Peter Heft

The following paper attempts to look at virtual reality technologies—and the (dis)embodiment affected by them—through a phenomenological lens. Specifically, augmenting traditional discussions of virtual reality as a purely technical problem, this paper seeks to bring Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s embodied phenomenology into the discussion to try to make sense of both what body we leave behind and what body we gain as we enter virtual worlds. To do this, I look both at historical examples of virtual reality technologies and their methods of (dis)integrating the body and speculative future examples of virtual reality where the corporeal body is fully sidelined through the lens of Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body schema, noting that habituation is an ever present factor that must be considered in virtual environments. Ultimately, I conclude that even in a scenario of one-to-one mind-computer transference, the virtual world will, like the physical world we currently inhabit, solicit a ‘phantom body’ thus forcing us to act and live in accordance with a mutual interplay between self and virtual world.

Out of the gusts of creative energy following the 2013 publication of Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams’ “#Accelerate: Manifesto for an Accelerationist Politics,” the cyber-feminist collective, Laboria Cuboniks, published their own manifesto in 2015. Entitled “The Xenofeminist Manifesto: A Politics for Alienation,” Laboria Cuboniks advocated, broadly speaking, the abolition of gender, increased technological intervention into the means of re-production, and, most controversially, an affirmation of alienation as intrinsically liberatory. Met with mostly positive responses, the Xenofeminist Manifesto spawned a series of workshops, talks, and accelerationist adjacent theorizing. That being said, residual issues of humanism and an open question about what “more alienation” actually means festered just below the surface. In response to recent articles critiquing Xenofeminism as misunderstanding Marxist-Transhumanism at best, and reifying white feminism at worst, the following article seeks to do three things. First, I aim to examine the neo-humanisms (be they trans- or post-humanism) that occupy our current era of technocapital acceleration, and sketch out a critique that affirms the inhuman; Second, I attempt to trace the accelerationist lineage of Xenofeminism by looking at early Marx up to Deleuze and Guattari while noting that Xenofeminism can be read as a necessary outgrowth of accelerationism insofar as Xenofeminism seeks to deterritorialize gender as such; and Third, I aim to respond to recent critiques levied against Xenofeminism that claim its affirmation of alienation is not only a naïve mis-reading of Marx, but a reification of oppression. While certainly not the last word, I hope this article spawns deeper intellectual theorizing about Xenofeminism and its implications.

In “Logic and Conversation,” H. P. Grice posits that in conversations, we are “always-already” implying certain things about the subjects of our words while abiding by certain rules to aid in understanding. Itis my view, however, that Grice’s so-called “cooperative principle” can be analyzed under the traditional Heideggerian dichotomy of ready-to-hand and presentat-hand wherein language can be viewed as a “mere” tool that sometimes breaks. Ultimately, I contend that the likening of language to a tool allows for a more robust understanding of it and conversational failures, while ontologically recategorizing language as an object of sorts.

The Somali pirates are met with scorn and have often been oversimplified in films such as Captain Phillips. Through the critical examination of factors that led to the rise of modern piracy while synthesizing historical understandings of piracy and State sovereignty with contemporary analyses, it is possible to draw a historical comparison between the pirates of the 17th century and piratical communities today. Via a Deleuzoguattarian framework new ways of understanding the existence of the pirates are provided. From this perspective the Somali pirates are examples of nomadic peoples operating war machinically against the State.

In “Logic and Conversation,” H. P. Grice posits that in conversations, we are “always-already” implying certain things about the subjects of our words while abiding by certain rules to aid in understanding. It is my view, however, that Grice’s so-called “cooperative principle” can be analyzed under the traditional Heideggerian dichotomy of ready-to-hand and present-at-hand wherein language can be viewed as a “mere” tool that sometimes breaks. Ultimately, I contend that the likening of language to a tool allows for a more robust understanding of it and conversational failures, while ontologically recategorizing language as an object of sorts.