The thesis develops a naturalist theory of phenomenal consciousness. The argument proceeds in three broad steps. The first consists in a defense of a representationalist view of consciousness. The second part argues that the relevant form of mental representation can be explained in terms of the predictive processing approach to brain function. The final part consists in an attack on metaphysical realism inspired by Bayesian approaches to cognition and a discussion of the implications of metaphy…
Read moreThe thesis develops a naturalist theory of phenomenal consciousness. The argument proceeds in three broad steps. The first consists in a defense of a representationalist view of consciousness. The second part argues that the relevant form of mental representation can be explained in terms of the predictive processing approach to brain function. The final part consists in an attack on metaphysical realism inspired by Bayesian approaches to cognition and a discussion of the implications of metaphysical anti-realism for the hard problem of consciousness.
