Pelle Hansen

In his Convention David Lewis defined conventions as behavioural regularities instantiating proper coordination equilibria made salient by precedent and operational by this being common knowledge. While later proponents of game theoretical approaches in the study of convention have agreed on dropping Lewis’ eccentric ‘coordination’ requirement as well as that of common knowledge, they are confused as to whether conventions should be regarded as proper thereby precluding mixed equilibria. In this paper I argue that mixed equilibria may not be conventions, but also suggest that the reason for this reveals that though common knowledge is not necessary for a convention to operate, it may be utilized to identify the conventional aspect of a given practice.

It has become a truism that we live in so-called information societies where new information technologies have made information abundant. At the same time, information science has made us aware of many phenomena tied to the way we process information. This article explores a series of socio-epistemic information phenomena resulting from processes that track truth imperfectly: pluralistic ignorance, informational cascades, and belief polarization. It then couples these phenomena with the hypothesis that modern information technologies may lead to their amplification so as to give rise to what are called “infostorms.” This points to the need for studying further the exact relations between information technologies and such infostorms, as well as the ways we may design technologies to avoid being misled away from what we have good reasons to believe