Per Sandin

Many thinkers endorse an idea that we humans should leave nature alone or somehow exercise restraint in our relations to nature. Among those thinkers, we find several who take a critical or pessimistic attitude to modernity and modern life in general and to technology, or some specific technologies like genetic engineering in particular. In this chapter, I take a constructive approach starting with an exploration of Albert Borgmann’s idea of focal practices. I side with Paul B. Thompson in suggesting that agricultural systems offer some potential areas for such focal practices. I argue that even highly engineered environments should contain ‘pockets of focality’ and that those may provide ‘stepping stones’ from which a system can be changed. Finally, I argue that there is room for implementing some of these elements within a context of responsible research and innovation, for instance in the form of ethics committees for food and agricultural issues.

This chapter provides an overview of how disasters have been conceived of in philosophy, starting with Plato, with focus on the analytic tradition. Philosophers have been surprisingly little concerned with disasters. Some works where philosophers, and some non-philosophers, explicitly define disasters are surveyed and discussed. Works by philosophers who have discussed philosophical issues pertaining to disasters and disaster-like situations without offering much discussion of the definition of the term are also treated. Those have mainly been ethicists, normative as well as applied, and political philosophers dealing with the Hobbesian tradition’s problems of state authority and exceptions. The use of imagined disasters in philosophical thought experiments, typically in ethics, is also discussed. The chapter concludes by offering tentative suggestions of some possible future developments in disaster philosophizing. Among them are that we might expect philosophers to devote increased attention to empirical work, for instance from behavioural science, and increased exploration of the intersection between disaster philosophizing and environmental ethics.

Citizen science (CS) has been presented as a novel form of research relevant for social concerns and global challenges. CS transforms the roles of participants to being actively involved at various stages of research processes, CS projects are dynamic, and pluralism arises when many non-professional researchers take an active involvement in research. Some argue that these elements all make existing research ethical principles and regulations ill-suited for guiding responsible CS conduct. However, while many have sought to highlight such challenges from CS, few have discussed principles per se providing the foundation for regulations. In this article we will investigate the possibilities of midlevel principlism in guiding responsible CS conduct. Principlism has the potential of accommodating many of the concerns taken to reduce the relevance of existing principles.

Citizen science (CS) is an umbrella term for research with a significant amount of contributions from volunteers. Those volunteers can occupy a hybrid role, being both ‘researcher’ and ‘subject’ at the same time. This has repercussions for questions about responsibility and credit, e.g. pertaining to the issue of authorship. In this paper, we first review some existing guidelines for authorship and their applicability to CS. Second, we assess the claim that the guidelines from the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE), known as ‘the Vancouver guidelines’, may lead to exclusion of deserving citizen scientists as authors. We maintain that the idea of including citizen scientists as authors is supported by at least two arguments: transparency and fairness. Third, we argue that it might be plausible to include groups as authors in CS. Fourth and finally, we offer a heuristic list of seven recommendations to be considered when deciding about whom to include as an author of a CS publication.

Science is supposedly meritocratic, and this means that it is important for scientists to be familiar with the mechanisms of how credit, for instance, in the form of authorship, acknowledgments, or awards, is bestowed. In citizen science – research activities in which volunteers are actively involved and where the research project and its success rely on those volunteer contributions – there are less clear guidelines and practices for awarding and valuing credit. This chapter introduces different forms of citizen science, disentangles concepts of credit, fairness, and incentives and considers their relevance in citizen science. Then some specific forms of expressing credit are discussed: prizes and awards, authorship, acknowledgments, and naming, including eponyms. Finally, some considerations to be taken into account when thinking of how to give credit in citizen science are proposed: To apply a wide conception of credit, to apply a wide conception of contributions and contributors, and to err on the side of generosity.

In this article, we defend two claims about the precautionary principle. The first is that there is no ‘core’ precautionary principle that unifies all its different versions. It is more plausible to think of the different versions as being related to each other by way of family resemblances. So although precautionary principle x may have much in common with precautionary principle y, and y with z, there is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions that unify all versions of the principle. Our second claim is that it is sometimes appropriate to think of the precautionary principle as a midlevel principle in the sense proposed by Beauchamp and Childress in their Principles of Biomedical Ethics, i.e. as a non-rigid moral principle. We argue that if the precautionary principle is conceived as a non-rigid principle that needs to be balanced against other principles before a moral verdict can be reached, then this enables us to address some standard objections to the principle.

