•  156
    On imagining what is true (and what is false)
    with Patricia Barres
    Thinking and Reasoning 9 (1). 2003.
    How do people imagine the possibilities in which an assertion would be true and the possibilities in which it would be false? We argue that the mental representation of the meanings of connectives, such as "and", "or", and "if", specify how to construct the true possibilities for simple assertions containing just a single connective. It follows that the false possibilities are constructed by inference from the true possibilities. We report converging evidence supporting this account from four ex…Read more
  •  131
    This paper describes Peirce's systems of logic diagrams, focusing on the so-called ''existential'' graphs, which are equivalent to the first-order predicate calculus. It analyses their implications for the nature of mental representations, particularly mental models with which they have many characteristics in common. The graphs are intended to be iconic, i.e., to have a structure analogous to the structure of what they represent. They have emergent logical consequences and a single graph can ca…Read more
  •  129
    The psychological puzzle of Sudoku
    with Geoffrey P. Goodwin and N. Y. Louis Lee
    Thinking and Reasoning 14 (4): 342-364. 2008.
    Sudoku puzzles, which are popular worldwide, require individuals to infer the missing digits in a 9 9 array according to the general rule that every digit from 1 to 9 must occur once in each row, in each column, and in each of the 3-by-3 boxes in the array. We present a theory of how individuals solve these puzzles. It postulates that they rely solely on pure deductions, and that they spontaneously acquire various deductive tactics, which differ in their difficulty depending on their “relational…Read more
  •  118
    Logic, Models, and Paradoxical Inferences
    with Isabel Orenes
    Mind and Language 27 (4): 357-377. 2012.
    People reject ‘paradoxical’ inferences, such as: Luisa didn't play music; therefore, if Luisa played soccer, then she didn't play music. For some theorists, they are invalid for everyday conditionals, but valid in logic. The theory of mental models implies that they are valid, but unacceptable because the conclusion refers to a possibility inconsistent with the premise. Hence, individuals should accept them if the conclusions refer only to possibilities consistent with the premises: Luisa didn't…Read more
  •  113
    The processes of inference
    with Sangeet Khemlani
    Argument and Computation 4 (1). 2013.
    (2013). The processes of inference. Argument & Computation: Vol. 4, Formal Models of Reasoning in Cognitive Psychology, pp. 4-20. doi: 10.1080/19462166.2012.674060.
  •  112
    An antidote to illusory inferences
    with Carlos Santamaria
    Thinking and Reasoning 6 (4). 2000.
    The mental model theory predicts that reasoners normally represent what is true, but not what is false. One consequence is that reasoners should make "illusory" inferences, which are compelling but invalid. Three experiments confirmed the existence of such illusions based on disjunctions of disjunctions. They also established a successful antidote to them: Reasoners are much less likely to succumb to illusions if the inferences concern disjunctions of physical objects (alternative newspaper adve…Read more
  •  108
    Descriptions and discourse models
    with A. Garnham
    Linguistics and Philosophy 3 (3). 1979.
    This paper argues that mental models of discourse are key in any theory of the interpretation of definite descriptions. It considers both referential and attributive uses of such descriptions, in the sense introduced by Donnellan
  •  69
    How falsity dispels fallacies
    with Mary R. Newsome
    Thinking and Reasoning 12 (2). 2006.
    From certain sorts of premise, individuals reliably infer invalid conclusions. Two Experiments investigated a possible cause for these illusory inference: Reasoners fail to think about what is false. In Experiment 1, 24 undergraduates drew illusory and control inferences from premises based on exclusive disjunctions (“or else”). In one block, participants were instructed to falsify the premises of each illusory and control inference before making the inference. In the other block, participants d…Read more
  •  62
    Syllogistic inference
    with Bruno G. Bara
    Cognition 16 (1): 1-61. 1984.
    This paper reviews current psychological theories of syllogistic inference and establishes that despite their various merits they all contain deficiencies as theories of performance. It presents the results of two experiments, one using syllogisms and the other using three-term series problems, designed to elucidate how the arrangement of terms within the premises affects performance. These data are used in the construction of a theory based on the hypothesis that reasoners construct mental mode…Read more
  •  62
    The nature and limits of human understanding (edited book)
    T & T Clark. 2003.
    This book is an exploration of human understanding, from the perspectives of psychology, philosophy, biology and theology. The six contributors are among the most internationally eminent in their fields. Though scholarly, the writing is non-technical. No background in psychology, philosophy or theology is presumed. No other interdisciplinary work has undertaken to explore the nature of human understanding. This book is unique, and highly significant for anyone interested in or concerned about th…Read more
  •  61
    Does everyone love everyone? The psychology of iterative reasoning
    with Paolo Cherubini
    Thinking and Reasoning 10 (1). 2004.
