Peter Hartman (Loyola University, Chicago): Publications

135

The Presence of the Past: Durand of St.-Pourçain and Peter of Palude on Intuitive Cognition of the Past
In Alessandro Palazzo, Francesca Bonini & Amalia Cerrito (eds.), Medieval Debates on Foreknowledge: Future Contingents, Prophecy, and Divination, Brepols. pp. 213-232. 2026.

Durand of St.-Pourçain holds that a mind (human or angelic) does not need representations or species in order to think about the world outside it. Quite the contrary, a mind can think about present things provided there are no impediments between it and those things, and whereas there are impediments that stand between embodied minds and present things outside them, there are no such impediments between angelic minds and things outside them. However, Durand’s anti-representationalism has its lim…Read more
Durand of St.-Pourçain holds that a mind (human or angelic) does not need representations or species in order to think about the world outside it. Quite the contrary, a mind can think about present things provided there are no impediments between it and those things, and whereas there are impediments that stand between embodied minds and present things outside them, there are no such impediments between angelic minds and things outside them. However, Durand’s anti-representationalism has its limits. One problem it would seem to face is what I will call the problem of the past. How does a mind think about something that is not present to it, including, of course, past things? How does the mind — human or angelic — remember? Peter of Palude raises this as a problem for Durand’s account of angelic thought. I argue that Durand’s answer is surprising: there is a sense in which past things are really present to angelic minds. The text I use to defend my reading occurs only in one version of Durand’s discussion of angelic knowledge of future contingents. Hence, I will first go over Durand’s theory about angelic knowledge of future things. I will then present Palude’s objection from the past, and what I take Durand’s answer to it to be. I will close with a few words about whether past things are also somehow really present to human minds as well.

13th/14th Century Philosophy
16

The Relation-Theory of Mental Acts
In Robert Pasnau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy Volume 7, Oxford University Press. pp. 186-211. 2019.

The relation-theory of mental acts proposes that a mental act is a kind of relative entity founded upon the mind and directed at the object of perception or thought. While most medieval philosophers recognized that there is something importantly relational about thought, they nevertheless rejected the view that mental acts are wholly relations. Rather, the dominant view was that a mental act is either in whole or part an Aristotelian quality added to the mind upon which such a relation to the ob…Read more
The relation-theory of mental acts proposes that a mental act is a kind of relative entity founded upon the mind and directed at the object of perception or thought. While most medieval philosophers recognized that there is something importantly relational about thought, they nevertheless rejected the view that mental acts are wholly relations. Rather, the dominant view was that a mental act is either in whole or part an Aristotelian quality added to the mind upon which such a relation to the object can be founded. This paper examines Durand of St.-Pourçain’s defense of the relation-theory of mental acts against two objections raised against it: the first from John Duns Scotus, among others, and the second from an anonymous Thomist and Adam Wodeham.
22

Utrum omnis notitia sit de numero bonorum, id est utrum omnis notitia sit bona
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 16-29. 2023.

Arguitur primo quod non, quia dicitur in tertio Metaphysicae quod in mathematica non est bonum neque finis.
16

Utrum sensus possit decipi circa sensibile proprium sibi
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 286-305. 2023.

Arguitur quod sic quia intellectus est multo potentioris virtutis et certioris quam sensus, sed ipse potest errare circa obiectum proprium; igitur, magis sensus. Consequentia tenet per locum a minori. Minus enim videtur quod virtus potentior et certior debeat decipi quam potentia vel virtus minus certa.
14

Utrum scientia de anima sit de numero difficillimorum
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 42-51. 2023.

Et arguitur primo quod non, quia Şillud quod per superabundantiam dicitur uni soli convenit,Ť ut dicit Aristoteles in Topicorum; ergo non sunt plura difficillima; ergo nihil est de numero eorum.
11

Utrum organum sensus communis sit in corde vel in cerebro seu in capite; nullus enim alibi ponitur illud organum
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 584-609. 2023.

Arguunt medici quod sit in cerebro et non in corde, auctoritate Galeni, Avicennae, Platonis et plurimorum aliorum, qui dicunt quod est in cerebro in eius anteriori concavitate.
20

Utrum universale nihil est aut posterius est
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 52-67. 2023.

Arguitur primo quod universale sit prius singularibus, et magis universale minus universalibus per Porphyrium qui hoc saepe dicit.
8

Utrum numerus, magnitudo, figura, motus, et quies sint sensibilia communia et per se
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 320-345. 2023.

