Perry Hendricks

I consider whether the amount of evil is a problem for theism and whether the amount of evil is evidence against theism. For example, suppose we were to find out that our world contains far more evil than we currently think it does. Would that be evidence against theism? The purpose of this article is to explore this issue within the framework of skeptical theism. Ultimately, I argue that the amount of evil just does not make an evidential difference with respect to theism and atheism—or, at least, it does not make an evidential difference when the typical method is used.

Skeptical theism challenges the evidential problem of evil by arguing that human cognitive limitations prevent us from judging whether any instance of evil is truly pointless. This symposium gathers leading philosophers who explore new directions for skeptical theism. Contributions include analyses of epistemic principles like conditions of reasonable epistemic access (Graham Oppy), defenses against the common sense problem of evil (Chris Tweedt), and responses to arguments from the quantity of evil (Perry Hendricks, Justin McBrayer). Timothy Perrine refines skeptical theism through “theory versioning,” and Lydia McGrew argues for a distinctively Christian response. Together, these papers chart emerging paths for the next phase of skeptical theism research.

Say The Pro-Life View is the position that abortion involves unjustifiedly killing a fetus. And say The Anti-Factory Farming View is the position that factory farms are deeply immoral. One recent objection to The Pro-Life View is that it entails violence against abortion doctors is justified—a view that many find implausible. For the sake of argument, I don’t initially contest this claim—I grant (initially) The Pro-Life View is committed to this position. However, I argue The Anti-Factory Farming View is committed to a similar view, namely, that violence against factory farm workers is justified. Therefore, if this is a good objection to The Pro-Life View, it’s a good objection to The Anti-Factory Farm View. And if it’s not a good objection to the latter, it’s not a good objection to the former. Furthermore, I show why it isn’t crazy to think that violence against abortion doctors is only contingently wrong, and I provide an error theory for why people may think otherwise.

The world faces an organ shortage, resulting in thousands of deaths each year. By allowing organ markets, we could increase the supply of organs, thereby saving many lives and enriching many organ sellers. One defense of organ markets points out that by prohibiting them, we are taking away what would-be organ sellers regard as their best option, and we thus doom them to stay in their dire circumstances. However, we shouldn’t take away what people regard as their best option, and hence we shouldn’t prohibit organ markets. Andreas Albersen claims this argument fails because justice requires we offer would-be organ sellers an even better option. However, I show that organ markets are always the best option.

It’s been argued that horrendous evil—evil that’s so terrible it makes the sufferer’s life seem like it lacks meaning—is a problem for theism. It’s been argued that gratuitous evil—evil that isn’t required to produce (a) greater good(s) or (b) whose prevention would have resulted in an equally bad or worse evil(s)—is a problem for theism. It’s been argued that the distribution of evil is a problem for theism. And it’s been argued that undefeated evils—evils that don’t make the sufferer better on the whole—are a problem for theism. In this article, I consider a different issue. Namely, I consider whether the amount of evil is a problem for theism and whether the amount of evil is evidence against theism. For example, suppose we were to find out that our world contains far more evil than we currently think it does. Would that be evidence against theism? The purpose of this article is to explore this issue within the framework of Skeptical Theism. Ultimately, I argue that, given Skeptical Theism, the amount of evil just doesn’t make an evidential difference with respect to theism and atheism—or, at least, it doesn’t make an evidential difference when the typical method is used. While this conclusion might sound crazy, it’s nevertheless the right result.

Commonsense problems of evil claim that we have commonsense (read: phenomenal conservative) justification for thinking that there’s some kind of theistically-problematic evil in the world. These arguments are claimed to be immune to skeptical theism, since—the argument goes—commonsense justification isn’t a candidate for being undermined by skeptical theism. I show that (1) it’s dubious to think that anyone has commonsense justification for thinking there’s theistically-problematic evil in the world and (2) even if there is such justification, it’s subject to undercutting defeaters. In light of this, I construct a better commonsense problem of evil—The Commonsense Problem of Undefeated Evil—and consider its prospects. Ultimately, I argue that it fares no better than the other versions of the argument: it’s dubious to think anyone has the relevant commonsense justification and even if anyone has such justification, it’s subject to undercutting defeaters—including one that arises from the nature of transformative experience.

This chapter is exploratory: for the sake of argument, I grant that skeptical theism undermines beliefs based on divine testimony. What follows from this? Not much. This is because even if one’s beliefs based on divine testimony are undermined, she can nevertheless still respond to divine testimony with rational faith. To illustrate this, I consider recent work on the nature and rationality of faith. I show that faith in response to divine testimony can be rational even if such beliefs are undermined. Hence, the worst case scenario for skeptical theism isn’t so bad.

