Pedro Bravo

Citizen science has been one of the main forms of public participation in scientific research. The inclusion of non-professional scientists in this context has, however, generated concerns about the reliability of its results, and a great part of the literature has been investigating it. In this paper, we aim to provide a more comprehensive epistemic evaluation of citizen science by discussing standards other than reliability. To do this, we refer to Alvin Goldman’s social veristic epistemology and its fivestandards for epistemically evaluating social practices or institutions: reliability (the ratio of results to total number of results and errors fostered by a practice), power (the practice’s ability to help cognizers find results that answer the questions that interest them), fecundity (the practice’s ability to lead to large numbers of results for many practitioners), speed (how quickly a practice leads to results), and efficiency (how well a practice limits the cost of getting results). By applying it to the citizen science literature and by relying upon its contributions, this framework enables the integration of various theoretical reflections on citizen science, encompassing trade-offs among these standards and addressing ethical concerns. Furthermore, it also allows one to respond to common criticism about citizen science and to draw some important implications. In particular, we show how citizen science's fecundity is crucial for mitigating the challenges associated with unseen science, i.e., research whose results are never shared outside an institution boundary, thus highlighting its significance in the growing landscape of public participation in scientific research.

Citizen science has been one of the main forms of public participation in scientific research. The inclusion of non-professional scientists in this context has, however, generated concerns about the reliability of its results, and a great part of the literature has been investigating it. In this paper, we aim to provide a more comprehensive epistemic evaluation of citizen science by discussing standards other than reliability. To do this, we refer to Alvin Goldman’s social veristic epistemology and its fivestandards for epistemically evaluating social practices or institutions: reliability (the ratio of results to total number of results and errors fostered by a practice), power (the practice’s ability to help cognizers find results that answer the questions that interest them), fecundity (the practice’s ability to lead to large numbers of results for many practitioners), speed (how quickly a practice leads to results), and efficiency (how well a practice limits the cost of getting results). By applying it to the citizen science literature and by relying upon its contributions, this framework enables the integration of various theoretical reflections on citizen science, encompassing trade-offs among these standards and addressing ethical concerns. Furthermore, it also allows one to respond to common criticism about citizen science and to draw some important implications. In particular, we show how citizen science's fecundity is crucial for mitigating the challenges associated with unseen science, i.e., research whose results are never shared outside an institution boundary, thus highlighting its significance in the growing landscape of public participation in scientific research.

Until recently, philosophers of science have largely focused their attention on academic and industry-funded research, overlooking the contributions of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to science. Nevertheless, NGO-supported science is highly significant both from a practical perspective (serving as a source of impactful research that can address the needs of local communities) and a theoretical perspective (serving as a unique institutional context for scientific research that contrasts with more well-studied institutional contexts). To facilitate further studies of NGO-supported science, this paper provides an overview of what is currently known about its major strengths and weaknesses, as well as potential strategies for addressing those weaknesses. On the basis of this analysis, the paper shows that studying NGO-supported science can generate important insights about the institutional structure of science, approaches for managing values in science, strategies for generating impactful research, and instances of “false advertising” in science that need to be carefully addressed.

Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) are a large class of chemicals, whose carbon-fluorine bonds allow a wide range of industrial applications but also make them highly persistent. Since there is evidence about only a few of them and their properties may vary, one of the pressing issues regarding PFAS is how to group them for different purposes. In this paper, I aim to show how a recent panel of experts about grouping PFAS was co-opted in a way that favor the fluorine industry. The panel consisted of eleven experts, including authors renowned for views in conflict with fluorine industry regulatory approaches, answering questions through an online application. Its main results along with the experts’ answers were published in 2022 in the journal Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology. Through a detailed analysis of all the material published and in dialogue with the literature about industry-funded research, I will present how choices in the design of the panel (e.g., which kind of consensus the exercise could capture, the ways questions were framed or even changed), in textual analysis (e.g., criteria for assembling opinions) and in the communication of the findings (e.g., what gets included or excluded) were made in an industry friendly way affecting two specific grouping approaches. I conclude with some lessons about this kind of influence of industry funding.

