na niektóre sformułowane przez nich zarzuty. Wygląda na to, że w średniowieczu istniały co najmniej trzy różne pojęcia uniwersaliów. Po pierwsze, rozumiano je jako byty wspólne, ściśle tożsame w wielu swoich realizacjach. To pojęcie uniwersaliów być może zawdzięczamy patrystycznym dyskusjom o Trójcy Świętej w IV wieku. Po drugie, uniwersalia definiowano jako byty orzekane o wielu, to znaczy ogólne pojęcia istniejące w intelekcie. Po trzecie wreszcie, uważano je, zwłaszcza w późnej scholastyce, za byty dzielące się w swoich realizacjach. Tylko to pierwsze pojęcie zgadza się ze współczesnym rozumieniem uniwersaliów. Wynika z tego, że średniowieczny i współczesny spór o powszechniki częściowo pokrywają się ze sobą. Staram się także pokazać, że proponowane przez Tiuryna i Głowalę interpretacje stanowiska św. Tomasza prowadzą do osobliwego poglądu łączącego teorię tropów i strusi nominalizm Quine’a.

The discussion about internal and external relations usually concerns what kind of relations exist. In this paper, I take up another question, namely whether external relations can become internal and internal relations become external. My starting point is the concept of a “relational collapse” formulated by the Soviet and Ukrainian philosopher Avenir Uemov. I try to develop his idea, distinguishing two senses of internal relation, based on the concepts of ground and essence. As I argue, internalisation may consist either on groundation or essentialisation of relations. Contrary to Uemov, both of these processes seem to be reversible, so we should also introduce the concepts of ungroundation and accidentalisation of relations. These four concepts form a framework for the general theory of internalisation and externalisation of relations. This framework seems to be particularly useful in analysis of some problems in social ontology.

Pavel Florensky (1882–1937), a Russian theologian, philosopher, and mathematician, argued that the religious discourse is essentially contradictory and put forward the idea of the logical theory of antinomies. Recently his views raised interesting discussions among logicians who consider him a forerunner of many non-classical logics. In this paper I discuss four interpretations of Florensky’s views: paraconsistent, L-contradictory, non-monotonic and rhetorical. In conclusion I argue for the integral interpretation which unites these four approaches.

Semen Frank (1877–1950) was one of the first and most ardent advocates of the ontological argument in the twentieth century. He proposed an original interpretation of the ontological argument based on its analogy to Descartes’ Cogito. Frank believed that it is possible to develop Cogito ergo sum into Cogito ergo est ens absolutum. In this paper, I analyze his version of the ontological argument. First, I propose a simple reconstruction of his reasoning, paying attention to its hidden premise. Second, departing from the classical logical interpretations of Descartes’ argument, I show that for Frank the claim that God exists had the same logical properties as Cogito. As a result, it seems that his argument was formally correct, though based on a premise which could hardly be convincing for a non-believer. This should not be surprising, however, since Frank, as most Russian religious philosophers, was not interested in the project of philosophical theology. His main concern was rather the development of philosophy based on religious premises, which might be called “theological philosophy”.

Essential properties are usually thought as properties that things must always possess, whereas accidental properties are considered as changeable. In this paper, we challenge this traditional view. We argue that in some important cases, such as social or biological development, we face not only the change of accidents, but also the change of essences. To analyze this kind of change we propose an alternative view on the relations between the modalities and time. Some properties might be necessary or possible for a thing in a classical sense throughout its existence, whereas others might be necessary or possible only for some restricted periods. We distinguish therefore absolute, prospective, retrospective, and relative modalities. As we argue, these non-classical concepts of modality are useful in analysis of some puzzling case of seemingly changing essences.

Paweł Florenski starał się sformułować ontologiczną teorię miłości. Uważał on, że miłość jest nie tylko zjawiskiem psychicznym, lecz zakłada takżejakiegoś rodzaju rzeczywiste zjednoczenie. Florenski proponował, by rozumieć je jako współistotność. Dwa numerycznie różne podmioty mogą stać się czymś jednym dzięki swojej numerycznie tożsamej istocie. Prócz tego Florenski zarysował teorię ontologiczną opartą na odróżnieniu między rzeczami a osobami. Wydaje się, że uznawał on wiązkową teorię przedmiotów i nominalizm tropowy dla kategorii rzeczy i teorię substratu połączoną z realizmem dla kategorii osób. Pogląd Florenskiego można więc uznać za jedno ze stanowisk w dyskusji o zasadzie identyczności nieodróżnialnych. Staram się także pokazać, że można przezwyciężyć pewne poważne problemy filozoficzne i teologiczne ontologii miłości Florenskiegojeśli doda się do niej patrystyczne rozróżnienie między istotą a energią.

In this paper I take a closer look at Fr. Georges Florovsky’s original view on the relation between philosophy and theology. I argue that he tried to formulate an approach based on patristic experience and opposed to the dominating secular paradigm of philosophy. In some sense he wanted to reverse the traditional account. As Teresa Obolevitch aptly suggested, he wanted to replace the principle fides quaerens intellectum by the rule intellectus quaerens fidem. In that first default case the faith needs to be justified or proved by the reason, in the second, unobvious one, the faith has an absolute priority and illuminates itself the natural thought. According to Florovsky, philosophy should not attempt to ground the theology, formulating arguments for the existence of God or proving the coherence of theism, but rather should accept theology as a fundamental premise and then develop a new, non-secular account for the old philosophical topics.

It has been widely recognized that Wittgenstein's theory of family resemblance solved the problem of universals. This theory may be considered in two ways, however. (1) Family resemblance may be understood in a manner of abstract universals theory. Most commentators accept this interpretation. Though in this case, I would argue, Wittgenstein's contribution to the problem of universals seems to be overestimated. (2) Wittgenstein's theory may also be considered, following one of contemporary Polish philosophers J. Szymura, as a view connected with the Hegelian theory of concrete universals. The article is devoted to put forward some arguments for this interpretation. Firstly, it is coherent with all Wittgenstein's theses on family resemblance and states that there is literally nothing common in things. Secondly, it fits to Wittgenstein's language (terms such as "family", "Ähnlichkeit" and so on). Thirdly, there are some biographical pieces of evidence that Wittgenstein was inspired by Goethe's concept of "Urpflanze", which is very close to concrete universal

Universals are usually considered to be universal properties. Since tropes are particular properties, if there are only tropes, there are no universals. However, universals might be thought of not only as common properties, but also as common aspects (“determinable universals”) and common wholes (“concrete universals”). The existence of these two latter concepts of universals is fully compatible with the assumption that all properties are particular. This observation makes possible three different trope theories, which accept tropes and no universals, tropes and determinable universals and tropes and concrete universals.