Innovation is necessary to deal with challenges that climate change brings for agriculture, such as droughts, floods, pests and pathogens that enter new climatic regions, and challenges relating to the labour force. There is a dominant narrative that science and technology are the locus of innovation, and that the solutions developed can change systems. Indeed, history shows how the Green Revolution started a massive change in practices worldwide and gave science and technology the main role. Innovation, however, also happens outside universities or industry research. Particularly in agriculture, it happens in the field through farmers’ experimentation. This opens up the idea of who is an innovator, and it is crucial to tackling climate challenges to agriculture. In this paper, we investigate the role of curiosity as a virtue of innovators. Instead of looking at systems of innovation, or at innovations themselves, we add to the growing scholarship on virtues of innovators. Among those virtues, curiosity is prominent. We argue that different contexts require different forms of the innovator virtues, and we conceptually investigate how such virtues ought to be cultivated in order to contribute to solving 21st century challenges for agriculture.

The purpose of the present thesis is to apply philosophical methods to the ongoing debate of the precautionary principle, in order to illuminate this debate. The thesis consists of an Introduction and five papers. Paper I con-cerns an objection to the method of conceptual analysis, the Charge from Psychology. After a brief characterisation of conceptual analysis, I argue that the Charge from Psychology is misdirected. In Paper II, the method of conceptual analysis is applied to the concept of precaution which is ana-lysed in terms of precautionary actions. The purpose is explicatory. A definition involving three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions is proposed, and the implications of this analysis for the debate on the pre-cautionary principle are discussed. Paper III attempts to provide an ana-lytical apparatus which may be used for finding improved formulations of the precautionary principle. The approach is lexicographical. Several exist-ing and possible formulations of the precautionary principle are examined, and four common elements and a common structure of the precautionary principle are identified. It is suggested that the analytical apparatus pre-sented can be used in negotiations of the precautionary principle. Paper IV questions the soundness of some arguments against the precautionary prin-ciple. Five common arguments are discussed and rejected. In Paper V, two of these arguments are further discussed. I argue that an attempt at rejec-tion of the precautionary principle delivered by John Harris and Søren Holm is unwarranted, because their arguments against it are based on in-terpretations of the precautionary principle that ignore context. Paper VI deals with the idea of de minimis risk. After a discussion of the distinction between disregarding a risk and accepting it, I examine one way of deter-mining how small a risk ought to be in order to be disregarded, namely the use of natural risk levels as benchmarks. I argue that this approach fails, even if the distinction between what is natural and what is not natural can be upheld.

Opposition against greenhouse gas emissions reductions is strong among some conservative Christian groups, especially in the United States. In this paper, we identify five scripture-based arguments against greenhouse gas mitigation put forward by a core group of Christian conservatives (‘the Cornwallists'): the anti-paganism argument, the enrichment argument, the omnipotence argument, the lack of moral relevance argument and the cost-benefit argument. We evaluate to what extent the arguments express positions that can be characterised as climate science denialist and to what degree they are consistent with support for climate adaptation. Using Stefan Rahmstorf's (2004) taxonomy of climate science denial, we conclude that the Cornwallists could be labelled climate change deniers. However, their opposition is not only based on denial of climate science but often rests on premises that render the science irrelevant, a position we term ‘relevance denialism’.

Anthropocentrism—the idea that humans are the most important beings there are—comes in many guises. One version of anthropocentrism states that only humans have full moral status. Those who argue for such a position (beyond merely assuming it) usually refer to some trait that confers moral status and that only humans have. Suggestions include linguistic ability, self-awareness or rationality. However, regardless of what trait one picks it will not track the line between Homo sapiens and other species. You will always be able to find some non-human animal that possesses the trait to a greater degree than some human does— even potentially. Koplin and Wilkinson1 adopt a broadly sentientist position: moral status is conferred by some mental or cognitive function. They discuss two sources of moral uncertainty related to this. In cases of moral uncertainty of the first type, it is uncertain whether Property X confers (full) moral status. In cases of uncertainty of the second type, we assume it to be true that moral status is conferred by X, but it is uncertain whether a particular entity (such as a pig) possesses the property. There are reasons to believe …

