Peihong Xie

Realizable entities are modal properties that are realized in processes. In the top-level ontology Basic Formal Ontology (BFO), realizable entities are classified by appeal to internal and external groundedness: dispositions and functions are internally grounded, whereas roles are externally grounded. This paper introduces a meta-ontology of grounding for refining the BFO notions of groundedness. In particular, it proposes to re-characterize internal groundedness in terms of partial immediate categorical grounding. This proposed refinement resolves a function-grounding challenge facing the BFO standard realizables classification while requiring only modest adjustments to BFO. It also accommodates apparently extrinsic dispositions and physically grounded roles.

The Provenance Ontology (PROV-O) is a World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) recommended ontology used to structure data about provenance across a wide variety of domains. Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) is a top-level ontology ISO/IEC standard used to structure a wide variety of ontologies, such as the OBO Foundry ontologies and the Common Core Ontologies (CCO). To enhance interoperability between these two ontologies, their extensions, and data organized by them, a mapping methodology and set of alignments are presented according to specific criteria which prioritize semantic and logical principles. The ontology alignments are evaluated by checking their logical consistency with canonical examples of PROV-O instances and querying terms that do not satisfy the alignment criteria as formalized in SPARQL. A variety of semantic web technologies are used in support of FAIR (Findable, Accessible, Interoperable, Reusable) principles.

This paper introduces and evaluates a possible truthmaking argument for a robust conception of aboutness commitment. According to the argument, the pure aboutness-based account of truthmaking and the thesis of Truthmaker Commitment entails that a truthbearer is ontologically committed to what it is about in an appropriate sense of “aboutness”. However, this argument encounters challenges, notably an inherent explanatory circularity within the robust conception of aboutness commitment, and a radical inconsistency between its two premises in terms of their underlying motivations. To address these issues, this paper proposes a more moderate conception of aboutness commitment, drawing inspiration from B. Smith’s mixed aboutness-based account of truthmaking. According to this moderate proposal, the representationalist notion of intended aboutness, or the anti-representationalist notion of general aboutness, constrains, but does not determine, the notion of ontological commitment, which in turn contributes to a stronger notion of genuine or satisfied aboutness. This modified moderate conception not only sidesteps the explanatory circularity, but also aligns more closely with the objective of providing a fundamental ontology. Therefore, it is recommended as a fitting approach to engaging in the relation between aboutness and ontological commitment.

As a main challenge to the growing block theory (GBT), the epistemic objection is intended to show that GBT is untenable because it leads to the ignorance of the objective present. What is worse, extant solutions to this objection, the dead past view (DPV) and strong tense views (STV), are unsatisfactory on the ground that their semantic explanations of tensed statements undermine the purported semantic unity of GBT and thus make GBT collapse into a version of presentism. In contrast to extant solutions, I recommend growing blockists to adopt a new “biting the bullet” solution: They should accept the ignorance of the absolute present for the dual purpose of retaining GBT’s semantic unity and theoretical independence. Moreover, I argue that ignorance is not a big loss for growing blockists: Although they lose the so-called “Moorean common advantage” over B-theorists and include some “deeply mysterious” and epistemically inaccessible fundamental posit in their ontology, growing blockists thereby protect the semantic unity of their theory and most of ordinary knowledge about B-relations between moments of time and their temporal locations. Theory choice, in essence, is a matter of balancing benefits and costs. I believe that versions of GBT which accept the ignorance of the objective present are indeed tenable intermediate positions in the philosophical debate about the nature of time, and they deserve serious considerations of B-theorists.

This paper presents a new anti-criterialist view, Brutal Personal Identity (BPI). According to BPI, personal identity is a quasi-fundamental fact, which is metaphysically grounded in brute facts about absolutely fundamental personhood. By reversing the order of metaphysical explanation, BPI is not a form of identity mysticism as Dean Zimmerman asserts. Instead, BPI has even the potential to lay a solid foundation for developing an appropriate account of mentality and first-person perspectives. Furthermore, a comparison between BPI and soul theory is provided to show why BPI is better than its main anti-criterialist rival. This provides us a compelling reason for considering BPI in the debate over personal identity.