Peter Hartl

The main thesis of the book is that both vulgar religion and philosophical theism in Hume come with both negative and positive variations. The positive variant of philosophical theism is true religion. Vulgar superstition can be contrasted not only with philosophical theism but also with reformed or supervised popular religion. The essential points of this interpretation are as follows. Hume argues that philosophy, if not founded upon proper experimental methods and mitigated scepticism, could be mixed with and corrupted by vulgar religion. Hume’s criticism of religion includes an internal critique of the assumptions of early modern Christian natural theology (relying on an empiricist, Newtonian methodology), as well as, indirectly, a priori scholastic metaphysics. For Hume, religious doctrines cannot be justified by cogent philosophical arguments or scientific methodology. Hume links true religion with (true) philosophy, and his view of the ideal philosopher’s character is somewhat similar to the ideal of the ancient sceptics and stoics. True religion exemplifies true worship and the moral, intellectual virtues that institutional religion ought to manifest but, in practice, it cannot. Finally, for Hume, virtually all religions found in history have had deleterious effects, though they could have positive effects if they were moderated and regulated by philosophical criticism as well as government power. Hume’s supervised church is a religious institution constrained by the government for practical reasons and should be treated in a rather fictionalist and pragmatic manner. Hume’s conception of true religion can be taken as a genuine humanistic alternative to both various trends in early modern Christian philosophy and the radical secularist and militant atheism that culminated in the Enlightenment. It offers an intellectual and practical alternative to both materialistic atheism and traditional Christianity.

For Hume, the so-called popular superstition is a corrupted form of true religion, with the latter constituting a type of worship whose role is to regulate passions. True religion is the true adoration of God (or the first cause of the universe) because it rejects anthropomorphism, leading the philosopher to true piety. Curiosity and the love of truth are the main passions of philosophical inquiry in general, and thus of true religion (the philosophical investigation of the arguments of natural theology) in particular. Although both minimal theism and agnosticism can be linked to true religion, the chapter examines how a minimal theist interpretation of Hume’s personal view on God (indicated more clearly in his earlier writings) could be reconciled with the more agnostic tone of Philo at the end of the Dialogues. Finally, the chapter elaborates on Hume’s idea of philosophical dialogue, linking it to the conception of true religion manifested in the relation between Philo and Cleanthes. Here, Hume shows how philosophical discussions ought to be carried out—ideally in a respectful and moderated manner as in Dialogues.

His overall account in The Natural History of Religion can be encapsulated in the following theses: (1) the dialectical context and the positive remarks on philosophical theism imply its incompatibility with popular religion (including Christianity); (2) the explanation of the origin of religion is an explanation of the origin of popular religion and superstition only and thus does not apply to philosophical theism; and (3) philosophical theism has a different origin and evidential basis from popular theism, and should therefore be evaluated in the same manner as any other explanatory hypothesis. Therefore, Hume’s position should be understood as a critique of religion that has its ‘“origin in human nature’”, rather than a critique of philosophical theism, that is, a religion that has its ‘foundation in reason’.

The final chapter focuses on Hume’s sporadic but substantial positive remarks on institutional religion, mainly in The History of England. Moreover, the chapter gives a fresh look at the discussion on the public role of philosophy and the social role of religion in Section XI of the first Enquiry. The chapter reconstructs Hume’s case for a reformed or moderated popular religion. Although he rejects the view that morality needs religious doctrines as a theoretical foundation, his stance on religion as a social institution is rather pragmatic. According to Hume, the government should control institutional religion. To reduce the power of church authorities and retain some positive effects of religion for the common people, the government should institute a state church. From a philosophical perspective, such a reform of popular religion includes the fictionalism of religion and a pragmatist stance. For Hume, an achievable optimum would be that religion’s negative effects should be moderated as much as possible, while preserving its benefits. This vision is linked to his ideal of religious tolerance and the fictional-conformist attitude in ancient polytheism. The chapter concludes with a comparison of Hume’s views with early modern positions on religion and society. Hume’s approach is surprisingly non-liberal and closer to the ideas of Hobbes’s Leviathan than the classical liberalism of John Locke or Adam Smith. Hume’s position is different from both liberals, who defend religious freedom and the separation between state and church, and the radical secularists, who wanted to abolish religion altogether. The result of this reconstruction is a novel, comprehensive and nuanced picture of Hume’s interrelated ideas on religion, philosophy, morality and society.