I consider whether skeptical theism provides us with a defeater for our commonsense beliefs. To do this, I first explain numerous kinds of defeaters: warrant defeaters, undercutting defeaters, rebutting defeaters, purely alethic defeaters, and Humean defeaters. I show that skeptical theism doesn’t threaten one’s commonsense beliefs with any of these defeaters. I also show that Christian (and perhaps Jewish and Muslim) skeptical theists can provide a strong positive case for thinking their commonsense beliefs aren’t defeated.

I consider whether skeptical theism is compatible with theodicy and natural theology. To do this, I use two theodicies as case studies and two pieces of natural theology as case studies. I show that the traditional motivation for these theodicies and pieces of natural theology are undermined by skeptical theism. However, I show that there’s a skeptical theism-friendly way of motivating them. I conclude by illustrating how to construct an argument for atheism that isn’t vulnerable to skeptical theism.

Say theism is the view that an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly loving, and perfectly good being exists. And say pointless atheism occurs just in case there’s an atheist who isn’t resistant to belief in God, and no greater good comes about on account of this atheist’s non-belief. In this article, I show that if two prominent views about evil and divine hiddenness are accepted, theism is compatible with pointless atheism—a result hitherto unnoticed. Furthermore, not only is theism compatible with pointless atheism, it entails pointless atheism. This is significant because many objections to the argument from divine hiddenness have tried to show that all instances of non-resistant atheism are required for a greater good. But if I’m right, given theism, there need not be a point to non-resistant atheism. Indeed, we should expect there to be pointless atheism.

I’ve argued that those who endorse the argument from divine hiddenness must give up all pure de jure objections to theism, and this means that endorsing the argument is costly for atheists. Benjamin Curtis claims that this isn’t a significant cost for atheists. I show that—contrary to Curtis—there is a significant cost, and spell out why this is so. Furthermore, I show that my argument functions as a new argument for affirming reformed epistemology—the view that if theism is true, belief in God is probably rational.

P-zombies are creatures that are physically (functionally, behaviourally) like you and I and yet lack phenomenal consciousness. If such creatures are possible, it’s (typically) taken to show property dualism is true: phenomenal consciousness isn’t reducible to – nor does it supervene on – physical states. If inverted qualia are possible, it’s possible that you and I have identical physical states and yet you see tomatoes as green and I see tomatoes as red. If this is the case, then (again) property dualism is (typically) taken to be true. In this article, I???ll show that p-zombies and inverted qualia – if they are actually possible – prove more than previously thought: if one thinks p-zombies or inverted qualia are possible, then one should endorse one of the four following theses: (i) substance dualism, (ii) we have even more reason to reject p-zombies and inverted qualia since they entail an even more radical conclusion than previously thought (i.e. substance dualism), (iii) eliminativism about selves, or (iv) friends of p-zombies and inverted qualia have homework: they need to show a relevant, plausible disanalogy between arguments for p-zombies and inverted qualia as traditionally stated and my parallel arguments that entail substance dualism. My purpose here isn’t to defend any of these particular options. Instead, my purpose is to highlight that these are the four options available to take.

(Wide) pro-theism is the view that the world is better overall if theism is true. (Wide) anti-theism is the view that our world would be better overall if atheism is true. Arguments for pro-theism and anti-theism typically make use of traditional theism (the view that an omni-God exists) and generic atheism (the view that an omni-God doesn’t exist). In my view, when the debate between pro-theists and anti-theists makes use of traditional theism and generic atheism, pro-theism clearly comes out on top. In this paper, I consider whether this result (i.e. pro-theism’s advantage over anti-theism) changes if we bring axiarchism into the mix: I compare axiarchistic theism and axiarchistic atheism. General axiarchism is the view that the world exists because it is good that it exists, and extreme axiarchism is the view that the world exists because it is the best possible world. When we take general axiarchistic theism and general axiarchistic atheism as our worldviews for comparison, I argue that there is no significant change with respect to anti-theism and pro-theism: neither position is able to capture goods that are traditionally associated with the other position, and so pro-theism still wins out. However, if we instead compare extreme axiarchistic atheism with extreme axiarchistic theism there is a significant change: while the case for pro-theism remains the same (because, I argue, it is not able to capture any of the goods of anti-theism), the case for anti-theism is greatly strengthened, because it is able to capture nearly all of the goods of pro-theism (e.g. the good of an afterlife, of cosmic justice, of there being no gratuitous evil). In other words, given extreme axiarchism, atheistic worlds can (and will) house goods that are traditionally associated with theistic worlds (e.g. those listed prior). This means that, given extreme axiarchism, pro-theists can’t appeal to those goods as favoring their position: they obtain whether our world is atheistic or theistic. Thus, they don’t favor pro-theism over anti-theism; the case for anti-theism has been strengthened. (Alternatively, we may say that the case for pro-theism has been weakened.) Ultimately, there is one good that extreme axiarchistic atheism does not enable anti-theism to capture—namely, God’s intrinsic unlimited goodness—and I argue that this shows that there is still a gap between pro-theism and anti-theism; while the gap has been substantially narrowed, it has not been eliminated. Thus, I suggest that the best route forward for anti-theists is to cast doubt on the view that God’s intrinsic goodness is unlimited.

