Peimin Ni

As one of the most influential comparative philosophers of our time, Henry Rosemont, Jr. is known for his unrelenting criticisms against Western libertarian ideas, and for advocating ideas derived from classic Confucian thought. One of the criticisms against him is that his views are one-sided, and hence unfair to Western libertarian ideas. In this paper, I argue that Rosemont’s one-sidedness is deliberate. His theory is not intended to be a balanced account. I will illustrate that Rosemont’s way of conceiving the human self is not peculiar to him, but characteristic of those who take philosophy as a way of life, such as Mencius and Sartre. I shall argue that their practices suggest a gong-fu perspective, with which we evaluate philosophical theories according to their functions in shaping people’s behaviors and with consideration of the context of their uses.

In this volume, leading scholars in Asian and comparative philosophy take the work of Joel J. Kupperman as a point of departure to consider new perspectives on Confucian ethics. Kupperman is one of the few eminent Western philosophers to have integrated Asian philosophical traditions into his thought, developing a character-based ethics synthesizing Western, Chinese, and Indian philosophies. With their focus on Confucian ethics, contributors respond, expand, and engage in critical dialogue with Kupperman’s views. Kupperman joins the conversation with responses and comments that conclude the volume.

Mencius’s theory of the gongfu (or art) to be human and live a human life is not just a part of his philosophy, but an overall approach of his philosophy. That is, the primary purpose of his philosophy is to guide people along the right path of life rather than to offer a truth-telling account of reality. Understanding this fact has implications on how Mencius should be interpreted. It resolves puzzling purported logical fallacies in the text of Mencius, and makes Mencius more coherent, intelligent, and plausible. It also implies that, although Mencius’s normative theory shares some features with other normative theories familiar to the West, such as utilitarianism, Kantian deontology, and virtue ethics, it should not be forced into any of these frameworks. The theory is distinct enough to be called a “gongfu ethics.”

Unlike typical journal articles that deal with specific issues in detail, this article offers a sketchy comprehensive re-description of the Confucian Way of family that serves the purpose of providing a bird’s-eye view to grasp the fact that, for Confucianism, family is not merely a part of the puzzle of human life, nor merely an ontological entity that serves as the foundation of the Confucian theory, but more a “Way” of living or gongfu 功夫 that comprised of values toward which cultivation of the person is practiced, an art of life to be mastered, and a model of social order to be implemented.

Unlike typical journal articles that deal with specific issues in detail, this article offers a sketchy comprehensive re-description of the Confucian Way of family that serves the purpose of providing a bird’s-eye view to grasp the fact that, for Confucianism, family is not merely a part of the puzzle of human life, nor merely an ontological entity that serves as the foundation of the Confucian theory, but more a “Way” of living or gongfu 功夫 (aka kung fu) that comprised of values toward which cultivation of the person is practiced, an art of life to be mastered, and a model of social order to be implemented.

Growing out of traumatic life experiences in youth, the author started his lifelong journey in studying and practicing philosophy during the turbulent Cultural Revolution in China. The path took him from a “secret library” in the Worker’s Union Office of a steel plant to universities in China and the US; from seeking personal healing to becoming a public intellectual; from pursuing enlightenment in western philosophies to re-discovering his own Chinese cultural heritage; and from learning to think for oneself to becoming an active scholar and formulator of a unique philosophical theory—the philosophy of the way of gongfu, or the art of life.

About 60 years ago, Tang Junyi 唐君毅, Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, and Zhang Junmai 張君勱 published “A Manifesto for a Reappraisal of Sinology and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture.” In the Manifesto, these major representatives of contemporary New Confucianism tried to rectify Westerners’ biases and reestablish Chinese people’s cultural confidence by upholding the Confucian learning of the heart-mind as the core of Chinese culture. Following the same approach, some prominent scholars today continue the effort of bringing Confucianism to a new epoch through reappropriating metaphysical theories of the heart-mind and human nature of the Zisi 子思–Mencius lineage, which flourished in the Song-Ming 宋明 period. This article critically reflects on this approach and argues that the Confucian learning of the heart-mind and human nature should not be taken so much as a mirror that reflects metaphysical reality than as a lever that directs and uplifts human vision and gongfu 功夫/工夫. In the cultural context today, revealing the gongfu nature of Confucianism can help us appreciate the real value of Confucianism as a constructive resource for global culture.

This paper tries to explore a gongfu ethics on the basis of traditional Chinese ethical theories. Used in the sense that the Song-Ming Neo-Confucians did, “gongfu” means the art of life in general and not merely the martial arts, although martial arts can be taken as a paradigm example of gongfu. The paper begins with the question “can bad guys have good gongfu,” which leads to three answers, each representing one stage of the dynamic relationship between morality and gongfu: The first is yes, since gongfu and morality belong to two different categories, i.e., the art of life and moral responsibilities. The second is no, because each moral goodness or badness corresponds to a respective gongfu virtuosity or the lack of it. The third answer is that moral persons, as long as they still have to invoke morality, are not true gongfu masters. Those who have real good gongfu transcend moral duties and become amoral. The analysis suggests a gongfu ethics that can include, but goes beyond moral goodness. The rest of the essay articulates the rich implications of this gongfu ethics by comparing it with virtue ethics, consequentialist ethics, and relativism-subjectivism.

This brief text assists students in understanding Reid's philosophy and thinking so they can more fully engage in useful, intelligent class dialogue and improve their understanding of course content. Part of the Wadsworth Notes Series,, ON REID is written by a philosopher deeply versed in the philosophy of this key thinker. Like other books in the series, this concise book offers sufficient insight into the thinking of a notable philosopher, better enabling students to engage in reading and to discuss the material in class and on paper.

Despite consistent student interest in Chinese philosophy, the author reports that American students tend to demonstrate a sense of distance from Chinese authors and texts, often exoticizing or romanticizing them. This paper describes one pedagogical strategy that proved highly effective for overcoming this cultural distance which can hinder students’ ability to engage critically or deeply with the material. The author recounts her experience of teaching a six week Chinese philosophy course to illustrate how becoming acquainted with the place and culture that gave rise to a philosophy help to render that philosophy more concrete. By being able to speak and interact with people in China (e.g. a Buddhist monk, a doctor practicing traditional Chinese medicine, etc.), the study of Chinese philosophical texts was brought to life, nuanced, and inflected by familiarization with the cultural, geographical, and political contexts of the philosophy being studied. Included in this paper are the course syllabus and one course assignment.

LIU Qingping’s criticism of Confucian teachings of filial piety, though valuable in stimulating critical attitude toward classic Confucianism, is largely based on misinterpreting Confucians as Kantians. The article tries to show that, unlike the Kantian rule-oriented ethic that provides universal ethical principles, Confucianism focuses on the process of person-making, and the teachings of classic Confucianism are more like gongfu instructions than moral principles. Looking from the gongfu perspective, Liu’s criticism becomes misdirected, if not irrelevant.

Roger Ames and David Hall’s Focusing the Falimiar makes a significant contribution to revealing the holistic and dynamic worldview entailed in the Confucian classic--the Zhongyong. Yet their emphasis on metaphysics eclipses an important dimension of the book—the “gongfu” (kungfu) instruction dimension. In this paper, the author first explains this concern by discussing Ames’ and Hall’s translation of the key terms of the book, namely “zhong,” “yong,” and “cheng.” Then he shows that their work, though falls short of revealing the gongfu dimension, has laid the groundwork for taking the further step.