This chapter reconstructes the main points of Hume’s criticism of the design argument and of Christian natural theology in a historical context, linked to an analysis of his concept of true and false philosophy. It outlines the historical context of his criticism: the scientific revolution, and its theological underpinnings, and the role of the design argument in early modern Christianity linked to Newtonian methodology. Hume’s argument should thus be seen as an internal critique of Newtonian natural theology: it shows that given Newtonian principles, only a very limited and religiously insignificant conclusion can be supported. Moreover, Hume criticizes philosophy when it mixes and incorporates itself with theology and religion to vindicate religious dogmas and religious authorities. Religion corrupts philosophy, and philosophy can also corrupt itself. False philosophy assumes either an incomprehensible mysticism or an implausible anthropomorphism, which is a false depiction of God that is linked to deleterious religious practices. Hume’s proposed alternative is mitigated scepticism, allied with either minimal theism or an indeterminate position on the nature of the first cause.

This chapter begins with a primary analysis of true religion and summarizes the main arguments for the positive and negative readings. Then, it explicates some general problems with the negative (ironic-insincere) reading according to which Hume was a closet atheist, ‘true religion’ has no substantial meaning and plays at most a tactical role in Hume. It analyses how an author’s intention and position could be best interpreted, and how and when we can take at face value what an author writes and apparently endorses, especially in a fictional dialogue. It shall be argued that the methodological principle (according to which Hume’s best arguments entail a non-theistic conclusion) motivating the ironic or insincere readings of Hume’s statements on theism is problematic and does not support a negative reading. There are reasons to doubt that Hume really thinks that his criticism of the design argument is incompatible with all forms of theism. Finally, the chapter points out some clues in Hume’s use of language about religion, theism and the distinction between true and vulgar religion, which indicate the sincerity of his positive remarks on both minimal theism and true religion.

Hume’s claims about theism and religion in general, as well as his apparent approval of true religion, involve various complications and ambiguities which have provoked contrasting interpretations. Alternatively to the negative reading (ironic, insincere interpretation) of Hume, the book studies and highlights the positive and constructive elements in Hume’s views on religion and theism. The book analyses Hume’s complex, sometimes underdeveloped ideas on true religion, and the relations between philosophy, religion, morality and society in his thought. For Hume, true religion is linked to philosophy, allied with minimal theism or indeterminate agnosticism—the former being the more reasonable interpretation. The book also reconstructs Hume’s views on moderated positive effects of religion in society and his proposal of how and why a state-church should be established and controlled by the government. Hume’s position is different from both liberals, who defend the separation between state and church, and the radical secularists, who wanted to abolish religion altogether. The title of this book refers to such a two-fold account by Hume: minimal theism for philosophers and a supervised church for the rest of society. The book sheds a new light on the important role of the notions of true religion in Hume and how this relates to various early modern positions on the role of religion in religion, society and philosophy.

This chapter is devoted to a discussion of arguments against the negative reading (i.e. the ironic or insincere reading) and argues for the prima facie plausibility of Hume’s sincerity on true religion. First, by analysing textual and circumstantial evidence, it shall be argued that the case for Hume’s conformism is overstated. Although he was cautious when writing about religion, it is implausible that he was completely insincere, or deliberately misrepresented his own views. Insincerity would also be incompatible with Hume’s ideal of philosophy as an essentially truth-seeking activity. Second, the ironic-atheist reading of Hume’s affirmative, theistic passages appears to be underdeveloped or unfounded, because a coherent and plausible attribution of irony to a writer requires an explanation of when and why irony is being used. Finally, the chapter critically examines David Berman’s account of theological lying. It argues that his account is not supported by historical evidence and deploys a problematic methodology. Therefore, irony and insincerity concerning theism and religion should not be taken as the default position for responding to exegetical challenge of Hume’s use of ‘true religion’ and his affirmations of (minimal) theism.

