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OCk, athryn, 163 Byrne, Ruth MJ, 61 Cosmides, Leda, 187 Garnham, Alan, 45, 117Cognition 31 295. 1989.
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Reasoning from múltiple conditionals: The interaction between content and structureThinking and Reasoning 4 97-122. 1998.
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1When 'or'means 'and': a study in mental modelsIn Ashwin Ram & Kurt Eiselt (eds.), Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society: August 13 to 16, 1994, Georgia Institute of Technology, Erlbaum. pp. 475--478. 1994.
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32Explanations make inconsistencies harder to detectIn S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Cognitive Science Society. 2010.
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43Illusions of consistency in quantified assertionsIn S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Cognitive Science Society. 2010.
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An antidote to illusory inferencesIn Garrison W. Cottrell (ed.), Proceedings of the Eighteenth Annual Conference of The Cognitive Science Society, Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 820. 1996.
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Illusions of understandingIn A. J. Sanford & P. N. Johnson-Laird (eds.), The nature and limits of human understanding, T & T Clark. pp. 3--25. 2003.
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The psychology of understandingIn A. J. Sanford & P. N. Johnson-Laird (eds.), The nature and limits of human understanding, T & T Clark. 2003.
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17Models of Possibilities Instead of Logic as the Basis of Human ReasoningMinds and Machines 34 (3): 1-22. 2024.The theory of mental models and its computer implementations have led to crucial experiments showing that no standard logic—the sentential calculus and all logics that include it—can underlie human reasoning. The theory replaces the logical concept of validity (the conclusion is true in all cases in which the premises are true) with necessity (conclusions describe no more than possibilities to which the premises refer). Many inferences are both necessary and valid. But experiments show that indi…Read more
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1How we reason: a view from psychologyThe Reasoner 2 4-5. 2008.Good reasoning can lead to success; bad reasoning can lead to catastrophe. Yet it's not obvious how we reason, and why we make mistakes. This book by one of the pioneers of the field, Philip Johnson-Laird, looks at the mental processes that underlie our reasoning. It provides the most accessible account yet of the science of reasoning
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4Mental Models in Prepositional ReasoningIn Ashwin Ram & Kurt Eiselt (eds.), Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society: August 13 to 16, 1994, Georgia Institute of Technology, Erlbaum. pp. 16--15. 1994.
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22The Meaning of ModalityCognitive Science 2 (1): 17-26. 1978.This paper describes a semantics for modal terms such as can and may that is intended to model the mental representation of their meaning. The basic assumption of the theory is that the evaluation of a modal assertion involves an attempted mental construction of a specified alternative to a given situation rather than the separate evaluation of each member of a set of possible alternatives as would be required by a “possible worlds” semantics. The theory leads to the conclusion that, contrary to…Read more
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12Will there be any neat solutions to small problems in cognitive science?Cognitive Science 3 (2): 173-176. 1979.
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23Will There Be Any Neat Solutions to Small Problems in Cognitive Science?Cognitive Science 3 (2): 173-176. 1979.
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57The nature and limits of human understanding (edited book)T & T Clark. 2003.This book is an exploration of human understanding, from the perspectives of psychology, philosophy, biology and theology. The six contributors are among the most internationally eminent in their fields. Though scholarly, the writing is non-technical. No background in psychology, philosophy or theology is presumed. No other interdisciplinary work has undertaken to explore the nature of human understanding. This book is unique, and highly significant for anyone interested in or concerned about th…Read more
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38The Truth of Conditional AssertionsCognitive Science 42 (8): 2502-2533. 2018.Given a basic conditional of the form, If A then C, individuals usually list three cases as possible: A and C, not‐A and not‐C, not‐A and C. This result corroborates the theory of mental models. By contrast, individuals often judge that the conditional is true only in the case of A and C, and that cases of not‐A are irrelevant to its truth or falsity. This result corroborates other theories of conditionals. To resolve the discrepancy, we devised two new tasks: the “collective” truth task, in whi…Read more
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27Strategies in sentential reasoningCognitive Science 26 (4): 425-468. 2002.Four experiments examined the strategies that individuals develop in sentential reasoning. They led to the discovery of five different strategies. According to the theory proposed in the paper, each of the strategies depends on component tactics, which all normal adults possess, and which are based on mental models. Reasoners vary their use of tactics in ways that have no deterministic account. This variation leads different individuals to assemble different strategies, which include the constru…Read more
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39
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31Semantic primitives for emotions: A Reply to Ortony and CloreCognition and Emotion 4 (2): 129-143. 1990.
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49Believability and syllogistic reasoningCognition 31 (2): 117-140. 1989.In this paper we investigate the locus of believability effects in syllogistic reasoning. We identify three points in the reasoning process at which such effects could occur: the initial interpretation of premises, the examination of alternative representations of them (in all of which any valid conclusion must be true), and the “filtering” of putative conclusions. The effect of beliefs at the first of these loci is well established. In this paper we report three experiments that examine whether…Read more
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University of New MexicoRegular Faculty
Albuquerque, New Mexico, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |