Peter G. Jones

In Pursuit of the Inconceivable is a compelling exploration of fundamental questions about existence, reality and the meaning of life that challenges the traditional scepticism of Western thought. It presents the evidence for a systematic, comprehensible and fundamental world-theory and places the reader in a position to judge its merits and plausibility for themselves. Peter Guy Jones explains the ongoing failure of Western philosophers to comprehend metaphysics as a consequence of not engaging with the only world-theory that survives analysis, the theory endorsed by the writers of the Indian Upanishads, the Buddha, Lao Tzu, Meister Eckhart and, many would say, Jesus and Muhammad. The findings of philosophers in the Western analytical ‘rational’ tradition are compared with the teachings of the Perennial tradition and shown to be in complete harmony. In Pursuit of the Inconceivable presents a philosophical explanation of mysticism, an apology for Abrahamic religion, a solution for all metaphysical problems and an appeal for a significant change of attitude in the academic and scientific community.

We often speak of 'Eastern' and 'Western' philosophy, yet it is not always easy to distinguish the key factors that justify this distinction. This essay explores the two very different conceptions of the continuum that underlie these traditions of thought and knowledge. The views of Hermann Weyl are given and it is proposed they are correct. Attention is drawn to the mutually-exclusive visions of the continuum that separate the philosophies of East and West, for they offer us a way of pinning down a definition of these vague geographical terms so as to give them, in at least one respect, a clear philosophical and scientific meaning.

Some time ago, in an article for the Journal of Consciousness Studies, David Chalmers challenged his peers to identify the ingredient missing from our current theories of consciousness, the absence of which prevents us from solving the 'hard' problem and forces us to make do with nonreductive theories. Here I respond to this challenge. I suggest that consciousness is a metaphysical problem and as such can be solved only within a global metaphysical theory. Such a theory would look very like the information theory proposed by Chalmers, but with the addition of an extra phenomenon that would allow it to become fundamental.