In this book, Péter Hartl offers a novel and comprehensive interpretation of David Hume’s philosophy of religion focusing on various notions of ‘true religion’ in Hume’s overall philosophy and how these ideas relate to various early modern positions on religion, society and philosophy. The account consists of both critical and positive parts of Hume’s overall, nuanced position on theoretical, social and political aspects of religion and the philosophical criticism of religion. Hartl criticises the atheist and completely negative readings of Hume’s philosophy of religion. Instead of presenting Hume’s position as either a radical secularist or closet atheist, Hartl’s interpretation builds on the underdeveloped, positive and constructive parts of Hume’s account of (true) religion. For Hume, on the one hand, true religion is compatible with or even vindicates minimal theism, and it forms part of philosophy exemplifying intellectual virtues. On the other hand, Hume has a pragmatic stance on the role of religion in society, according to which the government should control religious institutions to reduce the power of church authorities but to retain some positive social effects of religion.

This paper examines Hume’s views on the origin of religion, the priority of polytheism, and the difference between popular religion and philosophical theism in _The Natural History of Religion_ (NHR). Firstly, the paper presents Hume’s account of the origin of religion as a criticism of Christianity. For Hume, both polytheism and popular, institutional monotheism have the same origin: ignorance about natural causes and laws, an unreliable tendency to anthropomorphize, irrational hope, and fear about uncertain future events. Secondly, this paper criticizes two rival interpretative strategies: the _psychological reading_ (proposed by, among others, Emily Kelahan, Keith E. Yandell, and Richard Serjeantson) and the _destabilizing reading_ (defended by Peter Kail). Both approaches interpret Hume’s positive remarks on philosophical theism and his contrast of popular with philosophical religion as either insincere or, at best, irrelevant and inconsequential to the understanding of his position. By contrast, this paper defends a _positive reading_ according to which: (1) Hume’s positive remarks on philosophical theism should be taken in an epistemic sense, which implies the incompatibility of philosophical theism with popular religion (including Christianity); (2) his explanation of the origin of religion explains the origin of superstition only, and thus does not apply to philosophical theism. Although both theses are compatible with an agnostic reading of Hume’s position on theism, the textual and contextual evidence supports the conclusion that, in NHR, Hume took philosophical theism to be a reasonable position based on an inference from the evidence of design.

The book is arguably the first comprehensive collection of essays on Michael Polanyi’s social, political philosophy. The essays combine philosophical and historical approaches to show Polanyi’s social thought in the context of his epistemology and philosophy of science as well as the 20th century intellectual history. This volume appeals to specialists in Michael Polanyi’s philosophy, political philosophers who are interested in the 20th century political thought, mainly conservative-liberal political tradition. Furthermore it appeals to scholars focusing on the intersections between epistemology and political philosophy.

This article introduces Metaphilosophy's special issue on metatheories of disagreement, with the aim of promoting discussion on the nature of disagreement on a metatheoretical level. The contributions to this issue cover the following key topics related to disagreement: faultless disagreement, metaontological disagreement, metalinguistic disagreement, responses to peer disagreement in philosophy, hinge epistemology and deep disagreement, disagreement asymmetry, factual and nonfactual disagreement, and defining disagreement or verbal dispute. This introduction also provides general background on four major topics in order to contextualize the contributions to the special issue: first, the problem of characterizing the subject matter of disagreements; second, the most prominent accounts of deep disagreement, disagreement asymmetry and hinges; third, the notion of faultless disagreement; and finally, the problem of offering different approaches on what disagreements are.

This book addresses the complex relationship between the values of liberal democracy and the values associated with scientific research. The chapters explore how these values mutually reinforce or conflict with one another, in both historical and contemporary contexts. The contributors utilize various approaches to address this timely subject, including historical studies, philosophical analysis, and sociological case studies. The chapters cover a range of topics including academic freedom and autonomy, public control of science, the relationship between scientific pluralism and deliberative democracy, lay-expert relations in a democracy, and the threat of populism and autocracy to scientific inquiry. Taken together the essays demonstrate how democratic values and the epistemic and non-epistemic values associated with science are interconnected.