Abortion restrictions are particularly good for black women—at least in the United States. This claim will likely strike many as outlandish. And numerous commentaries on abortion restrictions have suggested otherwise: many authors have lamented the effects of abortion restrictions on women, and black women in particular—these restrictions are bad for them, these authors say. However, abortion restrictions are clearly good for black women. This is because if someone is prevented from performing a morally wrong action, it’s good for her. For example, it’s good for Sarah if she’s prevented from driving home drunk. However, since abortion is morally wrong, it follows that it’s good for women when they are prevented from getting an abortion. And since black women get abortions at disproportionately high rates, abortion restrictions are good in particular for black women. Indeed, this is an example of a positive effect of intersectionality. [lightly updated in light of it being rescinded.]

Is evil evidence against the existence of God? Does divine hiddenness provide an evidential problem for theism? Is our evolutionary history evidence that God doesn’t exist? Skeptical theism is the view that humans are cognitively limited in important ways that prevent us from providing affirmative answers to these evidential questions. In this book—the first monograph published on skeptical theism—Perry Hendricks gives careful, novel, and compelling arguments in favor of skeptical theism and provides a comprehensive defense of it, addressing all major objections to skeptical theism on offer. The implications of skeptical theism are teased out: it undermines the most prominent arguments for atheism on offer, which significantly lowers the epistemic status of atheism.

In this article, I argue that sceptical theists have too narrow a focus: they consider only God’s axiological reasons, ignoring any non-axiological reasons he may have. But this is a mistake: predicting how God will act requires knowing about his reasons in general, and this requires knowing about both God’s axiological and non-axiological reasons. In light of this, I construct and defend a kind of sceptical theism—Deontological Sceptical Theism—that encompasses all of God’s reasons, and briefly illustrate how it renders irrelevant certain charges of excessive sceptical and how it evaporates equiprobability objections. Furthermore, I put forth a simple argument in favor of Deontological Sceptical Theism, which shows that everyone (at least currently) ought to endorse it.

The pelvic exam is used to assess the health of female reproductive organs and so involves digital penetration by a physician. However, it is common practice for medical students to acquire experience in administering pelvic exams by performing them on unconscious patients without prior authorization. In this article, we argue that such unauthorized pelvic exams (UPEs) are sexual assault. Our argument is simple: in any other circumstance, unauthorized digital penetration amounts to sexual assault. Since there are no morally significant differences between UPEs and other instances of digital penetration, UPEs are sexual assault. So, insofar as one is against sexual assault, one should be against UPEs.

Perry Hendricks’ impairment argument for the immorality of abortion is based on two premises: first, impairing a fetus with fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral, and second, if impairing an organism to some degree is immoral, then ceteris paribus, impairing it to a higher degree is also immoral. He calls this the impairment principle. Since abortion impairs a fetus to a higher degree than FAS, it follows from these two premises that abortion is immoral. Critics have focussed on the ceteris paribus clause of TIP, which requires that the relevant details surrounding each impairment be sufficiently similar. In this article, we show that the ceteris paribus clause is superfluous, and by replacing it with a more restrictive condition, the impairment argument is considerably strengthened. There are no data in this work.

It is often assumed that if the fetus is a person, then abortion should be illegal. Thomson1 laid the groundwork to challenge this assumption, and Boonin2 has recently argued that it is false: he argues that abortion should be legal even if the fetus is a person. In this article, I explain both Thomson’s and Boonin’s reason for thinking that abortion should be legal even if the fetus is a person. After this, I show that Thomson’s and Boonin’s argument for legalised abortion fail; they have not given us good reason for thinking abortion should be legal.1 Finally, I argue that—if we play Boonin’s game—abortion should be illegal. When discussing the ethics and politics of abortion, whether the fetus is a person is usually central.3 4.2 However, Thomson1 long ago challenged this view. She argued that abortion is permissible even if the fetus is a person. To do so, she asks us to consider a case in which you are non-consensually taken to a hospital and hooked up to a famous violinist. The violinist, if he is to survive, needs to filter his blood through your body. After 9 months, he will be fine and you can unplug yourself and go on your way. If you unplug yourself prior to this, however, he will die. Is it permissible to unplug yourself? Thomson thinks the answer is ‘yes’. And this, she thinks, shows that abortion is permissible even if the fetus is a person. While the majority of her article focuses on the ethics of abortion, it is clear that she also aims to show that abortion should be legal if the fetus is a person; she would no doubt reject the view that the state is right to coerce you into …