Pedro Jesús Teruel

In this paper we examine the issues of the 1764 published essay – specially of its third section – which help us to reconstruct Kant’s position in the mind-body problem. The philosopher explores here the roots of pathological diseases and refers to a theory, exposed by Johann August Unzer in the weekly Der Arzt, which relates the Kantian point of view with the contemporary Functionalism in Philosophy of Mind. In this way we are pursuing a train of thought previously not taken into account in the Kantian research.

La aproximación al fenómeno de la akrasía desde la interpretación filosófica de los datos neurocientíficos trae consigo rendimientos teóricos y prácticos. Entre los teóricos se encuentra la fundamentación neurofisiológica de las acciones acráticas, con el consiguiente aumento de capacidad explicativa respecto de las argumentaciones clásicas ligadas a la noción de hábito. Entre los prácticos se halla su proyección terapéutica en el campo de la psicología y la psiquiatría. Sobre esta base propongo dicha aproximación como teoría con valor explicativo y predictivo que conjuga la reducción interteórica lograda con la evitación del reduccionismo ontológico.

Neither the term ‘emotion’, nor its current meaning, can be found in Kant’s writings. In this chapter I identify one strategy for exploring the realm of emotions by delineating the German notion of Erregung, its German-Latin counterpart Motion, and its semantic field. I argue that there is a link between the embodied aspect of emotions and the classic question of pathos, and that the Kantian approach to emotions is related to the stoic idea of ataraxia. Following the subsequent discussion of akrasia, I turn to its neuroscientific implications, in order to show that weakness of will in general, and especially its role within Kantian philosophy, can be understood from a naturalised model of causation.

La dialéctica entre naturaleza y libertad se halla en el corazón del debate contemporáneo entre los paradigmas científicos propios de las ciencias naturales y de las ciencias humanas. La neurociencia constituye, de hecho, uno de los fulcros de dicho debate y el campo de batalla de posiciones encontradas. El abordaje neurocientífico de las patologías revela presupuestos de fondo que remiten a esa contraposición contemporánea. Para mostrarlo, presentaré las líneas básicas de algunos tratamientos actuales basados en estimulación eléctrica del sistema límbico. Una vez expuesto su fundamento neurofisiológico y teórico, analizaré el alcance y los límites hermenéuticos de dicha estrategia

In this paper we are moving from the analysis of the historiographical and literary aspects of the figure of Hypatia of Alexandria in order to get to the reconstruction of her personal and intellectual trajectory. We enunciate the guidelines of her thought, which we base on her methodological approach to mathematics, geometry and astronomy; on the basic beliefs of the cosmological model to which she would have given her support; and finally, on the global vision which defines her manner of philosophizing as search for theoretical unity as well as practical engagement.

The maximalist or hard version of Artificial Intelligence [hAI] revolves around an enlargement of the limits of the human which goes far beyond merely complementing our existing abilities, in order to give rise to what amounts to another species. It is based on a theoretical framework dominated by the tension between two great visions of the world which we could call ‘materialist’ and ‘humanist’. The extreme position of hAI depends on an intellectual commitment to one or another of these two visions and implies, thus, various philosophical assumptions. In this chapter – “Reach and Limits of Artificial Intelligence: from Neuroscience to Cinema” – I will discuss the scope and boundaries of hAI, using as an interface the ways it has been approached in cinema. In the first section three phases are identified in the relationship between cinema and hAI. We will then focus on both its reach and limits from the point of view of its anthropological-philosophical assumptions. In the last section, these will be exemplified in two films: A.I. Artificial Intelligence (Spielberg, 2001) and Eva (Maillo, 2011).