This paper critically examines David Berman's theological lying interpretation of Hume and identifies two types of theological lying: the denial of atheism strategy and the pious Christian strategy. It is argued that neither reading successfully establishes an atheist interpretation of Hume. Moreover, circumstantial evidence shows that Hume's position was different from that of the atheists of his time. Attributions theological lying to Hume, therefore, are unwarranted and should be rejected, even if we grant that this literary technique was used in the early-modern era. Analysing other non-theistic readings of Hume is beyond the scope of this paper. However, given that Berman presents one of most elaborated atheist reinterpretations of Hume's affirmative theistic passages, the failure of Berman's analysis shows that rejecting these passages should not be the default interpretive approach, and it is reasonable to attribute to Hume a weak, indeterminate theism.

U ovome radu istražujem Polanyijeve glavne argumente za akademsku slobodu. Akademska i politička sloboda međusobno su blisko povezane: ako država preuzme kontrolu nad znanošću, to dovodi do kolapsa same slobode u cijelome društvu. Njegovi argumenti protiv totalitarizma oslanjaju se na njegovu anti-pozitivističku filozofiju znanosti. On definira totalitarizam kao poricanje akademske slobode koje se temelji na pragmatičkom poimanju znanosti i instrumentalističkim interpretacijama moralnih vrijednosti. Polanyijeva ideja znanosti je duhovni, idealistički opis zajednice slobodnih intelektualaca koji su strastveno posvećeni potrazi za istinom i imaju autonomnu zajednicu s vlastitim pravilima i autonomnim upravljanjem. Potraga za istinom radi nje same je bitan cilj znanosti, koji se može postići jedino ako znanost ostane slobodna od političkih, ideoloških i ekonomskih utejcaja. Tvrdim da Polanyijevi uvidi mogu biti relevantni i danas, kada znanost može postati instrument profitno orijentiranih praktičnih potreba umjesto potrage za istinom samom i kada se humanistika često smatra nepotrebnom.In the present essay I investigate Polanyi’s main arguments for academic freedom. Academic and political freedom are closely related to each other: if state takes control over science, it will lead to the collapse of freedom itself in the whole society. His arguments against totalitarianism rely on his anti-positivist philosophy of science. He diagnoses totalitarianism as a denial of academic freedom which is based on a pragmatist view of science and instrumentalist interpretation of moral values. Polanyi’s idea of science is a spiritual, idealistic description of a community of free intellectuals who are passionately committed to seeking the truth and have an autonomous community with its own rules and autonomous direction. Seeking the truth for its own sake is the essential goal of science, which can be accomplished only if it remains free from political, ideological and economical influences. I will argue that Polanyi’s insights can still be relevant today, when science can become an instrument of profit-oriented practical needs instead of seeking the truth itself, and the humanities are often considered unnecessary.Dans cet essai, j’examine les principaux arguments de Polany pour la liberté académique. La liberté académique et politique sont étroitement liées : si l’Etat prend le contrôle de la science, cela conduira à l’effondrement de la liberté elle-même dans toute la société. Ses arguments contre le totalitarisme reposent sur sa philosophie anti-positiviste de la science. Il diagnostique le totalitarisme comme un refus de la liberté académique fondé sur une conception pragmatique de la science et une interprétation instrumentaliste des valeurs morales. L’idée de la science de Polany est une description spirituelle, idéaliste, d’une communauté d’intellectuels libres, passionnément dédiés à la recherche de la vérité, et qui ont une communauté avec ses propres règles et une direction autonome. La recherche de la vérité pour elle-même est l’objectif essentiel de la science, ce qui peut être accompli uniquement si elle demeure libre des influences politiques, idéologiques et économiques. J’affirme que les visions de Polany peuvent toujours être pertinentes aujourd’hui, alors que la science peut devenir un instrument des besoins pratiques orientés vers le profit au lieu de chercher la vérité elle-même, et alors que les sciences humaines sont souvent considérées comme inutiles.Im präsenten Artikel gehe ich Polanyis Hauptargumentation für akademische Freiheit auf den Grund. Die akademische und politische Freiheit sind miteinander nahe verwandt: Unterzieht der Staat die Wissenschaft seiner Kontrolle, endet dies im Kollaps der Freiheit selbst in der gesamten Gesellschaft. Polanyis Begründung gegen den Totalitarismus stützt sich auf dessen antipositivistische Philosophie der Wissenschaft. Er diagnostiziert den Totalitarismus als Versagung der akademischen Freiheit, die auf dem pragmatischen Blickpunkt der Wissenschaft als auch der instrumentalistischen Interpretation der Moralwerte basiert. Polanyis Wissenschaftsvorstellung ist eine spirituelle, idealistische Schilderung einer Gemeinschaft freier Intellektueller, die sich der Suche nach Wahrheit glutvoll gewogen zeigt und über eine autonome Community mit eigenen Regeln sowie autonomer Verwaltung verfügt. Die Erkundung der Wahrheit um ihrer selbst willen repräsentiert das essenzielle Vorhaben der Wissenschaft, welches sich allein unter Bewahrung ihrer Independenz von politischen, ideologischen bzw. wirtschaftlichen Einflüssen zuwege bringen lässt. Ich halte dafür, Polanyis Einblicke hätten auch heutzutage Relevanzpotenzial, zu der Zeit, wenn sich die Wissenschaft auf ein Werkzeug des profitorientierten praktischen Begehrens reduzieren könnte, anstatt nach der Wahrheit selbst zu fahnden, und die Geisteswissenschaften gehäuft als entbehrlich abgestempelt werden