Utrum numerus, magnitudo, figura, motus, et quies sint sensibilia communia et per se. Arguitur primo de numero quod non, quia dicitur quarto Physicorum quod non potest numerare nisi anima et non quaelibet anima sed intellectiva. Sed non potest numerare non cognoscens numerum secundum rationem secundum quam dicitur numerus.
15

Utrum omnis scientia sit de numero honorabilium
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 30-41. 2023.

Arguitur quod non, quia tunc sequeretur quod omnes scientes deberent honorari. Consequens est falsum.
16

Utrum color sit proprium obiectum visus
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 346-355. 2023.

Arguitur quod sic quia Commentator dicit quod color est visibilis sicut homo est risibilis. Et tamen etiam ponitur communiter quod homo est per se et primo risibilis.
16

Utrum subiectum proprium in scientia libri De anima sit anima vel ille terminus anima vel corpus animatum vel quoddam aliud aut nihil
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 4-15. 2023.

Et arguitur primo quod sit corpus animatum, quia operationes et passiones hic consideratae sunt compositi ex corpore et anima et non animae sine corpore nec corporis sine anima.
21

Utrum naturalissimum operum in viventibus sit generare sibi simile
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 218-237. 2023.

Et arguitur quod non quia operationes magis propriae viventibus sunt eis magis naturales quam aliae. Sed nutritio est viventi ma- gis propria, quia convenit omni viventi et etiam semper per totam vitam et nulli alteri quam viventi convenit.
20

Utrum accidentia magnam partem conferant ad cognoscendum quod quid est
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 68-83. 2023.

Et arguitur primo quod non, quia sequeretur quod esset circulatio in demonstrationibus, quod est contra Aristotelem primo Posteriorum dicentem Şcirculo quoque demonstrare est impossibile.Ť Se queretur etiam quod esset petitio principii, quod est inconveniens.
21

Utrum sit idem sonus quando ego loquor quem quilibet vestrum audit
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 368-381. 2023.

Arguitur quod non quia, cum Socrates et Plato sint separati secundum locum et situm, non est idem quod pervenit ad aurem So- cratis et ad aurem Platonis.
17

Utrum sint tantum quinque sensus exteriores
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 504-529. 2023.

Et arguitur quod sint plures, quia statim dictum est quod duplex est sensus tactus, et praeter illum sunt alii quatuor, scilicet visus, auditus, olfactus, et gustus; igitur sunt sex.
20

Utrum intellectus humanus sit forma substantialis corporis humani
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 658-673. 2023.

Arguitur quod sic, per definitionem animae datam in secundo huius quam Aristotelis dicit esse ŞcommunissimamŤ, et per conse- 5 quens ipsa convenit animae intellectivae. Ibi enim dicitur quod anima est Şactus corporisŤ, etc. Idem autem est actus et forma; ergo etc.
15

Utrum definitio animae sit bona qua dicitur anima est actus primus substantialis corporis physici organici habentis vitam in potentia
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 124-135. 2023.

Arguitur primo quod non, quia absolutum non definitur per relativum, eo quod terminus absolutus non includit in sua ratione aliquem respectivum; et tamen anima est quid absolutum et iste terminus anima est terminus absolutus, isti vero termini actus et potentia sunt termini relativi ad invicem, ut patet nono Metaphysicae.
16

Utrum odor multiplicatur realiter per medium vel spiritualiter seu intentionaliter
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 382-401. 2023.

Arguitur quod sit in medio realiter quia ex quo ipse est in medio, oportet quod sit ibi aliqua res, et hoc est esse realiter.
19

Utrum intellectus humanus possit intelligere plura simul
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 890-907. 2023.

Arguitur quod non, quia dicitur quarto Metaphysicae, Şqui non unum intelligit nihil intelligit,Ť et in Topicis dicitur, Şcontingit plura scire, unum autem solum intelligere.Ť.
19

Circa tertium librum De anima quaeritur primo utrum intellectus humanus sit virtus passiva ab intelligibili
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 632-645. 2023.

Arguitur quod non, quia omne quod patiturmovetur, licet non e converso, ut habetur primo De generatione. Et Şomne quod movetur est divisibile,Ť ut habetur sexto Physicorum. Et intellectus non est divisibilis; ergo nec movetur nec patitur.
13

Utrum in eodem animali sit eadem anima vegetativa et sensitiva
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 136-155. 2023.

Et arguitur quod non, sed quod sint formae et animae diversae, quia non possumus arguere diversitatem formarum substantialium nisi per diversitatem operationum, cum non ducamur in notitias substantiarum nisi per accidentia et proprietates earum.
8

Utrum omnis intellectio simplex sit vera
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 822-837. 2023.

