Pengbo Liu

Digital duplicates (DDs), or artificial intelligence (AI) simulations of individual minds, are AI models designed to emulate real people. Depending on how they are trained, DDs can reproduce aspects or signs of a person’s psychology, values and communication style, enabling interaction with digital approximations of living, recently deceased or historical individuals. Proposed uses include education, advocacy, grief support, medical decision-­ making and the continuation of creative or personal projects. While potentially valuable, these applications also pose ethical risks such as privacy loss, misrepresentation, manipulation and the erosion of authentic human relationships. This paper argues that DDs should be treated as context-­ specific tools rather than general-­ purpose technologies. We outline a two-­ tier ethical framework grounded in considerations of harm and proportionality, supported by the values of information permission, transparency, authenticity and appropriate access. The framework unites diverse moral concerns under a single framework while allowing their relative weight to vary across domains such as medicine, education, memorialisation and entertainment. By situating ethical evaluation within a harm-­ reduction approach that is sensitive to context, we offer a practical basis for the responsible development and governance of human-emulating AI systems.

Imagine that you are given access to an AI chatbot that compellingly mimics the personality and speech of a deceased loved one. If you start having regular interactions with this “thanabot,” could this new relationship be a continuation of the relationship you had with your loved one? And could a relationship with a thanabot preserve or replicate the value of a close human relationship? To the first question, we argue that a relationship with a thanabot cannot be a true continuation of your relationship with a deceased loved one, though it might support one’s continuing bonds with the dead. To the second question, we argue that, in and of themselves, relationships with thanabots cannot benefit us as much as rewarding and healthy intimate relationships with other humans, though we explain why it is difficult to make reliable comparative generalizations about the instrumental value of these relationships.

Griefbots are chatbots modeled on the personalities of deceased individuals, designed to assist with the grieving process and, according to some, to continue relationships with loved ones after their physical passing. The essay examines the promises and perils of griefbots from a Daoist perspective. According to the Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi, death is a natural and inevitable phenomenon, a manifestation of the constant changes and transformations in the world. This approach emphasizes adaptability, flexibility, and openness to alternative ways of relating to the deceased after they are gone. Drawing on the Daoist ideas, this essay distinguishes between two importantly different ways to continue a relationship with the deceased, and correspondingly, two kinds of griefbot designs: preservational griefbots and transformational griefbots. A preservational griefbot, which aims to preserve the user’s relationship with the deceased, presents itself as the deceased individual by replicating the deceased’s personality as closely and for as long as possible. By contrast, a transformational griefbot aligns more with Zhuangist ideals and aims to facilitate the transformation of our relationship with the deceased. It helps the bereaved come to terms with their loss and move on with their lives, without abandoning their relationship with the deceased. Specifically, it facilitates this transformation in two ways: first, by helping the bereaved release themselves from their habitual ways of relating to the loved one, thereby bringing closure to their relationship in its previous form; and second, by enabling the bereaved to continue interacting with the ideas and legacies of the deceased in a new and digitally mediated way, which, in turn, reshapes and enriches the content and significance of their relationship.

Shun argues that the distinction between first and third person is ill-suited to explain the complexities of anger. In this commentary, I first argue that, while the distinction is not uniquely important in characterizing anger and its variations, it can be distinctively important in illuminating the nature and normative significance of different forms of anger. Indeed, Shun’s own characterizations of anger in the paper seem to presuppose this importance. Secondly, I show that there are two related but distinct ways in which one’s anger is ‘personally involved’: the first concerns how the offence is registered (e.g., whether it is perceived as targeting oneself), and the second concerns one’s emotional uptake of the offence. Lastly, I propose an alternative interpretation of Zhu Xi’s distinction between anger that ‘resides in things’ and anger that ‘resides in the self’, where the emphasis is not on whether anger is an appropriate response to a situation but on whether anger is properly encapsulated.

While respect for persons is fundamental to many moral and political theories, its nature and ground remain controversial. According to the standard model of respect, respect is primarily a response to certain inherent features of a person or an object. Importantly, it is in virtue of the value, status or authority of those features that respect is justified or owed. This model, however, faces many serious challenges. Drawing on the classical Confucian notion of jing, I develop an alternative model of respect, which construes respect as an expression of agent’s sense of the self and its place in the world. The emphasis is thus on the agent’s own self-conception and the corresponding attitudes and dispositions, as opposed to on inherent features of the objects of respect. To further illustrate this distinction, I contrast the traditional Kantian conception of respect for persons with the Confucian, jing-based, conception along three dimensions: the normative ground, the content, and the distribution of respect. The Kantian respect certainly has its merits, and perhaps is indispensable in some contexts, but there is much more to respect than what Kantians can offer. The Confucian conception of respect, on the other hand, has important theoretical and practical values such that it is essential to an adequate understanding of the role of respect in our moral and political life.

This paper distinguishes three major themes in the philosophy of death of the Zhuangzi. It shows that, while these themes are often intertwined in the text, they offer different outlooks on the nature of death and, correspondingly, different arguments about the significance of death and strategies for coping with death. The first sees death as a natural and inevitable part of the process of cosmic transformation that we have to accept or embrace. The second emphasizes the unity, continuity and interdependence of life and death, and advises us to appreciate death from this holistic perspective. The last strand of thought challenges our ability to know about death's nature and value. In addition, the paper reviews a few competing interpretations of the Zhuangzi in recent Anglophone literature and suggests that, first, they can be seen as attempts to articulate and develop different themes in the text, and second, they fail to offer a strong rational ground for the Zhuangist attitudes toward death, in part because they all rely on critical assumptions that are questionable or at least insufficiently defended.

The ancient Chinese text the Zhuangzi raises a mix of epistemological, psychological, and conceptual challenges against the value and usefulness of philosophical disputation. But instead of advocating the elimination of philosophy, it implicitly embraces a broader conception of philosophy, the goal of which is to engage us to reflect on our limitations, question things we take for granted, and better appreciate alternative perspectives and possibilities. Philosophy thus understood is compatible with a variety of methods and approaches: fictions, jokes, paradoxes, spiritual exercises, argument, disputation, and so on. Philosophical practices, on this view, also pave the way for an open‐minded, adaptive and flexible way of living that is at the core of the Zhuangist good life.