This paper offers a detailed criticism of different versions of modal scepticism proposed by Van Inwagen and Hawke, and, against these views, attempts to vindicate our reliance on thought experiments in philosophy. More than one different meaning of “ modal scepticism” will be distinguished. Focusing mainly on Hawke’s more detailed view I argue that none of these versions of modal scepticism is compelling, since sceptical conclusions depend on an untenable and, perhaps, incoherent modal epistemology. With a detailed account of modal defeaters at hand I argue that Van Inwagen and Hawke’s scepticism is either groundless, or it leads to boundless and unacceptable modal scepticism. Additionally, I show that Hawke’s conception of analogical modal reasoning is problematic. Either his principle of similarity is arbitrary or it begs the question about modal scepticism. In contrast to Hawke’s restricted view of analogical modal reasoning, I present two examples of analogy-based modal justification of philosophically relevant possibility claims. My criticism of modal scepticism also shows that there is no good reason to insist on a sharp distinction between an unproblematic and a presumably dubious kind of modality. The upshot is that in absence of proper defeaters both Yablo-style conceivability and properly applied analogical reasoning are reliable guides to possibility, and also that modal justification comes in degrees. The proposed framework of defeaters of modal justification as well as the analysed examples of analogical modal reasoning trace out interesting new areas for further discussions.

Empirical examinations about cross-cultural variability of intuitions, the well-known publication of Stich and his colleagues criticiz-ing thought-experiments and intuitions in philosophical debates, is still a challenge that faces analytical philosophers, as any systematic investigation of the methodology of philosophy must give answers to these basic questions: What is intuition? What role should intuitions play in philosophy? I present and examine the sceptical argument of experimental philosophers, and claim that experimental philosophers misunderstand the role of evidence in philosophy. My argument will utilize Goldman’s view, according to which intuitions give reliable evidence about a person’s concepts, and this knowledge is valuable for further philosophical research as well. I will argue that the sceptical conclusions of experimental philosophers are harmless against this conception of philosophy, because even from a naturalist perspective certain kind of intuitive judgments about our concepts can be warranted, and this grants the specific epistemic status of intuitions. Of course, the reliability of introspection can be challenged. However, denying self-knowledge about my internal mental states is disputable – as I will show – both from a philosophical and a scientific point of view