Defensores do princípio da precaução propõem com frequência mudanças nas práticas científicas, para que elas facilitem o mesmo objetivo do princípio: evitar ameaças incertas ao ambiente ou à saúde humana. A ciência deveria ser uma ciência precautória. Apesar da importância prática da ciência precautória e da sua proximidade com os debates sobre ciência e valores, ela ainda não foi sistematicamente examinada. Neste artigo, pretende-se contribuir para a literatura sobre a ciência precautória de dois modos: sistematizando sua literatura prévia e propondo uma definição de um de seus elementos principais, a precaução epistêmica, como uma orientação específica para a gestão de riscos indutivos. Conclui-se com algumas objeções que tal definição levanta, bem como caminhos de pesquisas futuras para abordá-las.

This paper aims to map the different theoretical options related to the Precautionary Principle (PP). Great part of the literature on it can be systematized by answering to three different questions: is there a basic structure in the PP? If so, in which interpretation of the PP does this structure express itself? Finally, are its damage or knowledge conditions fixed or adjustable? The first question separates realist from non-realist approaches. The second question allows us to discriminate monist, dualist, or pluralist positions in relation to the three interpretations of the PP: decision rule, procedural requirement, or epistemic rule. Finally, the third question distinguishes rigid from non-rigid formulations of the principle. Based on this mapping, one can not only navigate through the different formulations of the PP present both in official documents and in specialized literature, but also deflect some of its common objections, and understand Hans Jonas’ eventual connection with PP. Notwithstanding, this mapping does not capture other important themes attached to PP, which motivates a final distinction between narrow and broader forms of PP.

O objetivo deste artigo é analisar as relações entre agnotologia (construção social da ignorância) e o princípio da precaução (PP) sob dois aspectos. O primeiro diz respeito à crítica de que parcela dos defensores do PP teria utilizado estratégias de construção de ignorância. A partir do trabalho do filósofo Daniel Steel, mostro como elas enfraquecem um critério interno ao próprio princípio: a proporcionalidade. Sob o segundo aspecto, comento documentos tornados públicos que evidenciam estratégias de agnotologia por setores da indústria tanto sobre o PP como sobre resultados científicos para que ele não fosse aplicado. Semelhante exposição ainda não foi realizada na literatura especializada no PP. A partir dessa análise, busco contribuir para identificar estratégias de agnotologia em debates sobre o PP.

Objetivamos discutir a crítica, avançada por Colin Howson em Hume's problem, segundo a qual o argumento do milagre (doravante, AM) comete a falácia da taxa-base. Por falácia da taxa-base, entende-se a negligência do valor da probabilidade prévia de determinada hipótese ou teoria T, P(T). Por sua vez, em uma de suas versões, AM assere que apenas assumindo que uma teoria científica madura T é aproximadamente verdadeira não faz de seu sucesso preditivo um milagre. Formalizado probabilisticamente, Howson argumenta que a conclusão de AM, a probabilidade de que a teoria T seja aproximadamente verdadeira é grande, apenas se segue se assumirmos para T um valor não-negligenciável. Tal crítica de Howson despertou duas categorias de reação na literatura especializada: supondo que AM comete a falácia da taxa base, alguns autores propuseram abandonar AM enquanto um argumento para a tese epistemológica do realismo científico, ao passo que outros defenderam que apenas uma versão de AM comete a falácia da taxa-base; defendendo que AM não comete a falácia da taxa base, certos autores alegaram alguns problemas na formalização probabilística de AM, enquanto outros buscaram refinar tal formalização de modo que a nova evite a falácia em questão. Tendo apresentado esse estado da arte, investigaremos se a formalização probabilística do argumento do milagre é razoável. Discutiremos se ela acomoda a natureza de inferência à melhor explicação pressuposta no AM. Por fim, indicaremos, brevemente, algumas dificuldades para a crítica de Howson ao assumir-se que AM instancia, na verdade, uma abdução Peirceana.