Et arguitur quod non, quia si omnis conceptus simplex sit verus, sequeretur quod etiam omnis vox significativa correspondens conceptui simplici esset vera, cum non sit vera vel falsa in voce si- gnificativa vel scriptura nisi ratione verae vel falsae in mente.
14

Utrum necesse est ad sentiendum esse sensum agentem
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 266-285. 2023.

Arguitur quod sic quia sicut se habet intellectus ad intelligibilia, sic etiam sensus ad sensibilia, ut habetur tertio huius; et apparet quod sit conveniens proportio; sed ad intelligendum necesse est concurrere intellectum agentem, ut apparet tertio huius; ergo etc.
15

Utrum ad videndum colores lumen requiratur propter colorem vel propter medium
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 356-367. 2023.

Arguitur quod propter colores auctoritate Avempace et eius ratione quia colores generantur secundum aliquam participationem lu- cis vel luminis, licet extincte et obumbrate per opacum.
17

Utrum actus vel etiam habitus intellectualis sit idem quod anima intellectiva vel sit res sibi addita
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 800-821. 2023.

Propter quamdam opinionem antiquissimam et iam in istis temporibus ab aliquibus resumpta, quaeritur undecimo utrum actus vel etiam habitus intellectualis sit idem quod anima intellectiva, vel sit res sibi addita.
10

Utrum punctum monstretur vel intellegatur ut privatio
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 854-865. 2023.

Et arguitur quod non: vel punctum nihil est vel aliquid est. Si nihil est, tunc non intelligitur secundum dicta in alia quaestione. Et si aliquid est, tunc debet intelligi positive, cum omne ens sit positive, et cum si punctum est aliquid, ipsum est magnitudo, quae positive intelligitur.
14

Utrum oporteat praeter sensum communem ponere alios sensus interiores
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 560-583. 2023.

Arguitur quod sic, quia cum Aristoteles determinasset in secundo huius de sensibus exterioribus et de sensu communi, ipse conse- quenter determinavit de phantasia tamquam de alia virtute.
19

Utrum intellectus humanus sit perpetuus
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 702-717. 2023.

1. Arguitur quod non, quia sequitur quod homo esset perpetuus, quod est falsum, cum generatur et morietur.
13

Utrum species qualitatum proprie et per se sensibilium habeant in medio vel in organo instantaneam generationem et multiplicationem
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 402-489. 2023.

Et arguitur quod sic, quia sicut videmus de lumine et de spe-ciebus colorum, ita debemus imaginari de speciebus aliarum qualitatum sensibilium, vel oportet assignare causam diversitatis, quod non apparet facile.
32

Utrum tactus sit unus sensus vel plures
with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Jack Zupko

In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 490-503. 2023.

Arguitur primo quod sit unicus, scilicet in uno homine, quia ex parte animae non est plurificatus, cum sit una anima et indivisibilis. Et similiter ex parte corporis est unus, cum corpus sit unum continuum licet sit divisibile.

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Peter Hartman

The Presence of the Past: Durand of St.-Pourçain and Peter of Palude on Intuitive Cognition of the Past
In Alessandro Palazzo, Francesca Bonini & Amalia Cerrito (eds.), Medieval Debates on Foreknowledge: Future Contingents, Prophecy, and Divination, Brepols. pp. 213-232. 2026.

The Relation-Theory of Mental Acts
In Robert Pasnau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy Volume 7, Oxford University Press. pp. 186-211. 2019.

Peter Hartman

The Presence of the Past: Durand of St.-Pourçain and Peter of Palude on Intuitive Cognition of the Past In Alessandro Palazzo, Francesca Bonini & Amalia Cerrito (eds.), Medieval Debates on Foreknowledge: Future Contingents, Prophecy, and Divination, Brepols. pp. 213-232. 2026.

The Relation-Theory of Mental Acts In Robert Pasnau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy Volume 7, Oxford University Press. pp. 186-211. 2019.

The Presence of the Past: Durand of St.-Pourçain and Peter of Palude on Intuitive Cognition of the Past
In Alessandro Palazzo, Francesca Bonini & Amalia Cerrito (eds.), Medieval Debates on Foreknowledge: Future Contingents, Prophecy, and Divination, Brepols. pp. 213-232. 2026.

The Relation-Theory of Mental Acts
In Robert Pasnau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy Volume 7, Oxford University Press. pp. 186-211. 2019.