Food is sometimes labeled as ‘100% natural’ or as containing ‘all natural ingredients’. There is however controversy on how to justify, design and implement such labelling. This paper argues that since naturalness is not one single concept, but several ones, and those concepts typically allow degrees, so that things can be more or less natural, thus, this complexity should be reflected in labelling of foods. There is no obvious way of presenting an aggregate measure of a particular food item’s naturalness, and therefore a graphical representation that contains several axes, with the degree of naturalness represented on each axis, is considered. Such a mode of representation might however be too complex to be practical, and a possible compromise would be to settle for a small number of labels that represent some common combinations of degrees of naturalness along the axes.

In risk management, de minimis risk is the idea that risks that are sufficiently small, in terms of probabilities, ought to be disregarded. In the context of the distinction between disregarding a risk and accepting it, this paper examines one suggested way of determining how small risks ought to be disregarded, specifically, the natural-occurrence view of de minimis, which has been proposed by Alvin M. Weinberg, among others. It is based on the idea that “natural” background levels of risk should be used as benchmarks and de minimis levels should be derived from those levels. This approach fails even if the doubtful distinction between what is natural and what is not can be upheld.

While in vitro animal meat is not yet commercially available, the public has already begun to form opinions of IVM as a result of news stories and events drawing attention to its development. As such, we can discern public perceptions of the ethics of IVM before its commercial release. This affords advocates of environmentally sustainable, healthy, and just diets with a unique opportunity to reflect on the social desirability of the development of IVM. This work draws upon an analysis of ethical perceptions of IVM in 814 US news blog comments related to the August 2013 tasting of the world’s first IVM hamburger. Specifically, I address three primary questions: How does the public perceive the ethics of IVM development? How acceptable is IVM to the public relative to alternative approaches to reducing animal meat consumption? and What should all of this mean for the ongoing development and promotion of IVM? Ultimately, it is argued that there is a strong need for facilitation of public dialogue around IVM, as well as further research comparing the acceptability of IVM to other alternatives

This article reviews suggestions for how ethical tools are to be evaluated and argues that the concept of ethical soundness as presented by Kaiser et al. is unhelpful. Instead, it suggests that the quality of an ethical tool is determined by how well it achieves its assigned purpose. Those are different for different tools, and the article suggests a categorization of such tools into three groups. For all ethical tools, it identifies comprehensiveness and user-friendliness as crucial. For tools that have reaching a decision in a democratic context as a main purpose, it identifies transparency, guiding users toward a decision and justification of the decision-supporting mechanism. For tools that aim to engage the public, it identifies procedural fairness as essential. It also notes that the scope of use for ethical tools is limited to the same moral community, and that this feature is frequently overlooked

This paper argues for the following four claims: the terms “natural” and “unnatural” are ambiguous. Genetically modified food is unnatural in some senses of the term “unnatural”. Natural food should be favored over unnatural food in some senses of the terms “natural” and “unnatural”. Genetically modified food is not necessarily unnatural in a sense that would offer a good reason for favoring food that is not genetically modified. The claims are defended by distinguishing four different senses of the terms “natural” and “unnatural”. Each sense is analyzed with respect to its moral relevance for food choice

Social entrepreneurship, individual activities with a social objective, is used in this study as a conceptual tool for empirically examining farmers’ participation in alternative food networks. This study verifies whether their participation is driven by the social entrepreneurship dimension to satisfy social and environmental needs. We develop a more inclusive view of how social entrepreneurship is present among farmers participating in AFNs by using a behavioural approach based on three main psychological constructs: attitude, objective, and behaviour. The empirical results show that two types of farmers participate in AFNs. One type is closer to commercial entrepreneurs; the main attitudes and objectives affecting their behaviour are oriented toward profit maximization and farm progress. The second type is closer to social entrepreneurial activity; the main objectives affecting their behaviour are oriented towards satisfying social and environmental needs. The study’s results offer implications and suggest recommendations concerning social entrepreneurial practices and the motivations of the farmers who participate in AFNs