    When a quantified premise such as: Everyone loves anyone who loves someone, occurs with a premise such as: Anne loves Beth, it follows immediately that everyone loves Anne. It also follows that Carol loves Diane, where these two individuals are in the domain of discourse. According to the theory of mental models, this inference requires the quantified premise to be used again to update a model of specific individuals. The paper reports four experiments examining such iterative inferences. Experi…Read more
  •  60
    Believability and syllogistic reasoning
    with Jane Oakhill and Alan Garnham
    Cognition 31 (2): 117-140. 1989.
    In this paper we investigate the locus of believability effects in syllogistic reasoning. We identify three points in the reasoning process at which such effects could occur: the initial interpretation of premises, the examination of alternative representations of them (in all of which any valid conclusion must be true), and the “filtering” of putative conclusions. The effect of beliefs at the first of these loci is well established. In this paper we report three experiments that examine whether…Read more
  •  56
    Referential continuity and the coherence of discourse
    with Alan Garnham and Jane Oakhill
    Cognition 11 (1): 29-46. 1982.
    Two experiments were carried out to investigate the role of referential continuity in understanding discourse. In experiment 1, a group of university students listened to stories and descriptive passages presented in three different versions: the original passages, versions in which the sentences occured in a random order, and randomised versions in which referential continuity had been restored primarily by replacing pronouns and other terms with fuller and more appropriate noun phrases. The or…Read more
  •  52
    Transitive and pseudo-transitive inferences
    with Geoffrey P. Goodwin
    Cognition 108 (2): 320-352. 2008.
  •  52
    Illusions of consistency in quantified assertions
    with Niklas Kunze, Sangeet Khemlani, and Max Lotstein
    In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Cognitive Science Society. 2010.
  •  48
    The Truth of Conditional Assertions
    with Geoffrey P. Goodwin
    Cognitive Science 42 (8): 2502-2533. 2018.
    Given a basic conditional of the form, If A then C, individuals usually list three cases as possible: A and C, not‐A and not‐C, not‐A and C. This result corroborates the theory of mental models. By contrast, individuals often judge that the conditional is true only in the case of A and C, and that cases of not‐A are irrelevant to its truth or falsity. This result corroborates other theories of conditionals. To resolve the discrepancy, we devised two new tasks: the “collective” truth task, in whi…Read more
  •  47
    The Relation Between Factual and Counterfactual Conditionals
    with Ana Cristina Quelhas and Célia Rasga
    Cognitive Science 42 (7): 2205-2228. 2018.
  •  47
    The Analytic Truth and Falsity of Disjunctions
    with Ana Cristina Quelhas and Célia Rasga
    Cognitive Science 43 (9). 2019.
  •  42
    Possibilities as the foundation of reasoning
    with Marco Ragni
    Cognition 193 (C): 103950. 2019.
  •  39
    Models of Possibilities Instead of Logic as the Basis of Human Reasoning
    with Ruth M. J. Byrne and Sangeet S. Khemlani
    Minds and Machines 34 (3): 1-22. 2024.
    The theory of mental models and its computer implementations have led to crucial experiments showing that no standard logic—the sentential calculus and all logics that include it—can underlie human reasoning. The theory replaces the logical concept of validity (the conclusion is true in all cases in which the premises are true) with necessity (conclusions describe no more than possibilities to which the premises refer). Many inferences are both necessary and valid. But experiments show that indi…Read more
  •  38
    Illusions in Reasoning
    with Sangeet S. Khemlani
    Minds and Machines 27 (1): 11-35. 2017.
    Some philosophers argue that the principles of human reasoning are impeccable, and that mistakes are no more than momentary lapses in “information processing”. This article makes a case to the contrary. It shows that human reasoners commit systematic fallacies. The theory of mental models predicts these errors. It postulates that individuals construct mental models of the possibilities to which the premises of an inference refer. But, their models usually represent what is true in a possibility,…Read more
  •  34
    Reasoning From Inconsistency to Consistency
    with Vittorio Girotto and Paolo Legrenzi
    Psychological Review 111 (3): 640-661. 2004.
  •  34
    A hyper-emotion theory of psychological illnesses
    with Francesco Mancini and Amelia Gangemi
    Psychological Review 113 (4): 822-841. 2006.
  •  33
    Strategies in sentential reasoning
    with Jean-Baptiste Van der Henst and Yingrui Yang
    Cognitive Science 26 (4): 425-468. 2002.
    Four experiments examined the strategies that individuals develop in sentential reasoning. They led to the discovery of five different strategies. According to the theory proposed in the paper, each of the strategies depends on component tactics, which all normal adults possess, and which are based on mental models. Reasoners vary their use of tactics in ways that have no deterministic account. This variation leads different individuals to assemble different strategies, which include the constru…Read more