Peter E. Ells

Metaphysics has been rejected as nonsense by some philosophers (notably Hume and Ayer) because metaphysical systems cannot be tested empirically. This paper argues that these systems can still usefully be compared by using such criteria as: 1) Scope; 2) Not denying basic data; 3) Plausibility; 4) The minimum number of brute facts needed; 5) Engagement with and consistency with current science; 6) Lack of ‘promissory notes’; 7) Elegance and simplicity; 8) Clarity versus fudge. Berkeley’s Idealism and Physicalism (in both qualia realist and non-realist variants) are taken as examples and compared according to these criteria. Physicalism fares surprisingly poorly. It is all but inevitable that each person will possess a metaphysical system – and act upon it. If we fail to research alternatives then we are liable to assume a weak position implicitly (typically physicalism), and be reluctant to give it up.

If we reject physicalism, for the reasons given in my 2011 book ‘Panpsychism,’ we can arrive at a variant of idealism that accepts the concrete existence of all entities discoverable by science, but argues that these are nothing over and above centres of experience that can perceive one another and act on their percepts. In this metaphysical system, all physical properties and laws reduce without remainder to mental dittos – length is used in this paper as an example. Adopting this position resolves many difficulties in the philosophy of mind, including the problems of: the explanatory gap, mental causation, perception, qualia and zombies.

This work makes the case for a variant of panpsychism with an idealist metaphysic. It does not deny the concrete existence of any entities discoverable from commonplace experience or by science (such as cats, rocks, molecules and quarks), but argues that all true entities (the entire furniture of the universe) are in essence nothing over and above centres of experience that can perceive one another and act on their percepts. All physical properties and laws reduce without remainder to mental dittos. The system gives a lucid account of mental causation. The book critiques physicalism as obscure, perhaps even incoherent, and defends libertarian free will.